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ntra-corporate dissension between shareholders in a close corporation
that can lead to serious deadlock, corporate paralysis and attempted
squeeze-outs or other oppressive action is well documented.' The purpose
* David H. Means Professor of Law, University of South Carolina School of Law. A.B.
1961, J.D. 1964, Duke University. I am indebted to my colleagues Professor Gregory B.
Adams and James R. Burkhard and to G. Marcus Knight, Esquire of Nexsen Pruet Jacobs
and Pollard of Columbia, S.C. for their thoughtful comments on an earlier draft of this
Article. The research assistance provided by Elizabeth Baron is also gratefully acknowl-
edged.
' See O'Neal, Oppression of Minority Shareholders: Protecting Minority Rights, 35
CLEV. ST. L. REV. 121 (1986). See generally F.H. O'NEAL & R. THOMPSON, O'NEAL'S OPPRESSION
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of this article is to discuss the available remedies for dealing with this
dissension, placing particular emphasis on involuntary dissolution suits,
since historically such suits have been the most common litigation
remedy used by aggrieved shareholders. The basic conclusion reached is
that for the most part judges have done a commendable job of balancing
the expectation interests of minority shareholders against the inherent
voting and management rights of majority shareholders, and of fashion-
ing appropriate and innovative remedies to deal with oppression and
other wrongful conduct. A second major conclusion is that statutory
provisions which specifically authorize relief other than dissolution
greatly enhance the probability that a judge will order an effective
remedy in close corporation dissension litigation.
I. BACKGROUND
A number of close corporation contractual and quasi-judicial statutory
dispute resolution devices are potentially available. There are three basic
types: (1) those that bring in an outside party to attempt a resolution of
the dispute-a provisional director, custodial receiver, or arbitrator; (2) a
buy-out agreement triggered by deadlock; and (3) a special right of
dissolution.
A. Third Party Devices
1. PROVISIONAL DIRECTOR
The basic concept behind the use of a provisional director is to have a
third party temporarily act as a tie-breaker. 2 Consequently, it is an
appropriate remedy only in those situations where the board of directors
is evenly divided. It will not be effective if the vote of the provisional
director cannot be determinative of the outcome on the particular issue or
issues that triggered his or her appointment. For example, assume a case
where the applicable state statute or contractual agreement among the
shareholders requires a two-thirds vote for approval of a proposed merger
or other fundamental corporate structural change, and a corporation has
four directors who vote 2-2 on the issue in question. Even if the
provisional director votes in favor of the proposed action, it will not pass
OF MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS (2d ed. 1985)[hereinafter O'NEAL'S OPPRESSION OF MINORITY
SHAREHOLDERS]; F.H. O'NEAL & J. DERWIN, ExPuSION OR OPPRESSION OF BUSINESS ASSOCIATES-
"SQUEEZEOUTS" IN SMALL ENTERPRISES (1961).
2 See H. HAYNSWORTH, ORGANIZING A SMALL BUSINESS ENTITY, § 5.03(b)(1)(1986)[herein-
after ORGANIZING A SMALL BUSINESS ENTrTY]; Note, Alternative Remedies to Dissolution Under
the 1983 Illinois Business Corporation Act, 1985 U. ILL. L. REV. 709, 715-23 [hereinafter
Alternative Remedies].
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because three out of five votes is only sixty percent. 3 Moreover, a
provisional director can only break a deadlock on issues decided exclu-
sively by the board of directors and is therefore not effective on any issue
where approval by the shareholders is required, and the shareholders are
deadlocked. In addition, if the dissension among the shareholders is
protracted and deep-seated, as is often the case, the use of a provisional
director may at best merely postpone for a short time a more permanent
resolution of the underlying problems. 4 Finally, because a provisional
director will be operating in an atmosphere similar to a lawyer who tries
to represent both spouses in a marital breakup, it may be difficult to find
anyone willing to assume this role even with liberal compensation and a
strong indemnification agreement.
In spite of these drawbacks, a provisional director can be potentially
helpful where dissolution is not inevitable. This device is less intrusive on
management prerogatives and is also not as likely to have an adverse
effect on the corporation's credit or public image as would the appoint-
ment of a custodian, discussed below.5
According to one recent article, fourteen states currently have special
statutory provisions authorizing the court appointment of provisional
directors.6 Many of these statutes, however, have major defects. The
Georgia statute, 7 for example, requires a petition by one-half of the
directors, or holders of at least one-third of the shares, and authorizes
removal of any court-appointed provisional director by majority vote of
the shareholders. These requirements artificially limit the circumstances
in which a minority shareholder will be able to file a petition for the
appointment of a provisional director. Further, if a provisional director is
appointed by a court, the majority shareholders may dismiss him at any
time without court approval.
Contractual agreements between the shareholders liberalizing the
statutory scheme may be used to overcome these statutory deficiencies.8
Moreover, in a state having no specific statutory authorization, a provi-
' The use of more than one provisional director will resolve this problem, assuming
they vote the same way. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:12-7(3)(West Supp. 1986)(specific authori-
zation for appointment of more than one provisional director).
' See, e.g., In re O'Brien Machinery, Inc., 224 Cal. App. 2d 563, 36 Cal. Rptr. 782
(1964)(provisional director petitioned court to be relieved after one year in office).
See In re Jamison Steel Corp., 158 Cal. App. 2d 27, 322 P.2d 246 (1958).
See Alternative Remedies at 715. There are two basic types of statutes: (1) those that
include specific provisions for a provisional director as part of an involuntary dissolution
statute (see, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 32, § 12.55(a)(1), (b)(Smith-Hurd 1985); and (2) those
that are not directly tied to involuntary dissolution or any other statutory remedy (see, e.g.,
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 353 (1983)).
GA. Coos ANN. § 14-2-142 (1982).
8 For example, any shareholder could be given the right to file a petition for a
provisional director in the event of a deadlock.
1987]
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sion for appointing, compensating, and removing a provisional director
without court approval may be included in the articles of incorporation,
or as part of a shareholder voting agreement. 9
2. CUSTODIAL RECEIVER
At least eleven states10 have statutes specifically authorizing courts to
appoint custodial receivers. Such receivers have full power to run all
aspects of a deadlocked corporation as a going concern until further order
of the appointing court." Because a custodian in effect temporarily
replaces the board of directors and all officers, he or she has significantly
more power than a provisional director. This is the reason why the
appointment of a custodian is generally considered a more radical remedy
than the appointment of a provisional director.
1 2
The custodial receiver remedy seems to work best in situations where
the holders of the majority of voting shares have engaged in fraudulent or
self-serving transactions, or other serious high-handed or oppressive
conduct towards the minority shareholders, even though the corporation
is profitable and dissolution is not likely.1 3 A major problem created by
the appointment of a custodial receiver is the potential negative impact
on the corporation's credit standing and public image. Creditors and the
public may not perceive the difference between a custodian and a
liquidating receiver or a bankruptcy trustee.1
4
9 Cf. Lehrman v. Cohen, 42 Del. Ch. 222, 222 A.2d 800 (1966)(special class of stock
whose only purpose was to elect an impartial provisional director),
10 See Alternative Remedies at 723. Like the provisional director statutes, some of the
custodian provisions are included as part of the involuntary dissolution statutory scheme
(see, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 32, § 12.55(a)(2), (c) (Smith-Hurd 1985)) while others are not
directly tied to involuntary dissolution or any other remedy (see, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8,
§ 226, 352 (1983)). In states that do not have specific statutory authorization for a custodian
(and even in those that do), it may be possible to establish the procedures for appointing and
removing a custodian in a shareholders agreement or in the articles of incorporation or
by-laws. This technique avoids the time delay and notoriety of a judicial proceeding. See
infra note 14 and accompanying text.
" Preservation of the business as a going concern as opposed to liquidation is the
principal distinction between a custodian and a liquidating receiver.
12 See generally Organizing a Small Business Entity, supra note 2, § 5.03(b)(3); Note,
supra note 2, at 723-30.
"3 See, e.g., ARC Mfg. Co. v. Konard, 321 Pa. Super. 72, 467 A.2d 1133 (1983);
Wilderman v. Wilderman, 315 A.2d 610 (Del. Ch. 1974). Cf. Mayhue v. Mayhue, 336 Pa.
Super 188, 485 A.2d 494 (1984)(divorce court has inherent equitable power to appoint a
custodian receiver to prevent a husband from improperly siphoning off assets from a
corporation in which his wife claims a marital interest).
14 Some courts have appointed a "special fiscal agent" with specific financial powers as
a means of attempting to avoid the potential stigma attached to a custodian. See Holi-Rest,
Inc. v. Treloar, 217 N.W.2d 517 (Iowa 1974); Roach v. Marguilies, 42 N.J. Super. 243, 126
A.2d 45 (1956).
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3. ARBITRATION
The use of arbitration as a means of resolving intra-corporate dissen-
sion in closely held corporations has increased substantially in recent
years. 15 A majority of states will enforce binding arbitration agree-
ments;16 and even in states that do not, courts will, as a general rule,
enforce a contractual provision requiring arbitration as a prerequisite to
filing a court action on a particular dispute.' 7
Arbitration proceedings are generally less time-consuming and less
expensive than ordinary litigation. The ability to choose as arbitrators
persons who have expertise in the particular type of dispute also makes
arbitration attractive as a close corporation dispute resolution device. On
the other hand, arbitration often results either in the substitution of the
judgment of one or more third parties for that of the managing share-
holders or in a compromise solution that is unsatisfactory to both sides. It
seems to work best as a technique to resolve disputes involving essen-
tially factual issues such as the value of the corporation's stock, or
whether a particular salary increase was justified. It is less successful
when used in an attempt to resolve deep-seated management policy
disputes.18 Nevertheless, even if it fails to resolve a particular dispute,
arbitration at least provides a cooling-off period. 19
B. A Buy-Out Agreement
The illiquidity of close corporation stock is not only a major cause of
intra-shareholder dissension, but it also contributes to the difficulty of
remedying dissension once it occurs. 20 This is the reason that a buy-out
"5 See generally F.H. O'NEAL, CLOSE CORPORATIONS §§ 9.08-9.25 (2d ed. 1971)[hereinafter
O'NEAL, CLOSE CORPORATIxONS]; Note, Mandatory Arbitration as a Remedy for Intra-Close
Corporation Disputes, 56 VA. L. REv. 271 (1970).
16 See G. WILNER, DOMKE ON COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION § 4.01 (rev. ed. 1984). At least
twenty-five states and the District of Columbia have adopted the Uniform Arbitration Act,
which specifically authorizes binding arbitration. See 7 U.L.A. 1 (Supp. 1986).
"7 See, e.g., F.J. Siller and Co. v. Hart, 400 Mich. 578, 255 N.W.2d 347 (1977). See
generally DOMKE ON COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, supra note 16, § 19:05.
" In effect, arbitration provides a losing party with a second chance to win. In some
cases, this can be beneficial to minority shareholders. However, if, because of a veto power,
the minority prevails on the issue in controversy when it is brought before the board of
directors or shareholders, the majority can use arbitration as a potential means of negating
the contractual veto powers given to the minority through class voting rights,
supermajority voting rights, and other control distribution devices. These risks must be
taken into account when advising clients on the advantages and disadvantages of arbitra-
tion.
19 See ORGANIZING A SMALL BUSINESS ENTITY, supra note 2 at § 5:03(b)(3) for arbitration
clause drafting guidelines.
" A high percentage of close corporation litigation involves shareholders who are
voluntarily or involuntarily inactive, estates of deceased shareholders, and heirs and
1987]
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agreement can be a very effective dispute resolution device. The biggest
drawback to a buy-out agreement, however, is the potential financial
burden on the corporation and its shareholders. If the corporation
declines to purchase the shares or for legal reasons cannot purchase the
shares in question, the burden then falls upon the non-purchasing
shareholders.
There are several types of buy-out arrangements that have been
suggested as solutions for dissension and deadlock.21 In addition to cost
considerations, all of them have other serious limitations. Perhaps the
most widely used type is a buy-sell shoot-out agreement under which a
shareholder has the right to offer to buy out the remaining shareholder
or shareholders, who in turn must agree to sell to the offeror or to
purchase the offeror's stock on the same terms and conditions as the
offer. The biggest danger presented by this type of an agreement is the
possibility that the shareholder who triggers the buy-sell offer may end
up being bought out even though he or she genuinely wants to be the
purchaser.22
C. Special Rights of Dissolution
Most state business corporation statutes require at least a majority
vote to approve a voluntary dissolution. In recent years, several states
have enacted statutes granting minority shareholders a right to force
dissolution in much the same way general partners may in a partnership.
Generally, such statutes allow one or more minority shareholders the
right to dissolve a corporation under circumstances specified in the
articles of incorporation. 23 Even in states having no equivalent statute, it
is probably possible to create such a right indirectly through a share-
holder voting agreement requiring all the shareholders to vote in favor of
dissolution under circumstances specified in the agreement.24
The most significant disadvantage of this device is the enhanced
bargaining position it gives to the minority shareholders who can trigger
the dissolution. In other words, it can create the possibility of minority
tyranny. For this and other reasons, a special dissolution right is often
legatees of founding shareholders. See O'NEAL'S OPPRESSION OF MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS, supra
note 1 at §§ 2:03, :04.
21 See ORGANIZING A SMALL BusiNEss ENTITY, supra note 2, § 5.03(c).
22 This is exactly what occurred in the recent case of Fender v. Prescott, 101 A.D.2d 418,
476 N.Y.S.2d 128 (1984), affd on other grounds, 64 N.Y.2d 1077, 479 N.E.2d 225, 489
N.Y.S.2d 880 (1985).
23 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 355 (1983). Analogizing a close corporation to a
partnership is theoretically questionable in several respects. See infra note 289.
24 See American Bank & Trust Co. v. Lied, 487 Pa. 333, 409 A.2d 377 (1979); Wolf v.
Arant, 88 Ga. Ap. 568, 77 S.E.2d 116 (1953).
[Vol. 35:25
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coupled with a first refusal purchase option on the part of the remaining
shareholders. 2
5
D. Summary
All too frequently neither the shareholders nor their attorneys seri-
ously consider the possibility of dissension at the time a close corporation
is organized. Consequently, none of the devices discussed in this section
is incorporated into the corporation's articles of incorporation or a
shareholder agreement; or, in the case of statutory dispute resolution
remedies, the prerequisites to invoke them cannot be met when serious
dissension arises. 26 Moreover, even if one of these remedies is available,
it may not resolve the underlying causes of the disputes between the
shareholders on a long-term basis. If the dissension cannot be resolved
voluntarily, litigation of some type is likely to ensue. The next three parts
explore the litigation alternatives.
II. INVOLUNTARY DISSOLUTION SUITS-GENERAL PRINCIPLES
AND EXISTING STATUTES
The traditional general rule is that in the absence of statutory
authority, a court does not have the power to force a dissolution of a
profitable corporation at the request of a shareholder.2 7 Even where
statutory authority exists, courts have generally followed a strict con-
struction principle and have construed the statutes narrowly in recogni-
tion of the drastic effects of dissolution and the potential unfairness to the
majority shareholders who, if the corporation is dissolved, are deprived of
their inherent control rights as well as the going concern value of the
business. 28
25 See CON. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-384(g) (West 1960)(statutory buy-out right by majority
where minority have special rights of dissolution). Even with this limitation, a special right
of dissolution, in effect, gives the minority shareholders having this right, a "put," which
can create a severe potential financial strain on the corporation and remaining sharehold-
ers. See ORGANIZING A SMALL BUSINESS ENrrY, supra note 2 at § 5.03(d).
26 See supra note 23 and accompanying text (provision in articles of incorporation
necessary for special right of dissolution).
21 See O'NEAL, CLOSE CORPORATIONS, supra note 15, § 9.27; J. TINGLE, THE SToCKHOLDER'S
REMEDY OF CORPORATE DISSOLUTION 20-52 (1959)[hereinafter cited as TINGLE].
21 See Israels, The Sacred Cow of Corporate Existence: Problems of Deadlock and
Dissolution, 19 U. CHI. L. REV. 778, 781-85 (1952); Chayes, Madam Wagner and the Close
Corporation, 73 HARV. L. REv. 1532, 1545-49 (1960); Pachman, Divorce Corporate Style:
Dissention Oppression and Commercial Morality, 10 SETON HALL L. REV. 315, 330-32 (1979);
see generally TINGLE, supra note 27. Cf. Belcher v. Birmingham Trust Nat'l Bank, 348 F.
Supp. 61, 147-53 (N.D. Ala. 1968)(corporation had over 300 employees); In re Random &
Neidorff, 307 N.Y. 1, 7, 119 N.E.2d 563, 565 (1954)(involuntary dissolution constitutes
"judicially imposed death"); Delaney v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 278 Or. 305, 546 P.2d 277,
1987]
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Every state now has a statute that authorizes involuntary dissolution
in one or more circumstances. 29 These statutes vary considerably, how-
ever, and a few states have statutes that are so narrowly drawn that they
are virtually useless as an effective device to resolve close corporation
intra-shareholder dissension.3 0
288 (1977)(dissolution would hurt minority as well as majority shareholders), affd !rev'd]
on other grounds, 42 Or. App. 379, 601 P.2d 475 (1979); Capitol Toyota, Inc. v. Gervin, 381
So. 2d 1038, 1039 (Miss. 1980)(dissolution under the circumstances would constitute
oppression of the majority by the minority).
In many cases, the only available purchaser of the assets, if the corporation is dissolved,
will be the majority shareholders. If the majority shareholders are guilty of wrongdoing, a
court ordered dissolution in this situation, in effect, ends up indirectly rewarding them for
their malfeasance. This possibility has been discussed in some cases. See, e.g., Wollman v.
Litman, 35 A.D.2d 935, 316 N.Y.S.2d 526 (1970). Cf. In re Wiedy's Furniture Clearance
Center, Co., 108 A.D.2d 81, 487 N.Y.S.2d 901 (1985). The majority shareholders may even
be able to avoid any adverse tax consequences in the liquidation- repurchase situation. See
I.R.C. § 368(a)(1)(C)(1982).
29 ALA. CODE § 10-2A-195, -196 (1980); ALASKA STAT. § 10.05.540, .555 (1985); ARiz. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 10-097, -098 (1977)(and for electing close corporations §§ 10-215, -216); ARK.
STAT. ANN. § 64-908 (1980); CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 1800-1808, 2000, 2001, (West 1977 & 1986
Supp.); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 7-8-113, -116 (1973 & 1985 Supp.); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§§ 33-382 to -387, (West 1960 & 1986 Supp.); DsL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 273 (1983); D.C. CODE
ANN. § 29-419 (1981); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 607.274, .277 (West 1977); GA. CODE ANN.
§§ 14-2-286, 287 (1982); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 416-128, -131, -132 (1976 & 1984 Supp.); IDAHO
CODE §§ 30-1-97, -98 (1980 & 1986 Supp.); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 32 §§ 12.50, .55, .60
(Smith-Hurd 1985 Replacement Vol.)(and for electing close corporations, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch.
32 § 1214 (Smith-Hurd 1985 Supp.)); IND. CODE § 23-1-7-3 (1984); IOWA CODE ANN. § 496A.94
(West 1962 & 1986 Supp.); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-6804, -6812, -6813 (1981); Ky. REV. STAT.
§§ 271A.470, .475, .480 (1983); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:143 (West 1969 & Supp. 1986); ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 13A § 1111. 1115 (1981); MD. CORPS. & ASS'NS CODE ANN. § 3-413 (1974
& 1984 Supp.)(and for electing close corporations § 4-602, -603); MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.
156B § 99, 101 (Michie/Law. Co-op 1970 & 1985 Supp.); MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 450.1825
(1973); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 302A.751, -. 753 (West 1985); Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 79-3-187, -195,
-203 (1973), Mo. ANN. STAT. § 351.485 (Vernon 1966 & Supp. 1986); MONT. CODE ANN.
§§ 35-1-921, -922 (1984); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 21-2096 to -20103 (1983); NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 78.630 (1985); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 293-A:95 (Supp. 1985); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:12-7
(West 1986 Supp.); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 53-16-16 (Supp. 1986); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW §§ 1104,
1104-a, 1111, 1118 (McKinney 1986); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 55-125 to -127 (1982); N.D. CENT.
CODE §§ 10-19.1-115, -116 (1985); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.91 (Page 1985); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 18, §§ 1.195 to -. 197 (1986); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 57.595, -. 600 (1985); PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 15,§§ 2107,2108 (Purdon 1967 & Supp. 1986); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 7-1.1-90, -90.1, -91 (1985);
S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 33-21-150 to -160 (Lawyers Co-op Supp. 1985); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
§ 47-7-34 (1980); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 48-1-1008, -1009 (1984); TEx. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art.
7.05, .06 (Vernon 1980)(and for electing Close Corporations art. 12.5 to .54 (Vernon Supp.
1986)); UTAH CODE ANN. § 16-10-89, -91, -92 (1986 Supp.); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 2067
(1984); VA. CODE § 13.1-909 (Supp. 1986); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 23A.28, .70, .180 (1969 &
Supp. 1986); W. VA. CODE §§ 31-1-41, -134 (1982); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 18.771 (West Supp. 1957
& 1985)(and for electing close corporations § 180.995 (1985 Supp.)); Wvo. STAT. §§ 17-1-614,
-615 (1977 & 1986 Supp.).
o See the discussion of the Massachusetts and Ohio involuntary dissolution statutes
infra notes 280-81 and accompanying text. Some states with narrow involuntary dissolution
[Vol. 35:25
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A. Statutory Jurisdictional Requirements
The most prevalent type of involuntary dissolution statute follows the
format of Section 14.30 of the Model Business Corporation Act. 31 As a
general rule these statutes establish three types ofjurisdictional criteria:
(1) director or shareholder deadlock, (2) waste or misapplication of
corporate assets, and (3) fraudulent, illegal, or oppressive conduct.
1. DEADLOCK
Director or shareholder deadlock is the most widely recognized statu-
tory ground for involuntary dissolution. 32 Two factors, however, limit the
number of situations in which deadlock will be found to exist.
First, deadlock is generally defined as corporate paralysis of such a
magnitude that the corporation simply cannot function, and is in danger
of imminent financial disaster.33 Language such as "irreparable injury to
statutes have caselaw precedent for court-ordered involuntary dissolution or related
remedies under conditions similar to states having broader statutes. Delaware falls into
this category. See Whitman v. Fuqua, 549 F. Supp. 315 (W.D. Pa. 1982). Many courts,
however, have held that the statute is exclusive. See, e.g., Schrage v. Portsmouth Steel
Corp., 207 F.2d 497 (6th Cir. 1953); Alkire v. Interstate Theatres, Corp., 379 F. Supp. 1210
(D. Mass. 1974).
3' MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 14.30 (1984)[hereinafter MBCA]. § 14.30 incorporates
essentially the same wording that was used in § 97 of the 1969 MBCA. Thirty-two states
follow the basic format of the MBCA; but many of the statutes contain significant
differences that make broad generalizations hazardous. The MBCA format states are:
Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas, Colorado, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Kentucky, Maine,
Maryland, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New Mexico, North
Dakota, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee,
Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin and Wyoming. The
remaining involuntary dissolutions statutes do not follow any patterns that can be easily
classified.
32 Deadlock is listed as a reason for involuntary dissolution in all state business
corporation codes except in Michigan, Nevada, and New Hampshire. The involuntary
dissolution statutes in these states, however, contain other language that potentially
obviates the need for a specific deadlock provision. See MICH. Comp. LAWS ANN. § 450.1825
(West 1973)("willfully unfair or oppressive" conduct); NEv. REV. STAT. § 78.630 (1979)(the
corporation "has been or is being conducted at a great loss and greatly prejudicial to the
interest of its creditors and shareholders"); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 293-A:95 (Supp.
1985)("whenever actual or impending insolvency or other causes renders its liquidation
reasonably necessary for the protection of the rights of stockholders or creditors"). The
Delaware and Kansas involuntary dissolution statutes only cover deadlock ofjoint venture
corporations involving two fifty percent owners. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 273 (1983); KAN.
STAT. ANN. §§ 17-6804 (1981). Additional statutes in both these states, however, give a court
power to appoint a custodian or a provisional director in a deadlocked close corporation. See
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 §§ 226, 352, 353 (1983); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-7212, -7213 (1981). See
also Whitman v. Fuqua, 549 F. Supp. at 322-23 (inherent power of courts to order
involuntary dissolution of a Delaware corporation).
33 See, e.g., Whitman, 549 F. Supp. 315. Jackson v. Nicolai-Neppach Co., 219 Or. 560,
1987]
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the corporation," which is commonly included in deadlock statutes,3 4
reinforces this limitation. The Model Act adds as an alternative, "or the
business and affairs of the corporation can no longer be conducted to the
advantage of the shareholders generally because of the deadlock. '35 This
phrase broadens the circumstances justifying relief on the grounds of
deadlock by focusing on the effect of the deadlock on the shareholders,
rather than focusing simply on the economic effect of the deadlock on the
corporation. There are many reported cases involving financially success-
ful close corporations that are racked by bitter internal dissension. 36
Denying any relief unless the corporation is on the brink of insolvency
does not seem to make sense from either an economic or a policy
viewpoint.
Second, many decisions interpreting deadlock statutes have held that a
deadlock exists only if there is a fifty-fifty split on the board of directors
or between the shareholders. 37 Under this line of cases, shareholders who
do not have the right to elect fifty percent of the directors or who own less
than fifty percent of the corporation's voting shares can never success-
fully invoke an involuntary dissolution deadlock statute. Some cases,
however, have recognized the existence of a deadlock where, because of
supermajority voting rights required or authorized by statute, minority
shareholders (or directors representing them on the board of directors)
348 P.2d 9 (1959); Bator v. United Sausage Co., 138 Conn. 18, 81 A.2d 442 (1951). See
generally Comment, Deadlock and Dissolution in the Close Corporation: Has the Sacred Cow
Been Butchered?, 58 NEB. L. REV. 791, 814-824 (1979).
Even though a court may be unwilling to order dissolution of a corporation, if the facts
indicate that fraud or other overreaching conduct has taken place, the plaintiff may be able
to convince the judge to appoint a custodian receiver who will take over the management of
the business. See, e.g., ARC Mfg. Co. v. Konard, 467 A.2d 1133 (Pa. Super. 1983); Wollman
v. Litman, 35 A.D.2d 935, 316 N.Y.S.2d 526 (1970). See also supra notes 10-14 and
accompanying text.
14 See, e.g., MBCA, supra note 31, § 14.30. Cf. Gonseth v. K&K Oil Co., 439 S.W.2d 18
(Mo. App. 1969)(no relief where the only impact of the oppression was on the minority
shareholder and did not damage the economic success of the corporation).
" See, e.g., MBCA, supra note 31 § 14.30(2)(i). The Model Act also has a provision
stating that deadlock exists when the shareholders have failed for at least two consecutive
annual meetings to elect successors to directors whose terms have expired. Id. § 14.30(2)(iii).
No requirement that the corporation be financially impaired by this type of deadlock is
included in this provision. Although many states have a similar provision, it has not been
invoked in very many reported cases.
36 See, e.g., Jackson v. Nicolai-Neppach Co., 219 Or. 560,348 P.2d 9 (1959). See generally
the cases discussed infra Part III, all of which involved financially successful businesses.
"' See Herbert v. Royall of Pensacola, Inc., 259 So. 2d 750 (Fla. App. 1972); Dorf. v. Hill
Bus Co., 140 N.J. Eq. 444, 54 A.2d 761 (1947); In re Binder, 172 Misc. 634, 15 N.Y.S.2d 44
(1939). Cf. Oaio REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.91(A)(4)(Page 1985)(even number of directors or an
uneven number of directors and the shareholders are deadlocked and the holders of shares
representing fifty percent of the voting power petition for an involuntary dissolution).
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have a veto power over action proposed by the majority shareholders. 38
These decisions are commendable, since the potential harm to the
corporation and the shareholders is the same, regardless of whether the
failure to obtain approval of proposed action is caused by supermajority
voting rights or an evenly divided vote by the directors or shareholders.
2. WASTE OR MISAPPLICATION OF CORPORATION ASSETS
Although a majority of states have statutes authorizing involuntary
dissolution for waste or misapplication of corporate assets, there have
been few cases decided specifically on this ground. Courts generally
combine waste and misapplication of assets with fraud, illegality, and
oppression, without differentiating between the two categories. Analyti-
cally, this category properly includes involuntary dissolution cases in-
volving excessive salaries and bonuses, payment of personal debts and
expenses from corporation funds, and other situations involving self-
dealing and preferential use of corporate assets by the controlling
shareholders.3 9
3. FRAUD, ILLEGALITY AND OPPRESSION
As a general rule courts have placed fraud and illegality in one
sub-category, which is frequently combined with cases involving waste
and misapplication of assets. They have placed oppression and related
concepts such as unfairly prejudicial conduct and persistent unfairness,
See Mordka v. Mordka Enters. Inc., 143 Ariz. 298, 693 P.2d 953 (Ariz. App. 1984);
Ward v. Colord, 110 11. App. 2d 68, 249 N.E.2d 137 (1969); In re Hy-Lite Plastics, Inc., 8
Misc. 2d 101, 165 N.Y.S.2d 888 (1957). See also Roach v. Bynam, 403 So. 2d 187 (Ala,
1981)(dictum), affd, 437 So. 2d 69 (1983). Two states, Illinois and New Jersey, have statutes
that specifically do not require an even division to trigger a deadlock involuntary
dissolution suit. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 32, § 12.50(b)(1) (Smith-Hurd 1985 Replacement
Volume); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:12-7(1)(b)(West 1986 Supp.).
" See, e.g., Salvadore v. Connor, 87 Mich. App. 458, 276 N.W.2d 458 (1978); In re Villa
Maria, Inc., 312 N.W.2d 921 (Minn. 1977); Segall v. Shore, 269 S.C. 31, 236 S.E.2d 316
(1977).
In the absence of specific statutory authorization for a direct action by a shareholder,
many courts have held that claims for waste and mismangement, must be brought as
derivative actions. See, e.g., Galbreath v. Scott, 433 So. 2d 454 (Ala. 1983). But see Thomas
v. Dickson, 250 Ga. 772, 301 S.E.2d 49 (1983)(direct actions allowed where no other
shareholders or creditors affected); Zokoych v. Spalding, 36 Ill. App. 3d 654, 344 N.W.2 805
(1976)(corporation bankrupt). The potential problems for a plaintiff presented by derivative
claims are explored in Part IV. See infra notes 257-61 and accompanying text.
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which are used in addition to or in lieu of oppression in some involuntary
dissolution statutes,40 in a separate sub-category. 41
In recent years courts have increasingly focused on developing the
concept of oppression, and proof of oppressive conduct is rapidly becoming
the most likely avenue for minority shareholder relief in close corpora-
tions.42 Three definitions of oppression have been used in the cases.
The first, drawn from English case law is:
burdensome, harsh and wrongful conduct.., a lack of probity and
fair dealing in the affairs of a company to the prejudice of some
portion of its members; or a visual departure from the standards
of fair dealing, and a violation of fair play on which every
shareholder who entrusts his money to a company is entitled to
rely.43
Under this definition, oppression is basically a breach of the general
fiduciary duty of good faith and fair dealing that majority shareholders in
a corporation owe to the minority shareholders. 44
The second definition, first enunciated in the now famous case of
Donahue v. Rodd Electrolyte Company of New England, Inc.,45 is conduct
41 See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-21-150 (Law. Co-op. i985 Supp.)("oppressive or unfairly
prejudicial" conduct); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.751(a)(2)(West 1986)("unfairly prejudicial");
CAL. CORP. CODE § 1800(b)(4)(West Supp. 1977 & 1986)("persistent unfairness"),
(b)(5)("liquidation is reasonably necessary for the protection of the rights and interests of
the complaining shareholder or shareholders"). See also MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 450.1825
(West 1973)("willfully unfair or oppressive"); NEV. REv. STAT. § 78.630(1)(1982)("greatly
prejudicial to the interest of its creditors or stockholders"); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 14A:12-
7(1)(C)(West 1986 Supp.)("the directors or those in control ... have acted oppressively or
unfairly"); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-125(a)(4)(1982)("[1]iquidation is reasonably necessary for
the protection of the rights or interests of the complaining shareholders"). The substantive
difference, if any, between oppression and the other related terms has not been discussed in
any detail in the cases. See Hillman, The Dissatisfied Participant in the Solvent Business
Venture: A Consideration of the Relative Permanence of Partnership and Close Corporations,
67 MINN. L. REV. 1, 44 at n. 134; Note, Company Law-Minority Rights-Oppression
Remedy-Diligenti v. RWMD Operations Kelowna, Ltd., 11 U.B.C. L. REV. 326 (1977).
4' See, e.g., Gidwitz v. Lanzit Corrugated Box Co., 20 111. 2d 208, 170 N.E.2d 131 (1960).
42 Many of the "oppression" cases have been brought as breach of fiduciary duty actions
rather than involuntary dissolution actions. Most of the oppression cases are collected in
Annot., 56 A.L.R.3d 358 (1974). See also infra Part IV at notes 262-82 and accompanying
text for more detailed discussion of ficuciary duty breach cases.
" Comment, Oppression as a Statutory Ground for Corporate Dissolution, 1965 DUKE L.
J. 128, 134 (1965)(quoting from Scottish Co-op Wholesale Soc'ty v. Meyer [19581 3 All E.R.
66, 71, 86 (H.L. and Edler v. Elder & Watson, Ltd. 1952 Sess. Cas. 49, 55 (Scot.)). This
quotation has often been cited in American cases. See, e.g., Baker v. Commercial Body
Builders, Inc., 264 Or. 614, 628-29, 507 P.2d 387, 393-94 (1973).
"4 See, e.g., Masinter v. Webco Co., 262 S.E.2d 433, 440 (W. Va. 1980). See generally A.
Henn & J. Alexander, LAws OF CORPORATIONS §§ 235-42, 276 (3rd ed. 1983)[hereinafter LAWS
OF CORPORATIONS].
" 367 Mass. 578, 328 N.E.2d 505 (1975). The Donahue case was not an involuntary
[Vol. 35:25
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that constitutes a violation of the strict fiduciary duty of "utmost good
faith and loyalty" owed by partners inter se. This standard, which is based
on the analogy of close corporation shareholders who are active in
management to general partners in a partnership, is theoretically higher
than the "good faith and inherent fairness" standard normally applicable
in a corporation. 46
The third definition of oppression, initially derived from English case
law,47 and long advocated by Dean F. Hodge O'Neal 4s as well as other
leading close corporation experts, 49 is conduct which frustrates the
reasonable expectations of the investors. The reasonable expectations
doctrine has been gaining wide acceptance in the past few years.
Decisions in at least eight states have explicitly adopted this concept,50
and decisions in at least nine additional states have implicitly recognized
it.51 The approval of the reasonable expectations doctrine by the New
dissolution action. Because of restrictions in the Massachusetts involuntary dissolution
statute, it had to be filed as a direct action for breach of fiduciary duty. See infra notes
281-82 and accompanying text. Nevertheless, the definition of oppression in Donahue has
frequently been cited in close corporation involuntary dissolution suits. See, e.g,, Orchard v.
Coveli, 590 F. Supp. 1548, 1559 (W.D. Pa. 1984). However, the strict standard of "utmost
good faith and loyalty" in Donahue, was subsequently tempered to permit some oppressive
conduct if done for legitimate business purposes. See Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home,
Inc., 370 Mass. 842, 353 N.W.2d 657 (1976).
41 See infra note 289, for a critique of the analogy between close corporations and
partnerships.
47 See, e.g., Ebrahimi v. Westbourne Galleries, Ltd. [1972] 2 All E.R. 492 (H.L.); In re a
Company, [19831 2 All E.R. 854.
4s See O'NEAL'S OPPRESSION OF MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS, supra note 1, H§ 7:20, 10:11 to
10:14; O'Neal, Close Corporations: Existing Legislation and Recommended Reform, 33 Bus.
LAW. 873, 885-88 (1978).
49 See Afterman, Statutory Protection for Oppressed Minority Shareholders: A Model for
Reform, 55 VA. L. REV. 1043, 1063-77 (1969); Hillman, The Dissatisfied Participant in the
Solvent Business Venture: A Consideration of the Relative Permanence of Partnerhsips and
Close Corporations, 67 MINN. L. REV. 1, 49-55, 75-87 (1982); Olson, A Statutory Elixir for the
Oppression Malady, 36 MERCER L. REV. 627, 654-58 (1985); Note, A Statutory Proposal
Protecting Employment Expectations of a Close Corporation's Minority Shareholders, 63
WASH. U.L.Q. 545 (1985).
0 See Stefano v. Coppock, 705 P.2d 443 (Alaska 1985); Wilkes v. Springside Nursing
Home, Inc., 370 Mass. 842, 353 N.E.2d 657 (1976); Capital Toyota, Inc. v. Garvin, 381 So.
2d 1038 (1980); Fox v. 7L Bar Ranch Co., 198 Mont. 201, 645 P.2d 929 (1982); Exadaktilos
v. Cinnaminson Realty Co., Inc., 167 N.J. Super. 141, 400 A.2d 554 (1979); In re Kemp &
Beatley, Inc., 64 N.Y.2d 63, 484 N.Y.S.2d 799, 473 N.E.2d 1173 (1984); Meiselman v.
Meiselman, 309 N.C. 279,307 S.E.2d 551 (1983); Masinter v. Webco Co., 262 S.E.2d 433 (W.
Va. 1980). In addition, Minnesota has incorporated the reasonable expectations standard
into its involuntary dissolution statute. See MINN. STAT. § 302A.751 subd. 3a (1985). The
Minnesota statute is discussed in Olson, A Statutory Elixir For the Oppression Malady, 36
MERCER L. REV. 627 (1985).
"' See Gidwitz v. Lanzit Corrugated Box Co., 170 N.E.2d at 135-36 (1960); Hackbart v.
Holmes, 675 F.2d 1114 (10th Cir. 1982)(Colorado); Cressy v. Shannon Continental Corp.,
378 N.E.2d 941 (Ind. App. 1978); Sauer v. Moffitt, 363 N.W.2d 269 (Iowa 1984); Goben v.
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York Court of Appeals in the 1984 case of In re Kemp & Beatley, Inc.52 is
quite significant and will undoubtedly influence other courts.53
The most lucid jurisdictional statement of the reasonable expectations
doctrine to date is contained in the case of Meiselman v. Meiselman,5 4
decided by the North Carolina Supreme Court in 1983:
These 'reasonable expectations' are to be ascertained by examin-
ing the entire history of the participants' relationship. That
history will include the 'reasonable expectations' created at the
inception of the participants' relationship; those 'reasonable ex-
pectations' as altered over time; and the 'reasonable expectations'
which develop as the participants engage in a course of dealing in
conducting the affairs of the corporation. The interests and views
of the other participants must be considered in determining
'reasonable expectations.' The key is 'reasonable.' In order for
plaintiffs expectations to be reasonable, they must be known to
or assumed by the other shareholders and concurred in by them.
Privately held expectations which are not made known to the
other participants are not 'reasonable.' Only expectations embod-
ied in understandings, express or implied, among the participants
should be recognized by the court. Hillman, The Dissatisfied
Participant in the Solvent Business Venture: A Consideration of
the Relative Permanence of Partnerships and Close Corporations,
67 MINN. L. REV. 1, 77-81 (1983). Also, only substantial expecta-
tions should be considered and this must be determined on a
case-by-case basis. These requirements provide needed protection
to potential defendants in this type case. Cf. Capitol Toyota v.
Gerwin, Miss., 381 So. 2d 1038 (1980). (Dissolution denied and
relief limited to purchase of plaintiffs shares at book value as of
the date he left employment with the corporation).
In short then, the 'right or interests' of a shareholder in any
given case will not necessarily be the same 'rights or interests' of
Barry, 234 Kan. 721, 676 P.2d 90 (1984); Allen v. Royale "16", Inc., 449 So. 2d 1365 (La.
App. 1984); Salvadore v. Conner, 87 Mich. App. 664, 276 N.W.2d 458 (1979); Cerami v.
Dignazio, 424 A.2d 881 (Pa. Sup. Ct. 1981); Zidell v. Zidell, Inc. 277 Or. 423, 560 P.2d 1091
(1977).
52 64 N.Y.2d 63,484 N.Y.S.2d 799, 473 N.E.2d 1173 (1984). Prior to this decision by the
New York Court of Appeals, several other New York cases had adopted the reasonable
expectations theory. See, e.g., O'Donnell v. Marine Repair Serv's, Inc., 530 F. Supp. 1199
(S.D.N.Y. 1982); In re Gene Barry One Hour Photo Processing Inc., 111 Misc. 559, 444
N.Y.S.2d 540 (1981); Topper v. Park Sheraton Pharmacy, Inc., 107 Misc. 2d 25, 433
N.Y.S.2d 359 (1980).
" See Stefano v. Coppock, 705 P.2d 443, 446 n.3 (Alaska 1985).
54 309 N.C. 279, 307 S.E.2d 551 (1983).
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any other shareholder. An articulation of those 'rights or inter-
ests' will necessarily require a case-by-case determination based
on an examination of the entire history of the participants'
relationship.... For plaintiff to obtain relief under the expecta-
tions analysis, he must prove that (1) he had one or more
substantial reasonable expectations known or assumed by the
other participants; (2) the expectation has been frustrated; (3) the
frustration was without fault of plaintiff and was in large part
beyond his control; and (4) under all of the circumstances of the
case plaintiff is entitled to some form of equitable relief.55
Given the number of close corporation cases involving alleged squeeze-
outs and other improper behavior and the development of the concept of
oppression and related doctrines as an effective vehicle for courts to deal
with intra-shareholder dissension, it is distressing that so many states
have adopted narrowly drawn statutes preventing minority shareholders
who have been wronged from being able to seek involuntary dissolution
as a potential remedy in a significant number of circumstances. Dead-
lock, which is the most prevalent jurisdictional ground, is simply not
broad enough to encompass many types of squeeze-outs and oppressive
acts.56 Yet in many states deadlock is the only jurisdictional ground for
an involuntary dissolution suit.57 The absence of oppression or a related
term in many involuntary dissolution statutes is also disturbing. 5S
Some states have special statutes which authorize broad grounds for
involuntary dissolution suits brought by close corporation shareholders. 59
In many cases, however, these statutes are only applicable if a corpora-
.Id. at 298-99, 307 S.E.2d at 563-64 (1983).
56 See supra notes 32-38 and accompanying text.
17 See, e.g., IND. CODE § 23-1-7-3 (1976); MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 156B § 99 (Michie/Law
Co-op. 1979 & 1986 Supp.). The Delaware and Kansas involuntary dissolution statutes are
limited to deadlocks in joint venture corporations having two fifty percent owners. See DEL.
CODE ANN., tit. 8 § 273 (1983), KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-6804 (1981).
11 The statutes in fifteen states do not authorize involuntary dissolution on the grounds
of oppression or a related concept such as unfairly prejudicial conduct: Arizona, Connecti-
cut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine,
Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Ohio, and Oklahoma. A sixteenth, Wisconsin, only
authorizes oppression as a grounds for involuntary dissolution in a corporation that elects
to be a statutory close corporation. Compare Wis. STAT. § 180.771 (1957) with id.
180.995(19)(Supp. 1985).
" See, e.g., Asz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 10-097 (deadlock exclusive ground), 10-215
(1980)("deadlock or dispute" in an electing close corporation); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 14A:12-
7(1)(West 1986 Supp.)(only deadlock except in corporations having 25 or fewer sharehold-
ers); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW §§ 1104 (general), 1104-a (special provision for shareholders
owning 20 percent or more of a corporation whose stock is not regularly traded on an
exchange)(McKinney 1986).
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tion elects to be governed by the special close corporation statutes;60 and
the available evidence indicates that very few close corporations actually
make the election.6 1
Many statutes complicate the jurisdictional problem by imposing an
ownership percentage requirement as a prerequisite to an involuntary
dissolution suit. The percentage ranges from ten percent in Connecticut
and Nevada to fifty percent in Ohio.62 The rationale for this type of
limitation is at best flimsy. Somewhat similar limitations requiring
security for expenses in derivative actions brought by shareholders
owning a small number of shares have been severely criticized and are
much less prevalent than was once the case.63 Why should it make any
difference how many shares a wrongfully squeezed-out shareholder
owns? The ownership percentage requirement, in effect, provides an
unintended statutory justification for squeeze-outs of minority sharehold-
ers having ownership interests below the specified percentage.6 4
In most cases, a minority shareholder with a valid cause of action who
cannot qualify for an involuntary dissolution suit will be able to pursue
a breach of fiduciary duty claim or some other cause of action. As is
explained in Part IV, however, the other possible causes of action may not
be as desirable as an involuntary dissolution suit for a number of reasons.
6 See, e.g., ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 10-201 (1977); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 32 §§ 1201-1204
(Smith-Hurd 1985 Supp.).
6 See Blunk, Analyzing Texas Articles of Incorporation: Is the Statutory Close Corpo-
ration Viable?, 34 S.W.L.J. 941, 955-56 (1980); Shapiro, The Statutory Close Corporation: A
Critique and a Corporate Planning Alternative, 36 MD. L. REV. 289, 290 n.ll (1976).
Dykstra, Molding the Utah Corporation: Survey and Commentary, 7 UTAH L. REV. 1 (1960).
62 See CONN. GEN, STAT. ANN. § 33-382(a)(West Supp. 1986)(ten percent except in cases
involving deadlock); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:143B(1)(1969 & 1986 Supp.)(twenty percent
and in addition ownership of the requisite amount for six months); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.
156B § 99(b)(Michie/Law Co-op 1970 & 1986 Supp.)(forty percent); NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 78.630(1)(1982)(ten percent); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 293-A:95 (West Supp. 1985)(twenty-
five percent); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 1104-a (McKinney 1985 Replacement Volume)(twenty
percent for grounds other than deadlock); Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.91(A)(Page
1985)(fifty percent). The Delaware and Kansas business corporation acts limit involuntary
dissolution suits to joint venture corporations with two equal shareholders. See DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 8 § 273 (1983); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-6804 (1981). However, decisions in Delaware
indicate that courts will order involuntary dissolution in other circumstances. See White-
man v. Fuqua, 549 F. Supp. 315, 322-23 (W.D. Pa. 1982); Campbell v. Pennsylvania Indus.,
99 F. Supp. 199 (D. Del. 1951). Since the Kansas statutory scheme is the same as that in
Delware, the Delaware cases would presumably be followed by Kansas courts.
6 See LAWS OF CORPORATIONS, supra note 44 § 372.
These statutes also generate litigation to determine whether the requisite ownership
interest exists. See Gunzberg v. Art-Lloyd Metal Prod. Corp., 112 A.D.2d 423, 492 N.Y.S.2d
83 (1985)(assignment from children); In re Gargano, 112 A.D.2d 225, 491 N.Y.S.2d 440
(1985); Lewis v. Jones, 107 A.D. 931, 483 N.Y.S.2d 868 (1985)(common law right to
involuntary dissolution exists for shareholder owning less than the requisite 20 percent
required by N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 1104-a (McKinney 1986)).
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B. Remedies
Assuming a court finds that the requisite jurisdictional basis for an
involuntary dissolution suit exists, the next issue to be determined is the
appropriate relief. Some courts have taken the position that in the
absence of alternative forms of relief specified in the applicable statute,
the judge's choices are limited to authorizing dissolution or dismissing
the petition.65 Most courts, however, have held that the trial judge has
the inherent power to order any legal or equitable relief that will remedy
the dissension, with dissolution being the last resort.66 Appellate courts
will, as a general rule, uphold the trial court's decision on the appropriate
relief, if any, except in unusual cases involving clear evidence of abuse of
discretion. 67 This deference to the trial judge's decision may result in
what appears to be inconsistent opinions in cases involving essentially
the same facts, thus making it difficult to predict with any degree of
certainty the probable outcome in a particular case. It is justified by the
trial judge's unique opportunity to view all the facts in their totality, to
judge on the credibility of the witnesses, and to consider the most
appropriate remedy for the particular situation. As the cases discussed in
the next section of this article illustrate, trial courts have on the whole
exercised their discretion in a skillful manner.
Several states have enacted statutes explicitly listing alternative forms
of relief that can be granted in an involuntary dissolution suit.68 The
" See Gruenberg v. Goldmine Plantation, Inc., 360 So. 2d 884 (La. App. 1978); White v.
Perkins, 213 Va. 129, 184 S.E.2d 315 (1972); Harkey v. Mobley, 552 S.W.2d 79 (Mo. App.
1977). Cf. Hines v. Plante, 661 P.2d 880 (Nev. 1983); Crippen Printing Co. v. Abel, 441
N.E.2d 1002 (Ind. App. 1982); Poulakidas v. Charlidis, 68 Ill. App. 3d 610, 386 N.E.2d
405 (1979)(reluctance of courts because of interference with management prerogatives and
potential damage to the corporation's financial standing to appoint a receiver pendente lite
after an involuntary dissolution suit is filed, unless there is imminent danger that the
corporation's assets will be dissipated).
66 See, e.g., Baker v. Commercial Body Builders, Inc., 264 Or. 614, 507 P.2d 387 (1973);
Burnett v. Int'l Tennis Corp., 80 Mich. App. 396, 263 N.W.2d 908 (1978); Roach v.
Marqulies, 42 N.J. Super. 243, 126 A.2d 45 (1956).
67 See, e.g., Henry George & Sons, Inc. v. Cooper-George, Inc., 95 Wash. 2d 244, 249, 632
P.2d 512, 517 (Wash. 1981). But see Stumf v. C.S. Stumf & Sons, Inc., 47 Cal. App. 3d 230,
120 Cal. Rptr. 671 (1975)(court must order dissolution if the jurisdictional elements are met;
but the defendants can avoid liquidation by purchasing the plaintiffs shares).
' See Aiuz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10-216 (1977)(only applies to statutory electing close
corporations); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 32, § 12.55 (Smith-Hurd 1985 Replacement Volume); MicH.
COMP. LAws ANN. § 450.1825(2) (West 1973); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:12-7 (West 1986 Supp.);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-125.1 (1982); S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-21-155 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1986); TEx.
Bus. Coap. ACT. ANN. art. 12.52 (Vernon 1980)(only applies to electing close corporations);
WIS. STAT. § 180.995(19)(Supp. 1986)(applies to electing close corporations). Several states
have statutes that authorize other relief without specifically listing the types of relief. See
CAL. CORP. CODE § 1804 (West 1977 & 1986 Supp.)(a "court ... with or without winding up
and dissolution, may make such orders and decrees and issue such injunctions in the case
as justice and equity require"); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.751 subd. 2, 3, 3a (West
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most complete formulation of the various potential remedies is found in
Section 41-43 of the Statutory Close Corporation Supplement to the 1984
Model Business Corporation Act.
69
Section 41, which is titled "ordinary relief," authorizes a court to order
one or more of the following:
(1) the performance, prohibition, alteration, or setting aside of
any action of the corporation or of its shareholders, directors, or
officers of or any other party to the proceeding;
(2) the cancellation or alteration of any provision in the corpora-
tion's articles of incorporation or bylaws;
(3) the removal from office of any director or officer;
(4) the appointment of any individual as a director or officer;
(5) an accounting with respect to any matter in dispute;
(6) the appointment of a custodian to manage the business and
affairs of the corporation;
(7) the appointment of a provisional director (who has all the
rights, powers, and duties of a duly elected director) to serve for
the term and under the conditions prescribed by the court;
(8) the payment of dividends;
(9) the award of damages to any aggrieved party.70
Section 41 also authorizes a court to award one or more of the parties
reimbursement of all reasonable expenses including counsel fees and the
expenses of appraisers or other experts when one of the other parties is
found to have acted "arbitrarily, vexatiously, or otherwise not in good
faith."7' Section 42 of the Statutory Close Corporation Supplement
authorizes the court to order a shareholder to sell his shares at their fair
value to the corporation or to one or more of the remaining shareholders
if the remedies described in Section 41 are "inadequate or inappropri-
ate." 72 Finally, Section 43 authorizes dissolution of the corporation as a
last resort. 73 The tiering of remedies in Section 41-43 of the Statutory
1985)("equitable relief," dissolution or a buy-out); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 294:97 (West
Supp. 1985)("or to grant such other relief as may be just"); TEXAS Bus. CoRP. AcT. ANN. art.
7.06 (Vernon 1980)("all other remedies available either at law or in equity").
" The Model Statutory Close Corporation Supplement to the 1984 Model Business
Corporation Act [hereinafter MBCA Stat. Close Corp. Supp.l is published in 4 Model
Business Corporation Act Ann. 1803-79 (3rd ed. 1986 Supp.).
70 This list is similar to that found in Baker v. Commercial Body Builders, Inc., 264 Or.
614, 632-33, 507 P.2d 387, 395-96. The list in Baker has been cited in several other cases.
See, e.g., Masinter v. Webco Co., 262 S.E.2d 433, 441 n.12 (W. Va. 1980).
71 MBCA Stat. Close Corp. Supp., supra note 69, § 41(b).
72 Id. § 42(a). The court can order the shares of any shareholder to be sold. §§ 42(b)-(d)
contain provisions for determining the fair value of the corporation's shares and for
structuring the terms of the buy-out.
73 Id. § 43(a)(2)("all other relief ordered by the court under Section 41 or 42 has failed
[Vol. 35:25
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Close Corporation Supplement basically reflects the actual result in
involuntary dissolution suits. 7
4
Many of the existing state alternative relief statutes have significant
deficiencies. This is particularly true with respect to provisions authoriz-
ing a forced sale of stock, which, as will be pointed out in the next
section,75 is by far the most prevalent remedy ordered in involuntary
dissolution suits. Several statutes, for example, quite properly specify
that the price to be paid in a forced buy-out is the fair value of the shares
in question, but require that the fair value be determined as of the day
the involuntary dissolution suit was filed,7 6 or in some cases, the day
before the suit was filed.7 7 The value of the shares on that date may be
artificially depressed, however, because of oppressive action or other
malfeasance by the majority shareholders. Assuming that damages for
the majority shareholders' wrongdoing are included in the value of the
shares to be sold, or alternatively, are awarded to the selling shareholder
in addition to the fair value of the shares determined by the court, this
potential problem is moat. 78 These possibilities are not clearly mandated
by all the statutes in question. The New Jersey Corporation Code,
however, adequately resolves this issue by authorizing a court to deter-
mine the value "as of the date of the commencement of the action or such
earlier or later date deemed equitable by the court, plus or minus any
adjustments deemed equitable by the court. . .. "79
to resolve the matters in dispute"). Under § 43(a)(1), a court can also order the corporation
dissolved if the grounds for involuntary dissolution specified in MBCA, supra note 31,
§ 14.30 exist.
14 See infra Section III.
" See infra notes 143-54 and accompanying text.
76 See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.751 subd. 2 (West 1985).
77 See N.Y. Bus. CorP. LAW § 1118 (McKinney 1986).
78 See Scottish Co-op Wholesale Soc'y Ltd. v. Mayer, [1958] 3 All E.R. 66, 89 ("value
which the shares would have had at the date of the petition if there had been no
oppression"); Wolff v. Wolff, 67 N.Y.2d 638, 499 N.Y.S.2d 65, 490 N.E.2d 532 (1986). See
also MBCA Stat. Close Corp. Supp., supra note 69, § 42(b)(4)("after the seller delivers his
shares he has no further claim against the corporation, its directors, officers, or sharehold-
ers, other than a claim to any unpaid balance of the purchase price and a claim under any
agreement with the corporation or the remaining shareholder that is not terminated by the
court").
The purchaser can presumably recover on any cause of action he has against the selling
shareholder as an offset against the purchase price determined by the court. See Baker v.
Pratt, 176 Cal. App. 3d 370, 222 Cal. Rptr. 253, 260 (1986). Rut see Abrams v. Abrams-
Rubaloff& Assoc's, Inc., 114 Cal. App. 3d 240, 170 Cal. Rptr. 656, 659 (1980). Cf. Miller v.
Ruth's of North Carolina, Inc., 69 N.C. App. 153 316 S.E.2d 622 (N.C. App. 1984)(a plaintiff
waived all rights to pursue other direct causes of action against the defendants when he
failed to file exceptions to the buy-out order filed by the trial judge; defendants' counter-
claim also dismissed on the grounds that the price of the shares reflected any claim the
defendants had).
" N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:12-7(8)(a)(West 1986 Supp.). The Minnesota involuntary
1987]
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The appropriate valuation standard in court-ordered buy-outs has
caused some difficulties. Most statutes and cases apply the willing
seller-willing buyer model used in dissenter's rights cases.8 0 This means
that the value should be based on a going concern basis rather than a
liquidation basis, even though the lawsuit may be cast as an involuntary
dissolution action.8 ' The buy-out makes moot the liquidation issue, and a
valuation based on liquidation unfairly prejudices the rights of the
selling shareholder and unjustly enriches the remaining shareholders.
The California involuntary dissolution statute, however, mandates a
liquidation standard for a buy-out.8 2 In one recent case,83 the application
of this standard resulted in a buy-out price of $355,000 even though the
going concern value of the selling shareholder's shares was $482,500.
A related issue concerns whether one or more discounts should be
considered in determining the value of shares bought out as a result of an
involuntary dissolution suit.5 4 An illiquidity discount is appropriate since
it is consistent with the willing seller-willing buyer model.8 5 Close
corporation stock is inherently illiquid. A minority interest discount is
inappropriate, however. 86 The imposition of a minority interest discount
is inconsistent with the willing seller-willing buyer model. In addition, in
dissolution buy-out statute contains similar wording. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.751 subd.
2 (West 1986). The Illinois involuntary dissolution statutes are inconsistent. ILL. ANN. STAT.
ch. 32, § 1214 (Smith-Hurd 1985 Supp.), which applies to electing close corporations,
specifies that the valuation date shall be "as of the close of the business on the day on which
the petition for the dissolution was filed." ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 32, § 12.55(g)(Smith-Hurd 1985
Replacement Volume), which applies to all business corporations other than electing close
corporations, states that "the court shall determine the fair value of the shares as of such
date as the court finds equitable." For an example of a case where a court determined the
valuation date to be a date prior to the filing of the complaint, see Orchard v. Covelli, 590
F. Supp. 1548 (W.D. Pa. 1984).
50 See, e.g., MBCA Stat. Close Corp. Supp., supra note 69, § 42(b)(1); Taines v. Gene
Barry One Hour Photo Processing, Inc., 123 Misc. 2d 529, 474 N.Y.S.2d 362 (1983).
"' See Blake v. Blake Agency, Inc., 107 A.D.2d 139, 486 N.Y.S.2d 341, 347-48 (1985);
Segall v. Shore, 269 S.C. 31, 236 S.E.2d 316 (1977).
82 CAL. CORP. CODE § 2000 (West 1977 & Supp. 1986). See Ronald v. 4-C's Elec.
Packaging, Inc., 168 Cal. App. 3d 290, 214 Cal. Rptr. 225 (Cal. App. 1985)(liquidation value
as if the corporation is sold as a going concern rather than piecemeal).
83 Abrams v. Abrams-Rubaloff& Assoc's, Inc., 114 Cal. App. 3d 240, 170 Cal. Rptr. 656,
661 (Cal. App. 1981).
84 For a detailed discussion of valuations discounts, see Haynsworth, Valuation of
Business Interests, 33 MERCER L. REV. 457, 488-97 (1982).
85 See, e.g., In re Fleischer, 107 A.D.2d 97, 486 N.Y.S.2d 272 (1985)(twenty-five percent
discount authorized).
86 See Blake v. Blake Agency, Inc., 107 A.D.2d 139, 486 N.Y.S.2d 341, 349 (1985)(twen-
ty-five percent lack of marketability authorized; additional fifteen percent minority interest
discount held to be improper); In re Fleischer, 107 A.D.2d 97, 486 N.Y.S.2d 272 (1985);
Brown v. Allied Corrugated Box Co., 91 Cal. App. 3d 477, 154 Cal. Rptr. 170 (1979). Cf.
Woodward v. Quigley, 257 Iowa 1077, 133 N.W.2d 38, 42-44 (1965)(a minority interest
discount is not appropriate in a dissenter's right case).
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a case where a squeezed-out minority shareholder is ordered to sell his
shares, a minority interest discount, in effect, unjustly rewards the
remaining shareholders for their improper behavior. For similar reasons
a key man discount should not be applied in a court-ordered buy-out.8 7
Finally, a control premium should not, as a general rule, be imposed if the
majority shareholders are ordered to sell their shares to the minority.88
The effect of a price established in a contractual buy-out agreement
between the shareholders on a court ordered buy-out is unsettled. If the
buy-out agreement does not cover the circumstances giving rise to the
court-ordered transfer, or is an optional as opposed to a mandatory
buy-out, then the contractual buy-out price should be considered merely
as non-conclusive evidence of the fair value of the shares. 89 A stronger
case, however, can be made for utilizing the contractual buy-out price if
the agreement covers the factual situation, for example, in a termination
of employment case.90 Even in this situation, there could be circum-
stances that make the contractual price inequitable. 91 The Minnesota
involuntary dissolution buy-out statute specifically recognizes this pos-
sibility, and authorizes the court to disregard the contractual buy-out
price if the price or other terms specified are "unreasonable under all the
circumstances of the case." 92
A related problem concerns the right of the selling shareholder to
prejudgment interest on the value of his or her shares. Some courts have
expressed reluctance to award any interest that predates the forced sale
order.9 3 From the selling shareholder's perspective, however, the inabil-
7 There are no existing cases on this issue, however.
s In re Fleischer, 107 A.D.2d 97, 486 N.Y.S.2d 272, 275 (1985); In re Bird Precision
Bellows, Ltd., [1985] 3 All E.R. 523 (A.D.) affirming, [1984] 3 All E.R. 444 (Ch. Div.). But
see Ronald v. 4-C's Elec. Packaging, Inc., 214 Cal. Rptr. 225, 230 (Cal. App. 1985).
89 See Hughes v. Sego Int'l., Ltd., 192 N.J. Super. 60, 469 A.2d 74 (1983); Anderson v.
Clemons Mobile Home, Inc., 214 Neb. 283, 333 N.W.2d 900 (1983); In re Villa Maria, Inc.,
312 N.W.2d 921; Baylor v. Beverly Book Co., 216 Va. 22, 216 S.E.2d 18 (1975).
90 See Hughes v. Sego Int'l, Ltd., 469 A.2d 74 (recognizes possibility of a binding
contractual buy-out price). The validity of an agreement that triggers a mandatory buy-out
if any shareholder files an involuntary dissolution suit or any cause of action against
another shareholder would be questionable. See Crippin Printing Co. v. Abel, 411 N.E.2d
1003 (contractual buy-out right and dissolution suit are independent claims); Baylor v.
Beverly Book Co., 216 S.E.2d 18 (filing a dissolution suit is not an offer to sell).
"' See Anderson v. Clemmons Mobile Home, Inc., 214 Neb. 283, 332 N.W.2d 900
(1983)(unfair to use buy-out price because of majority shareholders misconduct); In re Villa
Maria, Inc., 312 N.W.2d 921 (Minn. 1981)(filing of involuntary dissolution suit superseded
book value buy-out option agreement).
92 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.751 subd. 2 (West 1985). See also MBCA Stat. Close Corp.
Supp., supra note 69, § 42(b)(in determining fair value the court is entitled to consider
among other relevant evidence "any agreement among some or all of the shareholders
fixing the price or specifying a formula for determining share value for any purpose").
" See, e.g., In re Bird Precision Bellows, Ltd. [1985] 3 All E.R. 523 (C.A.) affirming,
[1984] 3 All E.R. 444 (Ch. Div.); Abrams v. Abrams-Rubaloff & Assoc's Inc., 170 Cal. Rptr.
19871
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ity to obtain prejudgment interest could be quite prejudicial, particularly
if the value of the shares to be sold is determined several months or years
after the suit is brought.94 Inability to collect prejudgment interest can
also provide an artificial incentive to the defendants in an involuntary
dissolution suit to use delaying tactics. A statutory provision similar to
that in New Jersey specifically giving a court the discretion to award
interest "from the date determined by the court to be equitable,"9 5 is an
appropriate way to deal with this issue. Another alternative would be a
provision modeled after Section 42 of the Uniform Partnership Act which
authorizes a withdrawing partner in a dissolved partnership that contin-
ues without settlement of accounts to collect at his option, either interest
on the value of his partnership interest, or the profits attributable to the
continual use of his partnership capital.9 6
The absence of provisions in many of the involuntary dissolution
statutes specifically dealing with the allocation of costs for experts and
attorneys' fees is also troublesome. Courts have been very reluctant to
order reimbursement to successful plaintiffs for these expenses even in
egregious cases of wrongdoing,97 although the inherent power to award at
656, 661 (1981); Baker v. Pratt, 176 Cal. App. 3d 370, 222 Cal. Rptr. 253, 260-62 (1986)(even
though one of the causes of action was for involuntary dissolution, the plaintiff might be
entitled to some prejudgment interest for any damages attributable to other causes of action
based on breach of fiduciary duty because there was statutory authority for discretionary
awards of prejudgment interest in such cases; case was remanded in part to determine the
appropriate amount, if any, of prejudgment interest).
9' See, e.g., Miller v. Ruth's of North Carolina, Inc., 69 N.C. App. 153, 316 S.E.2d 622
(1984)(six-year interval between filing of the action and the court ordered buy-out); Stefano
v. Coppock, 705 P.2d 443 (Alaska 1985)(suit filed in 1976 and final decision in 1985;
prejudgment interest awarded from 1974 when cause of action arose); Orchard v. Covelli,
590 F. Supp. 1548 (W.D. Pa. 1984)(prejudgment interest for seven years of $163,690
awarded). Curiously, the Rhode Island involuntary dissolution buy-out statute only
authorizes prejudgment interest from "the date of the filing of the election to purchase such
shares;" but, at the same time, specifies that the value of the shares is to be determined as
of the day on which the involuntary dissolution order was filed. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 7-1.1-90.1
(1985). Since the buy-out petition can be filed at any time before a hearing on the
dissolution, or thereafter in the discretion of the court, a situation could arise where the
interval between the statutory valuation date and the statutory prejudgment interest date
could be significant.
11 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:12-7(8)(d)(1986 West Supp.). This type of statute avoids the
potential problem created by the wording of the Rhode Island buy-out statute discussed
supra note 94. The prejudgment interest rate should be in the discretion of thejudge and not
be limited to the rate on judgments. Compare ln re Fleischer, 107 A.D.2d 97, 486 N.Y.S.2d
272 (1985)(twelve percent) with Blake v. Blake Agency, Inc., 107 A.D.2d 139,486 N.Y.S.2d
341 (nine percent).
" UNIF. PARTNERSNiP ACT § 42 (1914). See Davidian, Corporate Dissolution in New York:
Liberalizing the Rights of Minority Shareholders, 56 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 24, 70-74 (1981). The
analogy between close corporations and partnerships is explored in Part V. See infra note
289.
" See, e.g., Baker v. Pratt, 176 Cal. App. 3d 370,222 Cal. Rptr. 253,257-59 (1986); Miller
v. Ruth's of North Carolina, Inc., 68 N.C. App. 40, 313 S.E.2d 849 (1984)(attorneys' fees
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least attorneys' fees in cases involving fraud and bad faith is well
established.98 On the other hand, if the shareholders named as defen-
dants in the suit prevail, they are not likely to be able, in the absence of
specific statutory authority, to recover their attorneys' fees and other
costs from the plaintiff, or to have these expenses reimbursed by the
corporation, except to the extent that they can prove that the corporation
benefitted from the suit.9 A statutory provision giving a court authority
to impose expert's fees and attorneys' fees as a sanction against any party
found to have acted arbitrarily, vexatiously, or in bad faith, is the fairest
manner of dealing with this issue.100 Such a provision will create a
disincentive for majority shareholders to use improper delaying tactics
and unnecessarily expensive trial strategies while at the same time
providing protection to the majority shareholders against frivolous ac-
tions and strike suits by disgruntled minority shareholders.
An additional deficiency in most of the statutes authorizing a buy-out
is the absence of any provision specifically authorizing a court to require
the seller to enter into a reasonable non-competition agreement. 10 '
Courts faced with this issue have expressed reluctance to include a
covenant not to compete in the order requiring a stock sale.10 2 This
reluctance is perplexing because, as a general rule, courts have readily
enjoined former shareholders of closely held corporations from competing
would have been appropriate, however, if the action had been a derivative action rather
than one for involuntary dissolution); Sauer v. Moffitt, 363 N.W.2d 269 (Iowa App. 1984).
Some courts have awarded attorneys' fees to successful plaintiffs in involuntary dissolution
suits, however. See, e.g., Salvadore v. Conner, 276 N.W.2d 458 (Mich. App. 1978); Segall v.
Shore, 269 S.C. 31, 236 S.E.2d 316 (1977).
98 See, e.g., Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y., 421 U.S. 240 (1975). See
generally Rowe, The Legal Theory of Attorney Fee Shifting: A Critical Overview, 1982 DUKE
L.J. 651.
" See, e.g., In re Levitt, 109 A.D.2d 502, 492 N.Y.S.2d 736, 742 (1985); In re Rappaport,
110 A.D.2d 642, 487 N.Y.S.2d 376, 378 (1985); Mardikos v. Arger, 116 Misc. 2d 1028, 457
N.Y.S.2d 371, 375 (1982).
o Several states have such statutes. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.751 subd. 4 (West
Supp.1985); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:12-7(10)(West Supp. 1986). See also MBCA Stat. Close
Corp. Supp., supra note 69, § 41(b).
101 See MBCA Stat. Close Corp. Supp., supra note 69, § 42(b)(2)(specific statutory
authority for a court to impose a non-competition covenant on the seller.) A provision
authorizing a court to order a selling shareholder to enter into a covenant not to compete is
included as part of the Wisconsin statutory close corporation statute. See WIS. STAT. ANN.
§ 180.995(19) (West Supp. 1985).
"02 See In re Fleischer, 107A.D.2d 97, 486 N.Y.S.2d 272,275 (1985). In Wolff v. Wolff, 67
N.Y.2d 638, 490 N.E.2d 532, 499 N.Y.S.2d 665 (1986), the New York Court of Appeals
reversed that portion of the tiral court's order imposing a covenant not to compete against
the plaintiff on the ground that the covenant was too broad. A more narrowly drafted
covenant would, apparently, have been upheld. See generally Kessler, Employment Ar-
rangements in Close Corporations, 11 SETON HALL L. REV. 187, 204-08 (1980). Cf. Lord v.
Lord, 454 A.2d 830, 834 (Me. 1983)(court ordered wife transferring stock to husband
incident to a divorce to sign a non-competition agreement).
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directly for the corporation's customers, particularly where the contacts
with customers on behalf of the former shareholder's new business began
while the shareholder was still employed by the corporation. 10 3 The
potential harm to the corporation and the remaining shareholders is
self-evident, and from everyone's point of view, it is better to deal with
this issue at the time of the order of sale than as part of a subsequent
lawsuit between the parties. In this connection, if a court does not require
a non-competition covenant, this fact should be taken into account in
determining the fair value of the selling shareholder's shares.' 0 4
In order to provide maximum flexibility and to minimize the financial
burden of a share purchase, involuntary dissolution statutes containing
buyout provisions should allow the corporation or any shareholder to be
a purchaser and should specifically authorize installment purchases.
California and New Jersey, however, have statutes that require the
corporation, or fifty percent of the shareholders, to file a petition to
buy out a plaintiffs shares and require cash payment of the fair value of
the shares. 10 5 In addition, the Illinois statute contains one provision' 0 6
which allows only other shareholders, but not the corporation, to file a
petition to buy out the plaintiffs shares; and another statute10 7 allows a
court on its own motion to order the sale of shares only to the corporation
without mentioning the possibility of allocating some or all of the shares
to the remaining shareholders in the event the corporation cannot for
legal or financial reasons purchase the shares.1 s
... See, e.g., Smith-Shrader Co. v. Smith, 136 Ill. App. 3d 571, 483 N.E.2d 283 (1985);
Agronic Corp. v. deBough, 21 Wash. App. 459, 585 P.2d 821 (1978). Cf. Mohawk Mainte-
nance Co., Inc. v. Kessler, 52 N.Y.S.2d 276, 437 N.Y.S.2d 646, 419 N.E.2d 324 (1981)(en-
forcement of an unwritten covenant not to compete against a seller of a corporation with a
substantial good will factor). See generally A. VAuIs, COVENANTS NOT TO COMPETE: FoRMs,
TACTICS AND THE LAW § 1.6 (1985).
104 See Abrams v. Abrams-Rubaloff & Assoc's, 170 Cal. Rptr. at 661 (1981)(value of a
hypothetical covenant not to compete properly taken into account in determining the fair
value of purchased shares; but the issue of whether a non-competition provision was
included in the order of sale was not discussed in the opinion).
o See CAL. CORP. CODE § 2000 (West Supp. 1986); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:12-7(8)(West
Supp. 1986). See also CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-384 (West 1960 & Supp. 1986)(cash deposit
for the full amount of the purchase price must be paid to clerk of court at the time the
shareholders exercise statutory purchase option; no right of the corporation to exercise
purchase option specified). It may be possible to interpret the California and New Jersey
statutes so that even though owners of fifty percent or more of the shares must file the
buy-out petition, not all the petitioners have to actually participate in the purchase. There
are no cases on this issue.
106 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 32, § 1214(1)(b)(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1985). This statute applies to
involuntary dissolution suits involving statutory close corporations. The equivalent statute
for other corporations authorizes the corporation or any other shareholder to file the buy-out
petition. Id. § 12.55(g) (Smith-Hurd 1985 Replacement Volume).
107 Id. § 12.55(g).
108 State corporation codes contain a wide variety of restrictions on stock redemptions.
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Buy-out statutes should also specify that the interest rate on any
court-ordered installment purchase can be based on existing rates for
similar privately negotiated close corporation installment sales and need
not be limited to the state's interest rate on judgments. 0 9 They should
also authorize a court to require security and personal guarantees for any
court-ordered installment purchase.11o
In short, the statutes should grant the courts discretion to include in
the buy-out order any provision that competent lawyers would include in
a privately negotiated buy-out agreement. 1 '
Several of the buy-out statutes authorize the corporation or other
shareholders to file a petition after an involuntary dissolution suit is
filed, demanding the right to purchase the plaintiffs shares. 112 Under
these statutes, once the petition is filed, the involuntary dissolution suit
is stayed pending a determination of the fair value of the plaintiffs
shares, and upon payment, the involuntary dissolution suit is presum-
ably dismissed. 113 This type of statute is appealing not only because it
avoids the possibility of an involuntary dissolution, but also because the
majority shareholders can prevent a public airing of the corporation's
internal dissension if the buy-out petition is filed before any hearings
take place. In six states, however, the statutes do not give the trial court
discretion to reject the buy-out petition if it is filed within a certain time
period.1 4 Yet the evidence, if allowed to be presented, may indicate that
See Kummert, State Statutory Restrictions on Financial Distributions by Corporations to
Shareholders Part 1, 55 WASH. L. REV. 359 (1980); Part 11, 59 WASH. L. REV. 185 (1984).
109 Compare Blake v. Blake Agency, Inc., 486 N.Y.S.2d 341, 350 (1985)(prejudgment
interest rate payable until full purchase price paid) with In re Fleischer, 486 N.Y.S.2d at
275 (1985) (twelve percent interest affirmed v. nine percent authorized in the Blake case).
"' See MBCA Stat. Close Corp. Supp., supra note 69, § 42(b)(2); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 302A.751 subd. 2 (West 1985).
I" See generally, ORGANIZING A SMALL BUSINESS ENTiTy, supra note 2, § 5.04(c)(1986). The
statute should, however, give the court discretion to deny one or more of these rights. See,
e.g., Taines v. Gene Barry One Hour Photo Processing, Inc., 474 N.Y.S.2d 362 (1983)(re-
quest of an installment purchase denied as punishment for defendants' behavior).
112 See CAL. CORP. CODE § 2000 (West Supp. 1986); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-384 (West
1960 & Supp. 1986); IlL. REV. STAT. ch. 32 § 12.55(g)(Smith-Hurd 1985 Replacement
Volume) and § 1214(b)(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1985)(applies to electing close corporations); MD.
CORPS. & ASS'N CODE ANN. § 4-603 (1985); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.752 subd. 2 (West 1985);
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:12-7(8)(West Supp. 1986); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 1118 (McKinney
1986); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 7-1.1-90.1 (Supp. 1985). Several other states have statutes allowing
a court on its own motion to order a sale to the corporation or other shareholders. See, e.g.,
S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-21-155 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1986).
"t In re Cristo Bros., Inc., 489 N.Y.S.2d 35, 64 N.Y.2d 975, 478 N.E.2d 176 (1985).
114 See CAL. CORP. CODE § 2000 (West Supp. 1986); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-384 (West
1960 & Supp. 1986); MD. CORPS. & AsS'N CODE ANN. § 4-603 (1985); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW
§ 1118 (McKinney 1986); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 7-1.1-90.1 (Supp. 1985). Illinois has one statute
which specifically gives the court authority to reject the buy-out petition but has another
statute, applicable to electing statutory close corporations, that omits any mention of court
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another remedy, including a purchase of the defendants' shares by the
plaintiff, is the most appropriate remedy in the circumstances. In
addition, the exercise of the buy-out right could prejudice other pending
causes of action by the plaintiff against the defendants. In one recent
case, for example, a court held that a plaintiffs derivative claim and a
claim to compel payment of dividends were barred because the facts
giving rise to these causes of action took place after the date established
for the buy-out.11 Even if any remaining causes of action survive, the
plaintiff will have lost the negotiating leverage provided by the potential
threat of involuntary dissolution.
For these and other reasons, this type of buy-out statute should include
a provision giving the trial court the power to reject the buy-out offer if
the plaintiff can make out a prima facie case that the forced buy-out
would be prejudicial or inequitable. 116 Because the plaintiff is guaranteed
the fair value of his or her shares, which will in most cases satisfy the
main objective in bringing the suit, a hearing on the merits of the buy-out
proposal will likely be requested only in exceptional circumstances. Yet,
in these special circumstances, the right to a hearing is a desirable
safeguard of the plaintiffs rights and is consistent with the wide
discretion given to trial judges with respect to all other aspects of
involuntary dissolution suits.117
III. INVOLUNTARY DISSOLUTION CASES DECIDED IN 1984-1985
A. Statistical Analysis
What results actually occur in close corporation involuntary dissolu-
tion suits? One way to answer this question is to examine existing
discretion on this issue. Compare ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 32, § 12.55(g)(Smith-Hurd 1985
Replacement Volume) with id. § 1214(b)(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1985). For a case holding that
no evidentiary hearing on the merits of the dissolution cause of action is authorized once the
buy-out petition is filed, see Abrams v. Abrams-Rubaloff & Assoc's, Inc., 114 Cal. App. 3d
240 (1981).
These statutes can present the defendants with a difficult procedural choice: if the
buy-out right is exercised within the statutory time frame, the defendants give up the
opportunity of prevailing on the merits in a trial; but if they do not exercise the statutory
buy-out right, they assume the risk that the court may be unwilling to order or allow a
buy-out at a subsequent stage or may order a buy-out at a lower price. See Gimpel v.
Bolstein, 125 Misc. 2d 45, 477 N.Y.S.2d 1014, 1018 n.4 (1984).
" Miller v. Ruth's of North Carolina, Inc., 69 N.C. App. 672, 318 S.E.2d 2 (1984).
"" See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.751 subd. 2 (West 1985)(the court upon petition "may"
order the sale); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:12-7(8)(West Supp. 1986)("the court may order the
sale by the plaintiff or plaintiffs of all shares of the corporation's stock held by them to
either the corporation or the moving shareholders, whichever is specified in the motion, if
the court determines in its discretion that such an order would be fair and equitable to all
parties under all the circumstances of the case").
'7 See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
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published opinions. For the purposes of this article, the opinions pub-
lished in 1984 and 1985 in which involuntary dissolution was one of the
major causes of action were analyzed. These two years were chosen
simply because they were the two most recent years for which decisions
were available. Given the number and variety of cases during 1984 and
1985, it is doubtful that increasing the number of years in the sample
would have yielded any significantly different or additional conclusions.
The 1984 and 1985 involuntary dissolution cases present an interesting
statistical profile. There were a total of forty-seven cases that qualified
for the sample.118 Forty-five of the cases came from twenty different
states Alaska, 119 Arizona, 20 California,12 1 Colorado, 122 Connecticut, 123
Georgia,124 Idaho, 25 Illinois,126 Iowa, 27 Louisiana, 128 Kansas, 129 Mary-
land,130 Minnesota,13' Montana, 132 Nevada, 133 New York,134 North Caro-
l18 There were three separate opinions published in one of the cases, but it is counted as
only one case for statistical purposes. See Miller v. Ruth's of North Carolina, Inc., 75 N.C.
App. 233, 313 S.E.2d 849 (1984); 69 N.C. App. 153, 316 S.E.2d 622 (1984); 69 N.C. App. 672,
318 S.E.2d 2 (1984). Six additional cases were initially considered but ultimately rejected.
Two of them involved cases where the trial court on its own motion ordered dissolution and
the appellate court held that there was no authority for such action. Combre v. Warren's
Family Drive-Inns, Inc., 680 P.2d 733 (Utah 1984); Owens v. Bricks, Inc., 703 S.W.2d 147
(Tenn App. 1985). One case was rejected because it was not clear from the opinion whether
the suit was brought by a shareholder or a creditor. Waddell v. Trostel, 485 A.2d 1208 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1984). Two more were eliminated because it was not clear from the opinion
whether involuntary dissolution of a corporation was one of the plaintiffs requests for relief.
Rosenburg v. Rosenburg Brothers Special Account, 134 Mich. App. 342, 351 N.W.2d 563
(1984)(involved both a partnership and a corporation); Evans v. Blesi, 345 N.W.2d 775
(Minn. Ct. App. 1984)("damages and equitable relief"; court ordered a buy-out and enjoined
both shareholders from filing for involuntary dissolution for two years). The sixth case was
an involutnary dissolution suit filed against a publicly held corporation. Gottschall v. Jones
& Laughlin Steel Corp., 482 A.2d 979 (Pa. Super. 1984).
119 Stefani v. Coppock, 705 P.2d 443 (Alaska 1985).
121 Mordka v. Mordka Enter's, Inc., 143 Ariz. 298, 693 P.2d 953 (Ariz. App. 1984).
121 Ronald v. 4-C's Elec. Packaging, Inc., 168 Cal. App. 3d 290, 214 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1985);
Baker v. Pratt, 173 Cal. App. 3d 1, 219 Cal. Rptr. 229 (1985), vacated 176 Cal. App. 3d 370,
222 Cal. Rptr. 253 (1986); Humes v. Margil Ventures, Inc., 174 Cal. App. 3d 486, 220 Cal.
Rptr. 186 (1985); Hoiles v. Superior Court, 157 Cal. App. 3d 1192, 204 Cal. Rptr. 111 (1984);
Resch v. Troy, Malin & Pottinger, 151 Cal. App. 3d 293, 198 Cal. Rptr. 504 (1984).
122 Neusteter v. District Court, 675 P.2d 1 (Col. 1984).
12 Bricklin v. Stengol Corp., 1 Conn. App. 656, 476 A.2d 584 (1984).
124 Gregory v. J.T. Gregory & Son, Inc., 338 S.E.2d 7 (Ga. App. 1985).
12' Gillingham v. Swan Falls Land & Cattle Co., 106 Idaho 859, 683 P.2d 895 (1984).
126 Smith-Shrader Co. v. Smith, 136 111. App. 3d 571,91 Ill. Dec. 1, 483 N.E.2d 283 (1985);
Coduti v. Hellwig, 127 Ill. App. 3d 279, 82 Ill. Dec. 686, 469 N.E.2d 220 (1984).
127 Sauer v. Moffitt, 363 N.W.2d 269 (Iowa App. 1984).
12' Allen v. Royale, "16", Inc., 449 So. 2d 1365 (La. App. 1984); Baltazor v. Walden, 459
So. 2d 711 (La. App. 1984).
129 Goben v. Barry, 234 Kan. 721, 676 P.2d 90 (1984).
130 Valerino v. Little, 62 Md. App. 588, 490 A.2d 756 (1985).
131 Schaub v. Kortgard, 372 N.W.2d 427 (Minn. App. 1985).
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lina,1 35 Pennsylvania, 13 6 South Carolina,137 and Texas. 13 The remaining
two are from Great Britain. 39 They were included in the sample first,
because historically the English close corporation dissension decisions
have been influential in the United States; la0 second, because these two
cases illustrate certain points that are not present in the American
decisions; and third, because their inclusion does not significantly affect
any of the statistical data.
Ten of the cases in the sample involved technical legal issues in which
no decision on the type of relief, if any, had been made at the time the
opinion was issued. 14 1 Although many of these opinions decided impor-
132 Maddox v. Norman, 697 P.2d 1368 (Mont. 1985).
133 Johnson v. Steel, Inc., 678 P.2d 676 (Nev. 1984).
134 In re Cristo Bros., Inc., 64 N.Y.S.2d 975, 489 N.Y.S.2d 35, 478 N.E.2d 970 (1985); In
re Kemp & Beatley, Inc., 64 N.Y.2d 63, 484 N.Y.S.2d 799, 473 N.E.2d 1173 (1984); In re
Wiedy's Furniture Clearance Center Co., 108 A.D.2d 91, 487 N.Y.S.2d 901 (1985); In re
DuBonnet Scarfs, Inc., 105 A.D.2d 339, 484 N.Y.S.2d 541 (1985); In re Levitt, 109 A.D.2d
502, 492 N.Y.S.2d 736 (1985); In re Gargano, 112 A.D.2d 225, 491 N.Y.S.2d 440 (1985); In
re Rappaport, 110 A.D.2d 639, 487 N.Y.S.2d 376 (1985); Gunzberg v. Art-Lloyd Metal Prod's
Corp., 112 A.D.2d 423, 492 N.Y.S.2d 83 (1985); Blake v. Blake Agency, Inc., 107 A.D. 139,
486 N.Y.S.2d 341 (1985); In re Fleischer, 107 A.D.2d 97, 486 N.Y.S.2d 272 (1985); Lewis v.
Jones, 107 A.D.2d 931, 483 N.Y.S.2d 868 (1985); Wolff v. Wolff, 112 A.D.2d 850, 492
N.Y.S.2d 763 (1985); In re Mintz, 112 A.D.2d 803, 493 N.Y.S.2d 488 (1985); Ricci v. First
Time Around, Inc., 112 A.D.2d 794, 112 A.D.2d 795, 492 N.Y.S.2d 295 (1985); Rosen v.
Hofteller Enterprises, Inc., 102 A.D.2d 855, 476 N.Y.S.2d 625 (1984); Gimpel v. Bolstein,
125 Misc. 45, 477 N.Y.S.2d 1014 (1984); In re Trocino, 126 Misc. 2d 394, 482 N.Y.S.2d 670
(1984); In re T.J. Ronan Paint Corp., 98 A.D.2d 413, 469 N.Y.S.2d 931 (1984). The large
number of cases from New York is probably due to trials and appeals from the inital batch
of cases filed after New York in 1979 enacted special legislation allowing holders of twenty
percent or more of the shares of a closely held corporation to file for involuntary dissolution
on much broader grounds than was previously possible and authorizing the remaining
shareholders to avoid involuntary dissolution by electing to buy-out the plaintiffs shares.
See N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 1104-a, 1118 (McKinney 1986). See supra notes 112-17 and
accompanying text and infra notes 194-96 and accompanying text for additional discussion
of these New York statutes.
135 Lowder v. All Star Mills, Inc., 75 N.C. App. 233, 330 S.E.2d 649 (1985); Miller v.
Ruth's of North Carolina, Inc., 313 S.E.2d 849 (N.C. App. 1984); 69 N.C. App. 153, 316
S.E.2d 622 (1984); 69 N.C. App. 672, 318 S.E.2d 2 (1984).
135 Orchard v. Covelli, 590 F.2d 1548 (W.D. Pa. 1984).
137 Ward v. Ward Farms, Inc., 283 S.C. 568, 324 S.E.2d 63 (1984).
138 Burnett v. Chase Oil & Gas, Inc., 700 S.W.2d 737 (Tex. App. 1985); Leck v. Pugh, 676
S.W.2d 180 (Tex. Civ. App. 1984).
131 In re Bird Precision Bellows Ltd. [1985] 3 All E.R. 523 (Ct. App.), affirming, [19841 3
All E.R. 444 (Ch. Div.); In re Zinotty Properties Ltd., [19841 3 All E.R. 754 (Ch. Div.).
140 See supra notes 42-55 and accompanying text. See generally O'NEAL'S OPPRESSION OF
MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS, supra note 1, § 10:14.
141 See Humes v. Margil Ventures, Inc., 174 Cal. App. 3d 486, 220 Cal. Rptr. 186
(1985)(involuntary dissolution suit and separate administrative action to have a contract
terminated for lack of a proper license arising out of the same facts can proceed
simultaneously without an election of remedies); Hiles v. Superior Court, 157 Cal. App. 3d
1192, 204 Cal. Rptr. 111 (1984)(the applicability of the attorney-client privilege and the
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tant procedural points that could have a significant impact on the
ultimate outcome of the case, 142 they will not be discussed further in this
article.
Of the remaining thirty-seven cases, a buy-out was the most frequent
relief ordered by the court or elected by the defendants. This result
occurred in twenty of the decisions (fifty-four percent). 143 Dissolution was
ordered in ten of the cases (twenty-seven percent). In four of the cases
(eleven percent), no substantial relief was granted to the plaintiff on the
merits. Finally, in the three other cases (eight percent) relief other than
either dissolution or a buy-out was the exclusive remedy ordered; and in
eleven of the dissolution and buy-out cases (thirty percent of the total and
thirty-seven percent of the dissolution and buy-out cases), additional
relief was also granted. This additional relief included compensatory
damages, punitive damages, an accounting, cancellation of issued stock,
partial liquidation and other innovative orders which will be discussed
later in this section.
That a court-supervised buy-out was the predominant form of ultimate
relief and that a buy-out occurred twice as frequently as a court-ordered
liquidation is not surprising. A buy-out, assuming fair value is received
for the shares, gives the plaintiff a cash-out right that he or she would not
otherwise have, and in many cases, this is undoubtedly the principal
motivation behind the lawsuit. Getting rid of a dissatisfied shareholder
permanently is also advantageous to the corporation and remaining
shareholders. Moreover, as was pointed out in the last section, 144 judges
have consistently stated that dissolution should be ordered only as a last
resort when no alternative remedy is feasible; and the dissolution cases in
work product doctrine in an involuntary dissolution suit); Resch v. Troy, Malin & Pottinger,
151 Cal. App. 3d 293, 198 Cal. Rptr, 504 (1984); Neusteter v. District Court, 675 P.2d 1 (Col.
1984)(applicability of the accountant-client privilege in a combination derivative and
involuntary dissolution action); Baltazor v. Walden, 459 So. 2d 711 (La. App. 1984); Johnson
v. Steel, Inc., 678 P.2d 676 (Nev. 1984); Lewis v. Jones, 107 A.D.2d 931, 483 N.Y.S.2d 868
(1985)(common law right to involuntary dissolution exists in addition to statutory right and
can be pursued even though the plaintiff has brought a separate derivative suit arising out
of the same facts); In re Mintz, 113 A.D.2d 803, 493 N.Y.S.2d 488 (1955)(an evidentiary
hearing must be held in a contested involutnary dissolution suit); Ricci v. First Time
Around, Inc., 112 A.D.2d 794, 112 A.D.2d 795, 492 N.Y.S.2d 295 (1985)(same); Rosen v.
Hofteller Enterprises, Inc., 102 A.D.2d 855, 476 N.Y.S.2d 625 (1984)(same).
142 See the parentheticals following the citations in note 141 supra.
143 In two of the New York cases the court ordered dissolution if the defendants did not
purchase the plaintiffs shares. See In re Kemp & Beatley, Inc., 64 N.Y.2d 63, 484 N.Y.S.2d
799, 473 N.E.2d 1173 (1984); Gunzberg v. Art-Lloyd Metal Prod's Corp., 112 A.D.2d 423,
492 N.Y.S.2d 83 (1985). These cases were classified as buy-out cases rather than dissolution
cases for two reasons: (1) the defendants were given a choice, so any liquidation was
voluntary, not involuntary; and (2) the appropriate sanction for failure to comply with a
buy-out order is liquidation. See MBCA Model Stat. Close Corp. Supp. supra note 69, § 42(a).
144 See supra notes 27-28 and accompanying text.
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the sample used in this article illustrate that in this instance, judges are
practicing what they preach.
What is somewhat surprising is the number of cases in which a
court-supervised buy-out is the result of the involuntary dissolution suit.
In a previous study of the fifty-four involuntary dissolution opinions
decided between 1960-1976 conducted by Professors J.A.C. Hetherington
and Michael P. Dooley of the University of Virginia,145 a court-ordered or
court supervised buy-out was involved in only three of the cases, 46
whereas dissolution was ordered in sixteen of the twenty-seven cases in
which some affirmative relief was granted. 147
Two reasons probably account for the rather dramatic change in the
mix between dissolution and buy-out cases in the two samples. First, a
number of states have in recent years enacted statutes that allow the
defendants to exercise a statutory buy-out right to purchase the shares of
the plaintiff, thereby terminating the involuntary dissolution cause of
action. 148 This statutory buy-out right was exercised in eight of the
twenty buy-out cases in the 1984-1985 opinions. Six of these were from
New York, which enacted this type of statute in 1979.149 Second, courts in
recent years seem to be increasingly willing to order a buy-out.150
Perhaps this in turn reflects a greater willingness of courts to consider
options other than dissolution or dismissal. Of the involuntary dissolu-
tion cases analyzed by Professor Hetherington and Dooley, no affirmative
relief was granted in twenty-seven cases, and in eighteen of those cases,
dissolution was either denied, or the complaint was dismissed.151 Only
four of the thirty-seven decisions on the merits in 1984 and 1985,
however, resulted in no substantial relief being granted.152
145 Hetherington & Dooley, Illiquidity And Exploitation: A Proposed Statutory Solution
to the Remaining Close Corporation Problem, 63 VA. L. REV. 1 (1976)[hereinafter
Hetherington & Dooley].
14' Id. App. I, cases 7, 8: App. II case 24, pp. 64-75.
147 Id. App., Table II, pp. 70-75.
148 See supra notes 112-27 and accompanying text.
149 In re Cristo Bros., Inc., 64 N.Y.2d 975, 489 N.Y.S.2d 35, 478 N.E.2d 970 (1985); In re
Levitt, 109 A.D.2d 502, 492 N.Y.S.2d 736 (1985); In re Gargano, 1120 A.D.2d 225, 491
N.Y.S.2d 440 (1985); Blake v. Blake Agency, Inc., 107 A.D. 139, 486 N.Y.S.2d 341 (1985);
In re Fleischer, 107 A.D.2d 97, 486 N.Y.S.2d 272 (1985); In re Trocino, 126 Misc. 2d 304,482
N.Y.S.2d 670 (1984). The other two cases are: Ronald v. 4-C's Electronic Packaging, Inc.,
168 Cal. App. 290, 214 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1985); and Bricklin v. Stengol Corp., 1 Conn. App.
656, 476 A.2d 584 (1984).
150 Actually, no court ordered a buy-out in any of the cases analyzed by Professors
Hetherington & Dooley. All three of the buy-out cases were from states having the statutory
buy-out format. In two of these cases, the plaintiff withdrew the complaint after the buy-out
petition was filed. See Hetherington & Dooley, supra note 145 App. I, cases 7, 8; App. II case
24, pp. 64-75.
I d., App. I, pp. 64-69.
152 These cases are discussed infra notes 235-54 and accompanying text.
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Professors Hetherington and Dooley not only analyzed the judicial
opinions issued between 1960 and the end of 1976, but they also followed
up on each case to determine the ultimate outcome. Interestingly, out of
all the cases, including those for which relief had been denied, fifty-four
percent actually ended up with one side buying out the other. 153 This is
exactly the same percentage as the buy-out cases in the 1984-1985
decisions. This parallelism suggests that recent decisions more accu-
rately mirror the results ultimately negotiated by the parties than the
decisions rendered a decade or more ago. 5 4
Factually, the 1984-1985 involuntary dissolution cases present a
fascinating tableau.155 Roughly forty percent involved dissension in
family-owned businesses. Many of the remaining sixty percent had more
than one shareholder from a family, but were not controlled by a single
family. Two of these cases' 56 involved a dissatisfied divorced spouse
153 See Hetherington & Dooley, supra note 145, App. I and II, pp. 64-75.
154 With respect to dissolution, ten of the thirty-seven cases in the 1984-1985 cases or
twenty-seven percent resulted in an involuntary dissolution order whereas only nine out of
fifty-four or seventeen percent of the corporations covered by the Hetherington and Dooley
survey were actually liquidated. Id. at 31. Just because an involuntary dissolution order is
issued does not mean that the corporation will be liquidated. Prior to liquidation, it could be
sold to a third party or one or more of the shareholders could buy out the plaintiffs shares.
This occurred in twelve of the seventeen cases in the Hetherington and Dooley survey where
the court ordered dissolution. See id. App., Table II, at 70-75. Based on these figures, the
percentage of corporations in the 1984-1985 sample used in this article that will actually be
liquidated may be lower than the Hetherington and Dooley sample of 1960-1976 cases.
155 The only major types of oppression not represented in the 1984 and 1985 involuntary
dissolution cases are freeze-out mergers and other related squeeze-out techniques such as
asset sales. See O'NEAL'S OPPRESSION OF MINOMY SHAREHOLDERS, supra note 1, §§ 5:04 - 5:08,
5:15 - 5:20. These cases are usually litigated as dissenters' rights cases; and damages can be
awarded for self-dealing transactions and other breaches of fiduciary duty by the majority
toward the minority shareholders arising out of the transaction. See Alpert v. 28 Williams
St. Corp., 63 N.Y.2d 557, 483 N.Y.S.2d 667, 473 N.E.2d 19 (1984); Weinberger v. UOP, Inc.,
457 A.2d 701 (Del. Sup. 1983). There is some authority, however, for challenging the
transaction in an involutnary dissolution action. See Gabhart v. Gabhart, 267 Ind. 370, 370
N.E.2d 345, 352-56 (1977)(freeze-out merger with no business purpose can be treated as a
de facto dissolution of the corporation). But see Jones v. Highway Inn, Inc., 424 So. 2d 944
(Fla. Dist. Ct. 1983)(dissenters' rights are exclusive, at least once the time period for filing
dissenters' rights has expired). On the issue of the exclusivity of dissenter's rights, see
Vorenberg, Exclusiveness of the Dissenting Shareholders Appraisal Rights, 77 HARv. L. REV.
1189 (1964). The possibility of an involuntary dissolution type claim even though dissent-
er's rights may be available is contemplated by the MBCA Statutory Close Corporation
Supplement. See MBCA Stat. Close Corp. Supp., supra note 69, § 40(d)("If a shareholder has
dissenters' rights . . . with respect to proposed corporate action, he must commence a
proceeding under this section before he is required to give notice of his intent to demand
payment.., or the proceeding is barred"). The advantage of such a suit is the possibility of
relief other than a monetary award.
.s Stefano v. Coppock, 705 P.2d 443 (Alaska 1985); Bricklin v. Stengol Corp., 1 Conn.
656, 476 A.2d 584 (1984).
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shareholder, an emerging category of case that will be explored in more
detail later in this section. 157
The family-controlled corporation cases are about what one would
expect: father-child and sibling disputes, dissension that develops after a
founding shareholder dies or retires, and divorce. Five of the cases1 58
(thirty-three percent of the total) involved family farms, another emerg-
ing category.
The remaining cases present a broad range of factual situations that
are difficult to categorize. The one consistent theme in most of these cases
is that the dissension between the shareholders is deep-seated and
protracted. This is particularly true with respect to the cases where
dissolution was ordered. The behavior exhibited by one side or the other,
and sometimes both sides, can in many cases only be described as
egregious and incredible, proving once again the wisdom of the old adage
that "truth is stranger than fiction."
A court-ordered or court-supervised buy-out was more prevalent in the
family-controlled corporation cases than in the remaining cases (sixty-
seven percent vs. forty-one percent). The family-controlled corporation
cases also had a lesser percentage of dissolution orders (twenty percent
vs. thirty-two percent) and fewer cases where no relief was granted (one
out of fifteen vs. three out of twenty-two). These statistics are not really
surprising, however.
The analysis of the 1984-1985 cases becomes more interesting when
they are examined in more detail. For this purpose, the cases will be
divided between those where dissolution was ordered and those where
relief other than dissolution, or no relief, was granted.
B. The Dissolution Cases
As a general rule, courts have ordered dissolution in two types of
situations: (1) protracted deadlock that stems from irreconcilable policy
or personal differences between the shareholders; and (2) high-handed,
overreaching egregious conduct by a dominating shareholder. The 1984
and 1985 cases contain illustrations of both types.
Leck v. Pugh'59 is a classical case of protracted deadlock. Leck and
Pugh formed a Texas corporation in 1972. Each owned fifty percent of the
shares. Almost from the inception of the business they engaged in
1 See infra notes 224-34 and accompanying text.
"~ Sauer v. Moffitt, 363 N.W.2d 269 (Iowa Ct. App. 1984); Maddox v. Norman, 697 P.2d
1368 (Mont. 1985); Lowder v. All Star Mills, Inc., 75 N.C. App. 233, 330 S.E.2d 649 (1985);
Gimpel v. Bolstein, 125 Misc. 2d 45, 477 N.Y.S.2d 1014 (1984); Ward v. Ward Farms, Inc.,
283 S.C. 568, 324 S.E.2d 63 (1984). One of the non-family cases also involved a farm
corporation. See Gillingham v. Swan Falls Land & Cattle Co., 106 Idaho 859, 683 P.2d 895
(1984).
159 676 S.W.2d 180 (Tex. Civ. App. 1984).
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continual litigation against each other. Finally, in 1979, a custodial
receiver was appointed, but he was unable after several years to come up
with a feasible plan to remedy the differences between the co-owners. The
Texas Court of Appeals upheld the trial court's involuntary dissolution
order, stating that "[tihe parties are irrevocably at odds with no reason-
able chance for any change. ' '16°
In re T.J. Ronan Paint Company,'16 a New York case, combines both
protracted deadlock and high-handed behavior. The two principal share-
holders, Lennon and Doran, who individually and through their respec-
tive families each controlled fifty percent of the corporation's stock, had
management disagreements beginning in the mid-1970's which intensi-
fied in 1976 when Lennon sued Duran for fraud, conversion, and waste.
This set off four years of corporate warfare during which time Lennon
allegedly physically assaulted Doran, cut off his salary, and locked him
out of the corporate offices. In spite of this turmoil, the corporation was
financially successful. In 1980 a custodial receiver was appointed. The
judge who appointed the receiver remarked in his opinion that "the two
principals had consumed more time in litigating claims involving this
corporation than any other group of litigants in the court's experience. "162
This particular opinion, issued in 1984 by the Appellate Division of the
New York Supreme Court, dealt with a number of issues relating to the
receivership, which at the time of the appeal had lasted three and
one-half years. The court ordered the corporation to be dissolved imme-
diately by public sale of assets unless Lennon and Duran could agree on
a private sale within thirty days. In the course of the opinion the court
observed that:
The degree of dissension, reflected by the intense personal hos-
tility, poses an irreconcilable barrier to the continued functioning
and prosperity of the corporation, a hopeless deadlock which
mandates dissolution as the only viable remedy. 16 3
Another somewhat similar combination of deadlock and overreaching
is Mordka v. Mordka Enterprises, Inc.,'6 which involved a financially
successful real estate corporation owned by three brothers. In June 1979
one of the brothers, Irwin, who had moved back to Arizona from New
160 Id. at 181. See also Burnett v. Chase Oil & Gas, Inc., 700 S.W.2d 737 (Tex. Civ. App.
1985)(after eighteen months the custodial receiver recommended liquidation of a two-man
deadlocked corporation); Gillingham v. Swan Falls Land & Cattle Co., 106 Idaho 859, 683
P.2d 895 (1984)(irreconcilable differences over proper use of a small farm equally owned by
the widows of the two founding shareholders).
161 98 A.D.2d 413, 469 N.Y.S.2d 931 (1984).
162 Id. at 415, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 933.
163 Id. at 421, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 936.
164 143 Ariz. 298, 693 P.2d 953 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1984).
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Zealand five months earlier at the request of the other two brothers, was
fired from the corporation, and his salary was terminated. The corpora-
tion paid no dividends. After the freeze-out the two brothers who were
active in the business raised their own salaries, bought and sold property,
and took other action in clear violation of a bylaw that required
unanimous consent of all three brothers for major decisions. This bylaw
had been agreed to at the insistence of Irwin at the time the three
brothers acquired a controlling block of stock from their mother. The trial
court ordered the corporation dissolved on the grounds that a technical
deadlock existed because of the unanimous consent bylaw. The appellants
unsuccessfully argued on appeal that the unanimous consent bylaw was
unenforceable. They also contended that it was improper to order
involuntary dissolution of a profitable corporation. The Arizona Court of
Appeals rejected this argument stating that profitability is not the "sole
criterion."165 The court further held that the Arizona involuntary disso-
lution statute requires "only that irreparable injury is threatened by
reason of the deadlock" 166 and that if the unanimous consent bylaw was
enforced, the corporation would be unable to borrow money or exercise
options without Irwin's consent, which presumably he would refuse to
give, thereby presenting a sufficient threat of irreparable injury.
Mordka represents an enlightened, liberal view of what constitutes a
deadlock. 167 In many other states, this case might have been classified as
a freeze-out oppression case. The only ground for involuntary dissolution
of a corporation other than an electing statutory close corporation in
Arizona, however, is deadlock. 168 Therefore, Mordka can logically be
viewed as an illustration of a court's willingness to stretch traditional
statutory construction principles to reach a desired result.
Goben v. Barry69 illustrates judicial inventiveness of a different kind.
In 1978 Goben and Barry organized a corporation to sell oil and gas
drilling interests pursuant to an oral agreement under which they were
each to own fifty percent of the stock, share profits and losses equally, and
draw equal salaries. No stock was apparently issued at the time the
corporation was formed, however. This joint venture was financially
successful from its inception, perhaps too successful. Several months after
the corporation began business, Barry, without Goben's knowledge or
consent, increased his weekly salary from $560 to $1,700. Shortly
165 Id. at 305, 693 P.2d at 960.
166 Id. at 305, 693 P.2d at 960.
167 See supra notes 33-38 and accompanying text.
161 See Asiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10-097 (1977). The involuntary dissolution statute
applicable to electing close corporations uses the somewhat broader term "deadlock or
dispute." Id. § 10-215(b). Cf. King v. Coulter, 113 Ariz. 245, 550 P.2d 623 (1976)(court
denied relief based on oppression theory in case involving excessive salaries and bonuses
and no dividends because of absence of statutory authority).
169 234 Kan. 721, 676 P.2d 90 (1984).
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thereafter, when Goben asked to see the check register, Barry became
quite belligerent and tried to badger Goben into selling his interest to
him for $10,000. Goben refused this ultimatum. Barry then proceeded to
cut off Goben's salary, have Goben's personal belongings in the corpora-
tion's office removed to a storage warehouse, and repossess an automobile
that had been purchased by the corporation for Goben's use. He also
issued shares representing fifty percent of the stock to his wife and during
the four years preceding the trial of this case authorized salaries to
himself and his wife that averaged about $125,000 per year.
Given the factual situation, it is not surprising that the Arizona Court
of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision that the corporation be
dissolved and also affirmed a punitive damage judgment of $82,237
against Barry. The interesting aspects of this decision are the court's
willingness to enforce the oral agreement between Goben and Barry and
the innovative fashion in which the court framed its order of relief.
Reversing the trial judge's ruling that Goben was only entitled to his
share of the profits up until the date Barry froze him out of the
corporation, the Arizona Court of Appeals held that Goben was entitled to
one-half of the net profits from the inception of the business until it was
formally dissolved. The court also held that Goben was entitled to
one-half the net assets upon liquidation and prejudgment interest on the
amount of salary paid to Barry and his wife in excess of the amount paid
to Goben plus a reasonable salary for the services performed for the
corporation by Barry's wife. 170 In effect the court treated the corporation
as if it were a partnership and gave Goben essentially the same rights as
he would have under the Uniform Partnership Act. 17 1
Another interesting dissolution case in the two-year sample used for
this article is Lowder v. All Star Mills, Inc.,172 which involved six
interrelated family corporations that engaged in various farming opera-
tions in North Carolina. All Star Mills, Inc., the original corporation, had
been formed in 1934 by W.A. Lowder. The other corporations were formed
in the 1950s and 1960s. All the corporations were owned in varying
percentages by the children and grandchildren of W.A. Lowder and their
spouses. The two principal protaganists were Horace Lowder, who since
W.A. Lowder's death in 1970 had assumed complete control and domina-
tion of all the corporations, and his brother, Malcolm, who worked over
the years as an executive in several of the corporations. Malcolm began
taking an active interest in the businesses in the mid-1970s following
Horace's criminal conviction for income tax evasion. In 1978 Malcolm
demanded full access to the books and records of all the corporations.
170 Id. at 731, 676 P.2d at 99.
171 See Unif. Partnership Act §§ 38-42 (1914). See also supra note 96 and accompanying
text.
172 75 N.C. App. 233, 330 S.E.2d 649 (1985).
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Horace refused this request, but he did give Malcolm income statements
and balance sheets for the previous ten years. Then, three days after
Malcolm's demand, Horace issued additional shares to himself giving him
absolute control in All Star Mills, Inc. At that point, All Star Mills, Inc.
was a holding company which leased property to businesses controlled by
Horace and which owned stock in some of the other corporations in the
group. Malcolm then filed this lawsuit and Horace retaliated by firing
him from his employment with one of the corporations.
Two types of relief were granted by the trial court and affirmed by the
North Carolina Court of Appeals. First, a constructive trust was placed
on the assets of three of the corporations controlled by Horace under the
corporate opportunity doctrine on the grounds that many of the assets
used in the formation and operation of these corporations were wrong-
fully diverted from All Star Mills, Inc. Under this part of the judgment,
All Star Mills, Inc. was to receive the assets of these three corporations
after payment of outstanding liabilities and repayment of investments
"properly proven. ' 173 Second, the remaining three corporations were
ordered to be dissolved on two grounds: one, that Horace's actions
improperly frustrated the reasonable expectations of Malcolm and the
other shareholders who were in agreement with Malcolm's position and
two, that dissolution was the only way the plaintiffs could realize their
reasonable expectations.1 7 4 In the course of the opinion, the court, which
adopted the rationale of the 1983 North Carolina Supreme Court case of
Meiselman v. Meiselman,1 75 stated:
Among the rights and interest that the Court in Meiselman said
that a shareholder has in a close corporation are secure employ-
ment, fringe benefits which flow from his association with the
corporation, and meaningful participation in the management of
the family business, in addition to the traditional shareholder
rights, such as the right to notice of stockholders' meetings, the
right to vote cumulatively, the right of access to the corporate
offices and to corporate financial information, and the right to
compel the payment of dividends. In the present case, the supe-
rior court found and concluded that plaintiffs, as shareholders of
All Star Mills, had reasonable expectations that the companies
would be managed by the controlling officer in accordance with
his fiduciary obligations and according to law; that the plaintiffs'
173 Id, at 242, 330 SE.2d 655.
174 North Carolina has an unusual statute that authorizes involuntary dissolution when
it is "reasonably necessary for the protection of the rights and interests of the complaining
shareholder." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-125(a)(4)(1982). This language has been interpreted as
encompassing the reasonable expectations doctrine. See Meiselman v. Meiselman, 309 N.C.
279, 307 S.E.2d 551 (1983).
175 309 N.C. 279, 307 S.E.2d 551 (1983).
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equity in the corporation would not be diluted by the usurpation
of corporation opportunities or the diversion of corporate assets to
other companies; and that plaintiffs would have a reasonable
opportunity to realize on the value of their equity in the compa-
nies. The court further found and concluded that plaintiff
Malcolm Lowder, as a shareholder of Mills, Farms and Consoli-
dated, had a reasonable expectation that he would have 'contin-
ued employment and a position and compensation reasonably
proportionate to his ownership in the companies, and his training
and experience'; and that plaintiffs' reasonable expectations were
frustrated, through no fault of theirs, because as the jury deter-
mined, Horace Lowder misappropriated corporate opportunities
of All Star Mills. As further support of its decision to liquidate the
corporations, the superior court cited Horace Lowder's exercise of
complete control and domination of the corporations since his
father's death in 1970, his refusal to allow Malcolm Lowder a
position of more authority or participation after their father's
death, his handling of tax claims against the companies without
counsel, his management of the companies without consulting
other shareholders, his direction of operations toward companies
in which he had larger interests, and his issuance of treasury
stock to himself without consulting other shareholders. Noting
that the other shareholders had exhibited animosity towards
Malcolm Lowder during this litigation, had aligned themselves
with Horace Lowder in this litigation, and had adopted a corpo-
rate resolution requiring the Board of Directors to return to
Horace Lowder any assets lost by him as a result of the litigation,
the Court found and concluded that the majority of the stockhold-
ers would align themselves in opposition to plaintiff in any future
operation of the corporations and that it would be difficult, if not
impossible, for the affairs of the companies to be conducted in
such a way that plaintiff might realize his reasonable expecta-
tions. The court concluded that the only way plaintiffs reason-
able expectations could be protected was through the liquidation
and dissolution of Farms and Consolidated. 176
The Lowder case is one of several cases in 1984 and 1985 that utilized
the reasonable expectations doctrine.177 It is also significant because of
the manner in which the court treated all six of the corporations as a unit
for analytical purposes and even though the complaint contained multi-
176 75 N.C. App. at 243-44, 330 S.E.2d at 656.
177 See, e.g., Stafano v. Coppock, 705 P.2d 443 (Alaska 1985); In re Kemp & Beatley, Inc.,
64 N.Y.2d 63, 484 N.Y.S.2d 799, 473 N.E. 1173 (1984).
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pie causes of action, fashioned a single order that provided appropriate
and total relief for all of the wrongs committed by Horace Lowder. 178
The final case in which involuntary dissolution was ordered that merits
discussion is the English case of In re Zinotty Properties, Ltd.,179 a
corporation formed in 1967 to develop a tract of real estate. Zinotty
Properties Ltd. was owned by two other corporations. One, which owned
twenty-five percent of the shares, was controlled by Leslie Brown. The
other, which owned seventy-five percent of the stock, was controlled by
Albert Perry and Robert Bulfield. Brown and Perry had previously
conducted other similar joint ventures on a twenty-five--seventy-five
percent basis. Bulfield had not been involved in the other corporations,
however.
Without Brown's knowledge, cash generated from the original devel-
opment was used to purchase another tract of land. In 1974 Brown
complained about this purchase and the fact that contrary to his
understanding of the agreement made when the corporation was formed,
he had never been made a director of Zinotty. In spite of these protests,
Perry and Bulfield continued to run Zinotty as they saw fit. By the end of
1980 they had caused Zinotty to loan various businesses they controlled
in excess of £233,000. The amount of interest on these loans, if any, was
unclear from Zinotty's financial records, which were handled by an
accounting firm in which Bulfield was a partner.
In December 1982 the corporation controlled by Brown filed suit to
have Zinotty involuntarily dissolved under § 222 of The Companies
Act.180 Then in January 1983, Perry and Bulfield contrived to call a
special shareholders meeting of the Board of Directors for the purpose of
placing Zinotty in voluntary receivership and to name another accoun-
tant in Bulfield's accounting firm as the liquidating receiver. Brown
objected to this procedure by letter and did not attend the shareholders
meeting on the assumption that since there were only two shareholders,
there could be no quorum in his absence. Prior to the meeting, however,
one share of stock in Zinotty was transferred to Bulfield personally. Perry
and Bulfield attended the shareholders meeting, declared a quorum, and,
controlling seventy-five percent of the shares, approved the voluntary
dissolution.
178 Actually, that part of the opinion granting a constructive trust on the assets of three
of the corporations because of a wrongful usurpation of corporate assets by Horace Lowder
will result in those three corporations being liquidated. See 75 N.C. App. at 240-42, 330
S.E.2d at 654-55. Thus, ultimately all six corporations were ordered to be involuntarily
dissolved, although two different legal theories were used to reach this result.
179 [19841 3 All E.R. 754 (Ch. Div.).
"' English Companies Act 1948, § 222. A petition for alternative relief under § 75 of the
English Companies Act of 1980 was abandoned. The interrelationship between §§ 222 and
75 (formerly § 210 of the 1948 English Companies Act) is explored in O'NEAL'S OPPRESSION
OF MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS, supra note 1, §§ 10:11-10:13.
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The Chancery Court held that the transfer of stock to Bulfield was
probably illegal;s" but even if it was proper, because of the overreaching
conduct by Perry and Bulfield and the conflict of interest created by the
involvement of Bulfield's accounting firm, the liquidation of Zinotty must
proceed as an involuntary dissolution.
This case illustrates two interesting points. First, the court, apparently
with the consent of the attorneys for both sides, pierced the corporate veil
of the two corporations that owned Zinotty and viewed this case as one
involving three individuals engaged in a quasi-partnership corporation.
The piercing was legally necessary in order to bring the case within the
ambit of the 1972 decision of Ebrahimi v. Westbourne Galleries, Ltd.,182
which was the first major case to adopt the reasonable expectations
doctrine.18 3 Second, Zinotty stands for the proposition that a voluntary
dissolution can be oppressive to the minority, thereby justifying equitable
intervention by a court. There is also American case law precedent for
this proposition. 8 4
C. Relief Other Than Dissolution
The principal differences between the cases in which involuntary
dissolution was ordered and those in which some other relief was granted
are: (1) the trial court's discretionary decision that relief other than
dissolution was appropriate under the circumstances and the upholding
of that decision on appeal under the narrow abuse of discretion rule; and
(2) the degree to which the plaintiffs conduct caused or exacerbated the
dissension that led to the suit. The absence of punitive or overreaching
conduct against a minority shareholder by the controlling shareholders
was also an important factor in many of the cases.
... Stock issues engineered by majority shareholders were declared illegal in three other
1984-85 involuntary dissolution cases: Bricklin v. Stengol Corp., 1 Conn. App. 656,476 A.2d
584 (1984); Valerino v. Little, 62 Md. App. 588, 490 A.2d 756 (1985); In re Rappaport, 110
A.D.2d 639, 487 N.Y.S.2d 376 (1985).
182 [19721 2 All E.R. 492 (H.L.).
183 American courts have shown a willingness to pierce the croporate veil and to treat
interrelated corporations as a single writ in somewhat similar circumstances involving
oppressive conduct. See Lowder v. All Star Mills, Inc., 75 N.C. App. 233, 330 S.E.2d 649
(1985), discussed supra notes 172-76 and accompanying text; In re Dubonnet Scarfs, 105
A.D.2d 339, 484 N.Y.S.2d 541 (1985), discussed infra notes 235-38 and accompanying text.
See also Belcher v. Birmingham Trust Nat'l Bank, 348 F. Supp. 61 (N.D. Ala. 1968); Hill v.
Bellevue Gardens, Inc., 190 F. Supp. 760 (D. C. Dist. Col. 1960), affd, 297 F.2d 185 (D.C.
App. 1961); Fortunge v. Hudson Manure Co., 51 N.J. Super. 482, 144 A.2d 297 (1958);
Prince v. Sonnesyn, 222 Minn. 528, 25 N.W.2d 468 (1946).
184 See Kirtz v. Grossman, 463 S.W.2d 541 (Mo. App. 1971); Levy v. Billeand, 443 So. 2d
539 (La. 1983). See also In re Widey's Furniture Clearance Center, Inc., 108 A.D.2d 81, 487
N.Y.S.2d 901 (1985)(injunction issued against attempted voluntary dissolution commenced
after involuntary dissolution suit filed). Cf Schraft v. Leis, 238 Kan. 28, 686 P.2d 865
(1984). See generally O'NEAL'S OPPRESSION OF MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS, supra note 1, § 5:21.
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Three cases decided in 1984 and 1985 involving family animosity
illustrate these points. The first is Sauer v. Moffitt,185 which like Lowder
v. All Star Mills, Inc.,18 6 discussed in the preceding subsection, 8 7
involved a series of family-owned farming operations. Prior to 1964
Maurice Moffitt owned three farms. In 1964 he gave one of them to his
two daughters, Martha and Kathy. In 1967 he formed the Moffitt
Corporation. His two farms plus the farm given to Martha and Kathy
were transferred to the corporation in return for stock. Maurice's wife and
two sons also received stock in Moffitt Corporation. According to Martha
and Kathy, Maurice had orally promised them that all four children
would receive an equal number of shares at the time of incorporation and
that any future gifts or devises of stock in Moffitt Corporation by Maurice
and his wife would also be equal. Nevertheless, the two sons each
received seven more shares than Martha and Kathy. When questioned
about this, Maurice said that the sons were operating the farms and for
that reason needed to be able to out-vote their sisters. In addition,
between 1967 and 1980, when this suit was tried, Maurice and his wife
made other gifts of Moffitt corporation stock to all four children, but had
given more stock to the two sons. The differential had increased from
seven to seventy-three shares by 1980.
Conflict developed after Martha and Kathy in 1971 moved back to Iowa
from Oklahoma where they had lived for several years and, needing
money, demanded that dividends be paid. This demand was ignored and
finally in 1978 Martha and Kathy filed suit, requesting various types of
relief including involuntary dissolution. The evidence showed that Mof-
fitt Corporation leased its farms to Maurice on a fifty-fifty sharecrop basis
but that some of Moffitt's share of the crops and money was improperly
diverted to Maurice directly and to other separate farming operations
conducted by Maurice and his sons. Tracing the degree of impropriety
was difficult because Moffitt's financial records were not kept properly or
accurately.
The trial court ruled that the oral agreement with respect to the
allocation of stock among the children was enforceable8 8 and ordered
Maurice and his wife to convey sixty-six shares of Moffitt stock to Martha
and Kathy. After this transfer, Martha and Kathy would own seven fewer
shares than their brothers, the same differential that existed at the time
Moffitt Corporation was formed.
The trial court also ordered Moffitt Corporation to redeem all the stock
185 363 N.W.2d 269 (Iowa App. 1984).
156 75 N.C. App. 233, 330 S.E.2d 649 (1985).
117 See supra notes 172-78 and accompanying text.
188 The willingness of courts to enforce oral agreements between close corporation
shareholders will be an increasingly important factor in the development of the reasonable
expectations doctrine. See infra note 289.
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owned by Martha and Kathy at its fair value, determined to be
$135,893.06, with interest from the date the suit was brought. The court
ordered a partial liquidation, and although it is not clear from the
opinion, apparently land or other assets of Moffitt Corporation were to be
used to pay for this stock.'l 9
In addition, reparation for improper expenditures from Moffitt Corpo-
ration was also ordered; and punitive damages in an unspecified amount
were awarded to Martha and Kathy. Finally, the trial court awarded
$20,000 in attorneys' fees to Martha and Kathy. They had submitted a
request for $80,000 of attorneys' fees. The trial court, however, rejected a
claim that a constructive trust should be imposed on other farms owned
by Maurice and one of the sons, holding that the evidence did not indicate
Moffitt Corporation had any reasonable expectancy in them.
The Iowa Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's order with minor
modifications. The Court of Appeals held that the trial court could have
ordered involuntary dissolution under the circumstances but had the
discretion to fashion other equitable relief, and "[t]he district court order
requiring a partial liquidation and redemption of the plaintiffs' shares
provides appropriate equitable relief for both their individual claims of
fraud and derivative claims . . . .",0 In addition, the Court of Appeals
upheld the punitive damage award on the grounds that the defendants'
actions in commingling and wrongfully diverting Moffitt Corporation's
assets were clear breaches of fiduciary duty that "rose to the level of
intentional acts of fraud."'191 The attorneys' fee award was also upheld on
the grounds that even though attorneys' fees could only be recovered for
the derivative cause of action, the derivative claim was only one of five
causes of action filed in the complaint. 192
The two additional family dissension cases are from New York. The
first is In re Wiedy's Furniture Clearance Center Co., Inc.,193 another case
9 Another 1984-85 case in which corporate land was distributed to a minority
shareholder in a court ordered partial liquidation is Maddox v. Norman, 697 P.2d 1368
(Mont. 1985). Maddox also involved a family farm corporation. Partial liquidations have
also beeen ordered in other cases. See Belcher v. Birmingham Trust Nat'l Bank, 348 F.
Supp. 61, 147-53 (N.D. Ala. 1968). Recent tax legislation amending Section 311 of the
Internal Revenue Code has eliminated the circumstances in which a corporation can
distribute land or other assets to a shareholder in a partial liquidation without having to
pay a tax on any built-in gain on the distributed property. For this reason courts should as
general rule refrain from directing that specific property be distributed to a shareholder.
The corporation can be directed to repurchase the stock; but the method of financing that
purchase should, except in very unusual cases, be left to the discretion of management.
'9 363 N.W.2d 269, 275 (Iowa App. 1984).
191 Id.
192 The reluctance of courts to award attorneys' fees to successful plaintiffs in involun-
tary dissolution suits is discussed supra notes 97-100 and accompanying text and infra note
276 and accompanying text.
'93 108 A.D.2d 81, 487 N.Y.S.2d 901 (1985).
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involving multiple family-owned corporations. Edward Wiederspeil, to-
gether with his wife and two sons, Edward III and Bruce, owned five
corporations that engaged in the furniture business. Bruce, who was the
plaintiff, owned one-third of the shares of Wiedy's Furniture Clearance
Center Co., Inc. and modest amounts of stock in some of the other family
corporations. Bruce had worked for one or more of the corporations for
most of his adult life, except for approximately a year when he moved to
Florida.
Wiedy's Furniture Clearance Center was formed at the time he
returned from Florida. Bruce managed this business from his return in
1974 until he was fired by his father in July, 1983 following a dispute
over the hiring of an employee. His father also discharged Bruce as an
employee and officer of all the family corporations, changed the locks on
Wiedy's Furniture Clearance Center, threatened Bruce with criminal
prosecution if he attempted to come onto any of the corporate properties,
and published a newspaper notice stating that Bruce was no longer
associated with the family businesses.
Bruce filed suit seeking involuntary dissolution of Wiedy's Furniture
Clearance Center and the other four corporations and also obtained a
temporary injunction prohibiting the attempted voluntary dissolution of
Wiedy's Furniture Clearance Center.
As a preliminary matter, the petition for dissolution of the corporations
other than Wiedy's Furniture Clearance Center was dismissed on juris-
dictional grounds. Section 1104-a of the New York Business Corporation
Law' 94 requires a shareholder to own a minimum of twenty percent of the
outstanding stock in order to seek dissolution under this statute. Bruce
could only meet this requirement with respect to Wiedy's Furniture
Clearance Center. 9 5 This ruling illustrates the practical problems cre-
ated by a minimum ownership requirement which New York and several
other states impose. 196
Proceeding to the merits of Bruce's claim, the trial court held that the
freeze-out of Bruce constituted oppression under the reasonable expecta-
194 N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAW § 1104-a (McKinney 1986).
's The court also ruled that even if all of the corporations were treated as a single unit,
Bruce would not own the requisite 20 percent in the aggregate. In fact, if the single entity
argument made by the plaintiff had been accepted by the court, the case would have been
dismissed in its entirety. See 108 A.D.2d at 81, 487 N.Y.S.2d at 901 (1985).
'96 See supra notes 62-64 and accompanying text. New York has a line of cases that
authorize a common law suit for involuntary dissolution, which presumably could be
invoked in a subsequent suit for involuntary dissolution involving the other four family
corporations. See Leibert v. Clapp, 13 N.Y.2d 313, 196 N.E.2d 540, 247 N.Y.S.2d 102 (1963);
Lewis v. Jones, 107 A.D.2d 931, 483 N.Y.S.2d 868 (1985); In re DuBonnett Scarfs, Inc., 105
A.D.2d 339, 484 N.Y.S.2d 541 (1985). Apparently neither Bruce's attorney nor the trial
judge was aware of these cases.
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tions doctrine and ordered that Bruce's shares in Wiedy's Furniture
Clearance Center be purchased at their fair value.
This order was affirmed on appeal. The Appellate Division of the New
York Supreme Court pointed out in its opinion that Bruce had a
reasonable expectation of continuous employment in the family busi-
nesses and that Wiedy's Furniture Clearance Center had been quite
profitable under his management.197 The appeals court also held that the
appropriate remedy for minority shareholder oppression is within the
sound discretion of the trial judge. 198 The appeals court further pointed
out that the applicable involuntary dissolution statute requires a court to
consider whether liquidation is the only feasible means of protecting the
plaintiffs interests; 199 and that in this particular case, the amount
received on liquidation, which would be one-third of the net assets of
Wiedy's Furniture Clearance Center, might well be less than the amount
received for his stock under the court ordered buy-out. 200 Moreover,
Bruce's father and other family members could always subsequently
decide to liquidate Wiedy's Furniture Clearance Center if they wished to
do so.
The other New York case is Gimpel v. Bolstein,20 1 which involved a
dispute between third generation shareholders in a family-owned dairy
farm corporation. All members of the family actively participated in the
dairy operations and were paid on a salary basis. No dividends had ever
been paid; but non-voting stock had been issued to some of the share-
holders and was periodically redeemed as part of an overall family estate
plan.
Robert Gimpel, who owned both voting and non-voting stock, was
197 108 A.D.2d at 84, 487 N.Y.S.2d at 903-04.
'o 108 A.D.2d at 84, 487 N.Y.S.2d at 904.
199 N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAW § 1104-a(b)(McKinney 1986) states:
The court, in determining whether to proceed with involuntary dissolution
pursuant to this section, shall take into account: (1) Whether liquidation of the
corporation is the only feasible means whereby the petitioners may reasonably
expect to obtain a fair return on their investment; and (2) Whether liquidation of
the corporation is reasonably necessary for the protection of the rights and
interests of any substantial number of shareholders or the petitioner.
200 The difference could be substantial since the buy-out price would presumably include
the going concern goodwill value of the corporation. See supra notes 80-83 and accompa-
nying text. Moreover, in many circumstances, the price received for business assets in a
forced liquidation sale is considerably less than the inherent fair market value of those
same assets. This is particularly true with respect to inventory, which was apparently the
main type of asset held by Wiedy's Furniture Clearance Center. An additional danger of a
liquidation in this case is that Bruce's father or the other corporations he controleed are the
most likely purchasers of the assets. If this occurs, the court ordered liquidation results in
an unintended benefit to the wrongdoing shareholders. This possibility has been a factor in
other decisions refusing to order an involuntary dissolution. See supra note note 28.
201 125 Misc.2d 45, 477 N.Y.S.2d 1014 (1984).
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employed as an executive with the corporation until 1974 when he was
discharged after being accused of embezzling $85,000. He subsequently
filed this action seeking to have the corporation involuntarily dissolved,
claiming oppression because he received no income from the corporation
and had been denied access to the corporation's books and records. He also
claimed that other shareholders were being paid excessive salaries, that
proper stock certificates had not been issued to him and that the
corporation failed to hold shareholders' meetings.
The New York Supreme Court held that Robert was not the victim of
oppression, whether that term is defined as frustration of reasonable
expectations or breach of fiduciary duty. As to the former definition, the
court stated:
the only expectations he could reasonably entertain were those of
a discovered thief: ostracism and prosecution. To the extent the
majority has refrained from prosecuting him, they have dealt
with him more kindly than he had reason to expect not less.202
As to the second definition, the court said:
[ilt was clearly not wrongful for the corporate victim of a theft to
exclude the thief from the councils of power. The salient point
here... is that the petitioner himself was the initial wrongdoer.
Thus, the only forms of participation which may fairly be said to
be open to Robert are those open to a shareholder in the position
of a stranger: possible entitlement to dividends, voting at share-
holders' meetings, and access to corporate records. 20 3
The court further held that the failure to issue stock certificates, to hold
shareholders' meetings or to allow Robert access to the corporate records
were wrongful but "[did] not, individually or collectively, constitute
oppressive conduct such as would justify dissolution."20 4 Moreover, the
court held that the allegations of excessive salaries could be determined
in a separate derivative action, and therefore, even if true, did not merit
dissolution.
The absence of any income on Robert's stock, however, presented a
more troublesome issue. The court observed:
[e]ven Cain was granted protection from the perpetual vengeful-
ness of his fellow man. (Genesis 4:12-15). While his past misdeeds
provided sufficient justification for the majority's acts to date,
there is a limit to what he can be forced to bear, and that limit has
been reached. The other shareholders need not allow him to
202 Id. at 52, 477 N.Y.S.2d at 1020.
203 Id. at 53, 477 N.Y.S.2d at 1020.
204 Id. at 54, 477 N.Y.S.2d at 1021.
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return to employment with the corporation, but they must by
some means allow him to share in the profits.
20 5
The relief granted by the court is the most interesting aspect of this
case. In addition to mandating that Robert be given full access to the
corporation's books and records, the court ruled that the majority
shareholders had six months to elect either to commence paying "sub-
stantial (consistent with sound business judgment)"20 6 dividends or to
make a good faith offer to purchase Robert's shares. The court pointed out
that in determining the reasonableness of any dividends, the amount of
salaries paid to the remaining shareholders that in fact represented
dividends would have to be taken into account. In addition, the court
recognized that if the dividend option was chosen, changes in the
corporation's capital structure might have to be made because of the
non-voting stock redemption plan that had been in effect for so many
years.20 7 The court said that "if any changes are made, they must be made
in good faith, for a legitimate business purpose, and not for the purpose
of weakening Robert's position."20 8 To assure compliance with its direc-
tives, the court issued its order as a mandatory injunction and specified
that dissolution could be one of the remedies for contempt.
The flexibility incorporated into this innovative order is quite remark-
able. 20 9 The corporation's remaining shareholders were given realistic
205 Id. at 55, 477 N.Y.S.2d at 1021.
206 Id. at 56, 477 N.Y.S.2d at 1022.
207 One reason why it might have been desirable to change the corporation's capitaliza-
tion was that a provision in the existing articles of incorporation required that equal
dividends be paid on both voting and non-voting shares. Limiting the dividends only to
voting stock or differentiating in the amount of dividends payable on the voting and
non-voting stock would lessen the overall cost of the dividend policy and still preserve the
estate planning objective that the non-voting stock was intended to achieve. The trial
judge's sensitivity to this and other corporate planning objectives is commendable. See 125
Misc. 2d at 56-57, 477 N.Y.S.2d at 1020, 1022.
20 Id. at 57, 477 N.Y.S.2d at 1022.
219 Other judges have also issued innovative orders in involuntary dissolution cases. See,
e.g., Belisle v. Colebrook Water Co., 110 N.H. 17, 259 A.2d 131 (1969)(order required that
the corporation either redeem preferred shares for their par value plus accrued but unapid
dividends or pay the court ordered fair value of the shares); Rytkonen v. Butler, 305 Mich.
580, 9 N.W.2d 849 (1943)(an assignment of a lease to a majority shareholder ordered
cancelled; the leased property belonged to a minority shareholder); Kisner v. Coffey, 418 So.
2d 58 (Miss. 1982)(deferred compensation required to be equalized); Handlan v. Handlan,
232 232 S.W.2d 944 (Mo. 1950)(corporation dissolved unless plaintiff purchased the
defendant's shares or vice versa; accounting ordered for questionable expenses such as
payment of shareholder's club dues and liquor); Browning v. C&C Plywood Corp., 248 Or.
574, 434 P.2d 339 (1967)(as relief for a pre-emptive rights offering squeeze-out engineered
by the majority shareholders, the appellate court, in reversing an order of involuntary
dissolution, suggested that the lower court on remand consider either cancelling the shares
issued in the rights offering or allow the plaintiff to purchase additional shares at the same
price as the majority up to the amount necessary to restore his previous percentage of equity
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options, and the court retained jurisdiction of the case to see that both
sides used good faith. The court's willingness to grant some relief to
Robert even though he was the principal wrongdoer is also innovative. A
shareholder in a closely-held corporation should at a minimum be entitled
to some dividends or other return on investment if all the other share-
holders are obtaining distribution from the corporation in the form of
salary.210
The relative degree of fault among the contending shareholders can be
a significant factor in the outcome of a particular case. The contrast
between Gimpel v. Bolstein and In re Kemp & Beatley,211 a 1984 decision
from the New York Court of Appeals, illustrates this point. Just before or
shortly after two long-time executives left Kemp & Beatley, the corpora-
tion changed its compensation policy. Before the change, the corporation
paid out profits in the form of bonuses based on the percentage of stock
held by each shareholder. After the change, only salaried employees
received the bonuses. Since Kemp & Beatley paid no dividends, the two
former employees, who together owned slightly over twenty percent of
the stock, received no income from the corporation after they ceased to be
employees.
The trial court gave Kemp & Beatley a choice: it could either buy out
the plaintiffs' shares at their fair value or be dissolved. This decision was
upheld on two grounds by the New York Court of Appeals, which used the
case as an opportunity to adopt the reasonable expectations theory of
oppression: 212 (1) the trial judge has broad discretion to fashion the
appropriate remedy; 213 and (2) once a prima facie case of oppression is
with the cost being an offset against unpaid back salary owed to the plaintiff); In re
Schramm, 107 Misc. 2d 393, 434 N.Y.S.2d 333 (1980)(eviction consent order agreed to by
fifty percent shareholder of a restaurant corporation after an involuntary dissolution suit
was filed set aside; if not, the restaurant would have been out of business); ARC Mfg. Co.,
Inc. v. Konrad, 467 A.2d 1133 (Pa. Super. 1983)(custodian appointed to remedy high-handed
behavior by the majority including changing locks, exclusion from access to coroporate
records, termination of salary and eligibility for pension and profit sharing plan, and
increase in salaries of remaining shareholders; no error, however, in refusing to order
plaintiff rehired due to the animosity between the shareholders). See also Goben v. Barry,
234 Kan. 721, 676 P.2d 90 (1984), discussed supra notes 169-71 and accompanying text.
21o Other courts have ordered dividends to be paid to minority shareholders who have
been improperly squeezed out in somewhat more appealing factual circumstance than
existed in Gimpel v. Bolstein. See Patton v. Nicholas, 154 Tex. 385, 279 S.W.2d 848 (1955);
id., 302 S.W.2d 441 (Tex. Civ. App. 1957); Erdman v. Yolles, 62 Mich. App. 594, 233
N.W.2d 667 (1975); Miller v. Magline, Inc., 76 Mich. App. 284, 256 N.W.2d 761 (1977). See
also Smith v. Atlantic Properties, Inc., 12 Mass. App. 201, 422 N.E.2d 798 (1981)(minority
shareholder who refused to vote in favor of dividend payments ordered to pay accumulated
earnings tax and all other penalties; and in addition shareholders were required to file with
the court a dividend policy with respect to future dividends).
2ii 64 N.Y.2d 63, 473 N.E.2d 1173, 484 N.Y.S.2d 799 (1984).
212 64 N.Y.2d 63, 73, 473 N.E.2d at 1177-80, 484 N.Y.S.2d at 803-04 (1984).
2'3 64 N.Y.2d 63, 74, 473 N.E.2d at 1180, 484 N.Y.S.2d at 806 (1984).
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presented, the defendants have the burden of demonstrating that some
relief other than dissolution is an appropriate remedy, and the defen-
dants had failed to present any alternatives. 214 One major distinction
between Gimpel v. Bolstein and Kemp & Beatley is that in Gimpel, the
corporation did not alter any existing policies when the plaintiff left. This
difference was mentioned in the Gimpel opinion. 215
Another case illustrating the significance that relative fault plays in
the decisions is Orchard v. Covelli.216 Beginning in 1962 Robert Orchard
and Albert Covelli operated a group of McDonald's franchises in Erie,
Pennsylvania. Orchard was the manager of the restaurants, and Covelli
was the President. Ultimately the chain grew to seven restaurants, each
of which was operated as a separate corporation. A group of investors
from Chicago held forty-five percent of the shares in six of the corpora-
tions. Covelli held forty percent and Orchard the remaining fifteen
percent. Covelli owned eighty-five percent of the stock in the seventh
corporation and Orchard owned the remaining fifteen percent. Orchard
claimed, however, that he should have received fifty percent of the stock
in this restaurant under an oral agreement with Covelli that they would
be equal partners in any restaurant in which the Chicago investment
group did not invest. Orchard claimed he was unaware of the Chicago
group's non-participation until several years after the seventh restaurant
began operating.
In 1977, the Chicago investment group negotiated a sale of their stock
with Covelli. The stock was purchased by the six corporations in which
the group owned stock pursuant to a redemption agreement. When
Orchard found out about this deal, he demanded that his shares also be
purchased. Covelli agreed to do so but negotiations over the price reached
an impasse after Covelli refuse to pay anything for Orchard's interest in
the seventh restaurant. When Orchard refused to cave in, Covelli fired
him as the manager of all the restaurants and at the next annual
shareholders' meeting removed him as a director in all the corporations.
The corporations also ceased paying dividends.
Sometime after this, Orchard apparently moved to Florida and ob-
tained one or more franchises with a competitor of McDonald's. Then in
1981, three of the Erie franchises expired. In the course of renegotiating
the renewal of these franchises with McDonald's, Covelli's lawyers
disclosed Orchard's connection with a competitor. McDonald's had previ-
ously expressed some dissatisfaction with Orchard's performance as
manager of the Erie restaurants. For these and other reasons,
McDonald's ultimately decided to reissue the franchises to Covelli
individually. Subsequently, Covelli transferred these franchises to new
214 Id. at 64 N.Y.2d at 73-74, 473 N.E.2d at 1180, 484 N.Y.S.2d at 806 (1984).
215 Gimpel v. BoIstein, 125 Misc. 2d 45, 54, 477 N.Y.S.2d 1014, 1021 n.9 (1984).
216 590 F. Supp. 1548 (W.D. Pa. 1984).
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corporations owned entirely by him and agreed to purchase at their book
value the leasehold improvements, equipment, furniture and fixtures
owned by the corporations in which he and Orchard held stock.
Orchard filed suit alleging multiple causes of action. The court found
that Covelli was not guilty of any misappropriation of corporate assets,
that Orchard did not have an enforceable employment contract with the
various corporations and that there was insufficient evidence to support
the oral agreement which would have given Orchard fifty percent
interest in the seventh franchise. Relying on the strict fiduciary duty
concept enunciated in Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Company of New
England, Inc.,2 17 however, the court found that the unjustified freeze-out
of Orchard engineered by Covelli, the failure to pay any dividends
following the freeze-out, Covelli's refusal to compensate Orchard for the
seventh restaurant, and Covelli's failure to use his best efforts to obtain
the franchise renewals in the name of the corporations jointly owned by
Orchard and Covelli, in combination, constituted a breach of fiduciary
duty that justified some remedy.2 18 The court rejected dissolution as
being too "drastic."2 19 Instead the judge ordered Covelli to purchase or
cause the various corporations to purchase22 for cash all of Orchard's
stock in all seven corporations 221 at the same price per share as was
offered to the Chicago investment group, together with prejudgment
interest of six percent from February 28, 1977, the date of the agreement
with the Chicago investment group. 222 The court stated that "[s]uch relief
217 367 Mass. 578, 328 N.E.2d 505 (1975). See supra, notes 45-46 and accompanying text
and infra notes 217, 281-82 and accompanying text for further discussion of the Donahue
case.
21 The court pointed out that although Orchard's acquisition of the Florida franchises
was a technical violation of the McDonald's franchise agreements, it did not directly harm
the existing corporations jointly owned by Orchard and Covelli nearly as much as Covelli's
actions. The court also pointed out that Orchard's acquisition of other business interests was
a "predictable response" to the squeeze-out. See 590 F. Supp. at 1558-59.
219 Id. at 1559.
220 The order required Covelli to pay out of his own funds any balance due to the Chicago
investment group under the 1977 redemption agreement.
221 With respect to the seventh corporation, the judge ruled that Orchard should be
allocated 27.5 percent of the value of the stock even though he technically only owned
fifteen percent of the stock. Orchard owned 27.5 percent of the stock in the other six
corporations following the redemptin of the stock owned by the Chicago investment group.
The judge had previously ruled that there was insufficient proof of the oral agreement that
would have given Orchard fifty percent of the stock in this corporation. 590 F. Supp. at
1555-56. The judge stated he was awarding Orchard a 27.5 percent interest rather than the
fifteen percent he owned as punishment for Covelli's failure to disclose the existence of the
seventh restaurant to the Chicago investment group.
222 By keying the buy-out to the Chicago investment group sale, the court avoided
several potentially difficult valuation issues. That sale was an arm's-length negotiated
transaction, and therefore the price per share should approximate any fair value deter-
mined by the court. In addition, the fair value of the seven jointly owned corporations in
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is adequate to redress his [Orchard's] claim of breach of the fiduciary duty
and is necessary to bring the business dealings of the parties to an
end."223
The final two cases to be discussed in this section involved dissension
between former spouses, both of whom owned stock in a close corpora-
tion.224 In addition to illustrating the effect of improper conduct on the
ultimate outcome, these cases also illustrate the need to have a buy-out
agreement that will avoid the possibility of both spouses owning stock
after a divorce. 225
In re Trocino226 involved a taxicab company incorporated by Joseph
Trocino in 1982. Joseph subsequently voluntarily transferred fifty per-
cent of the stock to his wife, Marguerita. As part of a property settlement
agreement when they divorced in 1983, Joseph also transferred another
one percent of the stock to Marguerita. In January 1984, Joseph offered
to sell his remaining shares to Marguerita, who made an offer of $8,000.
She refused, however, to allow him full access to the corporate records.
Their negotiations were apparently not very harmonious, and Joseph
filed suit seeking involuntary dissolution of the corporation, claiming
among other wrongs that Marguerita had made improper loans of
$37,000 to herself from the corporation. Marquerita filed a petition under
Section 1118 of the New York Business Corporation Law227 to buy out
Joseph's shares. The Supreme Court felt that this was an appropriate
resolution and ordered a fair value hearing. The judge also required
Marguerita to make available to Joseph all relevant corporate records228
and enjoined Joseph from entering the corporation's place of business or
1977 was probably considerably greater than at the time the order was issued in this case
because of the franchise terminations in three of the corporations.
223 590 F. Supp. at 1560.
224 See also Bricklin v. Stengol Crop., 1 Conn. 656, 476 A.2d 584 (1984)(shares in a close
corporation and limited partnership owned by former spouse ordered to be purchased; stock
issued to her former husband and another shareholder ordered cancelled; improper
expenditures ordered repaid, and judgment rendered for $14,000 to compensate for a lease
of corporate property to a shareholder at an unreasonably low rental).
225 See ORGAN[ZINC A SMALL BUSINESS ENTITY, supra note 2, § 5.04(c)(3)(e)(1984) for
suggestions on the alternative buy-out schemes that might be used for this purpose.
226 126 Misc.2d 394, 482 N.Y.S.2d 670 (1984).
227 N.Y. Bus. CoRp. LAW § 1118 (McKinney 1986). See supra notes 112-17 and accompa-
nying text for further discussions of this and similar statutory provisions.
228 Access to corporate records was also ordered in two other New York involuntary
dissolution opinions issued in 1984 and 1985. See Gimpel v. Bolstein, 125 Misc. 2d 45, 56,
477 N.Y.S.2d 1014, 1022 (1984); In re Levitt, 109 A.D.2d 502, 492 N.Y.S.2d 736, 741-42
(1985)(access to corporate records limited to a period prior to commencement of involuntary
dissolution suit: (1) because the defendants had exercised a statutory right to purchase the
plaintiff's shares and the statute fixes the valuation date as of the day preceding the date
of the suit was filed, and (2) the plaintiff was working for a competitor). Other courts have
also directed that minority shareholders be granted access to corporate records. See, e.g.,
Riser v. Genuine Parts Co., 150 Ga. App. 502, 258 S.E.2d 185 (1979).
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in any fashion interfering with the corporation's day-to-day business
activities. 22s
In Stefano v. Coppock,230 Patricia Coppock Muir, the former wife of one
of three equal shareholders in an Alaska corporation, received one-half of
her husband's stock at the time of their divorce in 1970. During the next
four years, she received virtually no information about the corporation
and was not properly informed of shareholders' meetings. She retained an
attorney and attempted to negotiate a sale of her shares. The other
shareholders offered to purchase her shares at $133 per share or to sell
her their shares for $266 per share. Mrs. Muir then filed suit in 1976 and
the trial court ordered her shares to be purchased for $213 per share plus
interest from 1974 and attorneys' fees. Following a remand of the case for
more specific findings of fact in an opinion issued in 1980,231 the Alaska
Supreme Court in 1985 affirmed the trial court's monetary judgment
based on a finding that the founding shareholders' actions constituted
oppressive conduct.23 2 The case was remanded a second time, however, to
make more specific findings on the amount of the attorneys' feeS. 233
One interesting aspect of this case was the court's reaction to the
contention by the three founding shareholders that a court-ordered
buy-out was more drastic than dissolution and that in any case dissolu-
tion was the only remedy specifically authorized in the applicable Alaska
Business Corporation Act statute. The court stated that other equitable
remedies are not precluded and:
[m]oreover, we are not persuaded that ordering a buy-out of an
oppressed minority shareholder's interest is more drastic than
ordering the death of the corporation. From the controlling
shareholders' point of view, the buy-out may be more costly, but
such a remedy provides an effective means of fairly compensating
the aggrieved shareholder here. The buy-out remedy fits the
situation in this case. 234
229 The inspection of the corporate books and records was ordered to take place in the
courthouse or some other site selected by the litigants' lawyers. In re Trocino, 126 Misc. 2d
394, 397, 482 N.Y.S.2d 670, 673. For another case where the court limited a belligerent
plaintiffs access to the corporation's business premises, see In re Levitt, 109 A.D.2d 502,
505-510, 492 N.Y.S.2d 736, 741-42 (1985).
230 705 P.2d 443 (Alaska 1985).
231 See Alaska Plastics, Inc. v. Coppock, 621 P.2d 270 (Alaska 1980).
232 705 P.2d at 445-46.
233 The amount of the attorneys's fee award was $20,000, which is quite substantial in
light of the final buy-out price of $32,000. The Alaska Supreme Court ruled, however, that
the trial court did not follow established guidelines in determining the amount of the fee.
234 705 P.2d at 446.
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D. The No-Relief Cases
The four involuntary dissolution cases in 1984 and 1985 in which no
significant substantive relief was granted illustrate two important
points: (1) courts are unwilling to grant relief in the absence of a
protracted voting deadlock where there are mere policy disagreements
between the shareholders and no evidence of a freeze-out or other
unjustified or improper conduct by the majority shareholders; and (2)
inadequacies in a state's involuntary dissolution statute can result in
dismissal at the pleading stage of a case that would be tried on the merits
in many other states.
In In re Dubonnet Scarfs, Inc.,235 Arthur Olshan owned fifty percent of
the stock in Arkwright Accessories, Inc., a New York corporation, and the
other fifty percent was owned by Dubonnet Scarfs, Inc., a New Jersey
corporation. Dubonnet in turn was owned by Fred Thomas and Florence
Thomas, who held part of her stock as a nominee for Fred and the
remainder as a nominee for Harry Gordon, a business partner of Fred's.
In 1982 Harry and Fred filed for bankruptcy reorganization after a
demand was made that they honor personal guarantees on several loans
made to some of their other joint ventures. Dubonnet on their behalf
asked that Arkwright redeem the Dubonnet stock. Olshan, who had been
the principal manager of Arkwright since its formation in 1952, refused
this request. Dubonnet then filed suit requesting involuntary dissolution
of Arkwright claiming that Arkwright had sufficient liquid assets to
finance the purchase and that the failure to do so resulted in a deadlock
and also constituted oppression. Dubonnet also alleged that Olshan had
misrepresented the value of Arkwright's assets during the negotiations
over the requested buy-out.
The trial court dismissed the complaint. The Appellate Division of the
New York Supreme Court in a 4-1 decision affirmed. The appellate court
pointed out that:
[tihe petitioners present no legal authority that holds that a
shareholder in a close corporation, who is in personal financial
difficulty, which is unrelated to that corporation, can demand to
be bought out, because he or she needs the cash to satisfy personal
creditors, and that if such demand is not complied with, then such
shareholder can seek the dissolution of that corporation. 236
235 105 A.D.2d 339, 484 N.Y.S.2d 541 (1985). Other cases a court refused relief when the
evidence showed mere policy differences between the shareholders unaccompanied by any
oppressive action include In re A Company, [1983] 2 All E.R. 36 (Ch. Div.); Barnett v.
International Tennis Corp., 80 Mich. App. 396, 263 N.W.2d 908 (1978); and Hockenberger
v. Curry, 191 Neb. 404, 215 N.W.2d 627 (1974).
236 105 A.D.2d at 343, 484 N.Y.S.2d at 544.
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This opinion is particularly significant because it specifically rejects
the concept of a no-fault judicial buy-out as a method of resolving the
problems created by the inherent illiquidity of close corporation stock.
This concept, advocated by respected close corporation commentators, 37
will be discussed further in Part V.238
Coduti v. Hellwig,239 a 1984 decision issued by the Illinois Appellate
Court, is a good example of the difficulties a minority shareholder has in
convincing a court to grant relief where the majority does not attempt a
freeze-out or take other unjustifiable action. James Coduti and Werner
Hellwig formed Hudson Tool & Die Corporation in 1954. Coduti, who ran
the corporation's production facilities, owned approximately forty percent
of the stock; and Hellwig, the President, owned approximately sixty
percent of the stock. Coduti and Hellwig operated Hudson without any
serious disagreements until 1977. Thereafter, they had a number of
disputes that culminated in this suit, which took twenty-four days to try.
The disputes were determined by the trial court to be relatively minor
policy disputes and personality clashes. For example, Coduti complained
about Hudson's bonuses and dividend policy. The evidence showed,
however, that generous bonuses had been paid to him on a regular basis,
that the one dividend declared by Hudson had been delayed for several
months at Coduti's request, and that Coduti had never presented a
resolution requesting that dividends be paid. 240 Coduti also complained
that Hellwig improperly obtained approval of a resolution authorizing
Hellwig to sign checks without Coduti's co-signature contrary to a
long-standing policy requiring both their signatures on all checks.
Hudson testified, however, that the resolution question was passed
because Coduti had refused for two weeks to sign checks that would
transfer funds from the general account to the accounts payable and
payroll accounts. After learning of the Board's resolution, Coduti re-
sumed signing checks and no further check signing problems had
occurred. 241
The most serious dispute occurred in 1980 when Hellwig wrote a
memorandum rescinding Coduti's authority to make bids to customers.
Hellwig justified this action on the grounds that business had fallen off
more than fifty percent, and he felt that he needed to take a more active
211 See Hetherington & Dooley, supra note 145, pp. 32-62. The Hetherington & Dooley
proposal has been criticized by other commentators as being too impractical. See
Easterbrook & Fischel, Close Corporations and Agency Costs, 38 STAN. L. Rav. 271, 287-290
(1986); Hillman, The Dissatisfied Participant in the Solvent Business Venture: A Consider-
ation of the Relative Permanence of Partnerships and Close Corporations, 67 MINN. L. REV.
1, 75-87 (1982).
238 See infra note 289.
239 127 Ill. App. 3d 279, 469 N.E.2d 220 (1984).
240 Id. at 285, 469 N.E.2d at 226.
241 Id. at 286, 469 N.E.2d at 226-27.
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role in running the corporation. When he saw the memorandum, Coduti
lost control and, shouting obscenities and brandishing a piece of copper,
chased Hellwig into the plant. Hellwig had Coduti arrested for aggra-
vated assault and sent him a letter of dismissal. The board of directors,
however, took no action to remove Coduti as an officer; and Coduti
continued working and received the same salary and vacation pay as
before this incident. 242
The trial court found that Hellwig's acts did not constitute oppression,
fraud, illegality, waste, or breach of fiduciary duty. The appellate court,
in affirming, pointed out that it had the power to reverse the trial court's
findings only if they were against the manifest weight of the evidence,
which means that "upon hearing such evidence, no reasonable person
would reach the conclusion arrived at by the trial court."243 The appellate
court also held that Coduti's complaints clearly did not justify involun-
tary dissolution of Hudson and that because there was no oppression,
deadlock, or other ground for involuntary dissolution, the court had no
power to order a buy-out or other remedy even though the Illinois
Business Corporation Act had been amended during the pendency of the
appeal specifically to authorize relief other than dissolution.
244
The final two no-relief cases both involved alleged freeze-outs. In the
first, Allen v. Royale "16", Inc.,245 a minority shareholder in a Louisiana
close corporation sued for involuntary dissolution after he was dismissed
as President and removed from the board of directors. Although the
plaintiff claimed the corporation was to be operated by unanimous
consent, the court held the proof on this issue inadequate. 246 Therefore,
there was no deadlock. The only other possible grounds for involuntary
dissolution under the applicable Louisiana statute were insolvency,
failure or abandonment of corporate purposes, ultra vires acts, and benefit
to the interests of the shareholders. The court held that the alleged
deficiencies in the corporation's accounting procedures, failure to hold
board meetings since this lawsuit was filed and the corporation's precar-
242 Contrast the restraint shown in Coduti v. Hellwig with In re T.J. Ronan Paint
Company, 98 A.D.2d 413, 469 N.Y.S.2d 931 (1984) discussed supra notes 161-63 and
accompanying text, and Notzke v. Art Gallery, Inc., 84 Il1. App. 3d 294, 39 Ill. Dec. 860, 405
N.E.2d 839 (1980)(dissolution ordered).
243 127 Ill. App. 3d 279, 286, 469 N.E.2d 220, 227.
244 Cf. Johnston v. Livingston Nursing Home, 221 So.2d 151 (Ala. 1968)(no relief granted
even though two sisters, who were the controlling shareholders, had major policy disagree-
ment and sometimes physically assaulted one another; no evidence of fraud, oppression or
freeze-out); Collier v. Collier, 61 Ill. App. 3d 1011, 378 N.E.2d 405 (1978)(deadlock for four
months insufficient time period to justify relief); Baker v. Commercial Body Builders, Inc.,
264 Or. 614,507 P.2d 387 (1973)(refusal to allow access to corporate records or to give notice
of shareholders' meeting for a one-year period held non-actionable; corrective action taken
prior to trial).
245 449 So. 2d 1365 (La. App. 1984).
246 id. at 1367-68.
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ious but improving financial situation did not fall within any of these
statutory provisions. 247 The court further held that the removal of Allen
as President and a member of the board of directors "were within the
corporate powers and not ultra vires."248 All claims were therefore
dismissed and the dismissal was upheld on appeal.
Significantly, the Louisiana involuntary dissolution statute249 does not
contain an oppression provision. Oppression is also omitted from the
Georgia involuntary dissolution statute, 250 and this omission may have
played a role in the outcome in Gregory v. J.T. Gregory & Son, Inc.,25 1 a
1985 decision by the Georgia Court of Appeals. After acting merely as the
titular President of a family corporation for sixteen years while he was
employed by another company, J.T. Gregory, Sr. reasserted his authority
through ownership of fifty-one percent of the stock in 1981 and two years
later fired his son, who ran the corporation during his father's absence,
and removed him from the board of directors. The father then caused the
corporation to file suit against the son demanding the return of a car and
boat allegedly belonging to the corporation and money the son had
allegedly borrowed from the corporation or used to pay personal expenses.
The son counterclaimed for involuntary dissolution. The Georgia Court of
Appeals affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the involuntary dissolution
claim on a summary judgment motion.25 2 The court held that the only
possible statutory grounds supporting involuntary dissolution were dead-
lock and waste. There was no deadlock, however, since the father held
fifty-one percent of the stock;253 and although the son made allegations of
mismanagement, he failed properly to plead a cause of action for
misapplication or waste of the corporation's assets.
The decision in both these cases may well have been the same even if
the Louisiana and Georgia statutes authorized involuntary dissolution
because of oppression. Nevertheless, the large number of cases where
247 Id. at 1368-70.
248 Id. at 1370.
24 See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:143 (West 1969 & Supp. 1986).
250 See GA. CODF ANN. § 14-2-285 (1982).
25' 338 S.E.2d 7 (Ga. Ct. App. 1985).
252 The corporation was granted summary judgment for the automobile and the money it
claimed the son owed; but the court held that a dispute over the ownership of the boat must
be resolved by a trial on the merits.
253 The son claimed that the by-laws, which along with other corporate documents had
been destroyed in a 1964 fire, contained a two-thirds quorum requirement. If this was the
case, the resolutions giving the father the authority to fire him would have been illegal
since the son, who owned forty-nine percent of the stock was not present at the meeting
when the resolution was passed. The only evidence of this fact was a set of by-laws typed
after the fire by the secretary of the lawyer who had handled the incorporation. She could
not remember whether she had copied these by-laws from the lawyer's file on the
corporation or from some other source. The court held that there was insufficient evidence
to support the two-thirds quorum requirement.
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relief on oppression grounds has been granted to minority shareholders
who have been dismissed as employees and removed from the boards of
directors calls into question the wisdom of omitting this important
concept from involuntary dissolution statutes.254
IV. OTHER REMEDIES
There are a variety of other types of lawsuits that can potentially be
brought to remedy close corporation intra-corporate dissension. The most
common are causes of action based on violation of federal and state
securities acts, breach of fiduciary duty, and common law conspiracy and
fraud.25 5 Frequently, however, the prerequisites for these alternative
causes of action may not exist in the particular fact situation, or, even if
they do, the remedies that can be granted by the court will be unsatis-
factory.
For example, unless the challenged action involves a purchase or sale
of stock, it is very unlikely that a shareholder cause of action based on
securities laws violation will be successful. 256 Many common forms of
squeeze-outs, for instance, removal of a shareholder from all managerial
responsibilities, do not, however, involve purchases or sales of securities.
To the contrary, the fact that the squeezed-out shareholder cannot sell his
or her stock because there is no market for it is one of the principal
reasons why a judicial remedy is pursued.
In addition, if the court construes the action as being essentially
grounded on a wrong to the corporation rather than an injustice to the
shareholder qua shareholder, then the court is likely to require that the
action qualify as a derivative action. 25 7 This determination not only
254 See, e.g., In re T.J. Ronan Paint Company, 98 A.D.2d 413, 469 N.Y.S.2d 931 (1984),
discused supra notes 161-63 and accompanying text; Mordka v. Mordka Enterprises, Inc.,
143 Ariz. 298, 693 P.2d 953 (Ct. App. 1984), discused supra notes 164-68 and accompanying
text; In re Wiedy's Furniture Clearance Center, Co., Inc., 108 A.D.2d 81, 487 N.Y.S.2d 901
(1985), discussed supra notes 193-200 and accompanying text. See also supra notes 40-64
and accompanying text.
255 See generally O'NEAL'S OPPRESSION OF MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS, supra note 1,
§§ 7:01-8:22.
... See, e.g., Ketchum v. Green, 557 F.2d 1022 (3d Cir. 1977). See generally O'Neal's
OPPRESSION OF MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS, supra note 1, § 7:12-7:13, 8:01-8:22.
257 Because of differing and sometimes conflicting rationales used by the courts to
differentiate between direct and derivative actions, it is often difficult to predict how a court
will rule in a particular case. See Welch, Shareholder Individual and Derivative Actions:
Underlying Rationales and the Closely Held Corporation, 9 J. CORP. L. 147, 153-69
(1984)(hereafter "Welch"); LAWS OF CORPORATIONS, supra note 44, § 360. The essential
difference appears to be whether the alleged wrongful act depletes corporate assets and
thereby only indirectly harms the shareholders, or the alleged wrongful act essentially
harms a personal or individual right of a shareholder. See AMERICAN LAW INSTrrUTE,
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increases the procedural hurdles the plaintiff will have to meet in order
to recover, 256 but will also, with rare exceptions, result in judgment
requiring payment of any damage awarded to the corporation. 25 9 While
the plaintiff will indirectly benefit from the judgment, so will the
shareholders who were the wrongdoers. Moreover, even if a direct action
is allowed, a court will, as a general rule, only award restitutionary
damages, or in the case of a wrongful appropriation of corporate property,
create a constructive trust.260 Dissolution and many of the other equita-
ble remedies used by courts in involuntary dissolution suits are generally
held not to be applicable. 26 1
Some of the difficulties encountered in bringing such actions are
illustrated by three recent cases. In Abrams v. Donati,26 2 the former
President of Donati, Inc. sued the remaining shareholders and two other
corporations claiming a conspiracy to terminate his employment and to
depress the value of Donati, Inc.'s stock so that it could be purchased from
the plaintiff at a greatly reduced price, as well as mismanagement, and
PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: AN ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS DIsCuSSION § 7.01
Comment (Draft No. 1 1985)(hereinafter ALI PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE).
258 State derivative action statutes and cases as a general rule require the plaintiff to
own stock in the defendant corporation both at the time the transaction complained of took
place and at the time the suit is filed, require the plaintiff to prove that intra-corporate
remedies have been exhausted (the demand requirement), impose strict pleading require-
ments not applicable to direct actions, and, unlike direct actions, require court approval of
any pre-judgnent settlement. Many states also require a plaintiff in a derivative action to
post a security bond. See Welch, supra note 44, §§ 361-67, 372; ALI PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE, supra note 257, §§ 7.02-7.15.
On the other hand, from a plaintiffs viewpoint, derivative actions are more advantageous
than direct actions for the following reasons: (1) attorneys' fees can generally be recovered
in a derivative action but not in a direct action; and (2) the defendants in a derivative action
cannot normally file counterclaims against the party filing the action. See Welch, supra
note 257 at 152, 190-92; LAWS OF CORPORATIONS, supra note 44, §§ 368, 377.
255 See Welch, supra note 257 at 180-89; LAWS OF CORPORATIONS, supra note 44, § 373. Some
courts have authorized a direct or pro rata recovery by a shareholder in a derivative action
in situations where creditors of the corporation are not adversely affected and all the
shareholders who are affected by the action are before the court. See, e.g., Watson v. Button,
235 F.2d 235 (9th Cir. 1956); Lynch v. Patterson, 701 P.2d 1126 (Wyo. 1985); Thomas v.
Dickson, 250 Ga. 772, 301 S.E.2d 49 (1983), affg 162 Ga. Ap. 569, 91 S.E.2d 747 (1982). This
result is approved in the ALI PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 257,
§§ 7.01(d), 7.16(e).
260 Some cases have authorized punitive damages in direct actions, however. Compare,
e.g., Holden v. Construction Mach. Co., 202 N.W.2d 348 (Iowa 1972) with Beals v.
Washington International, Inc., 386 A.2d 1156 (Del. Ch. 1978).
2"l As with all general rules, there are exceptions. See, e g., Evans v. Blesi, 345 N.W.2d
775 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984)(breach of fiduciary duty case in which actual and punitive
damages were awarded; and in addition the court ordered a two-year buy-out procedure
established during which time the shareholders were enjoined from seeking dissolution of
the corporation or entering into a competing business).
262 66 N.Y.2d 951, 498 N.Y.S.2d 782, 489 N.E.2d 751 (Ct. App. 1985), aftg, 485 N.Y.S.2d
1012 (1985).
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diversion of corporate assets. For some unexplained reason, a separate
cause of action seeking damages for wrongful discharge was discontin-
ued. The New York Supreme Court dismissed the main cause of action
based on the conspiracy theory, stating that it was based on a wrong to
the corporation theory and therefore must be brought as a derivative
suit.263 The New York Court of Appeals, in a brief memorandum opinion
issued in December, 1985 affirmed, pointing out that the plaintiff had
mixed individual and derivative causes of action and had not plead any
specific acts showing a breach of a duty owed to him independent of the
duty owed to the corporation. 26 The Court of Appeals also upheld the
trial court's decision denying the plaintiff the right to file amended
pleadings. 265
In the second case, Landorff v. Glottstein,266 the plaintiff, who owned
twenty-five percent of the shares in a close corporation, filed a multiple
cause of action complaint against the corporation, its directors and the
other shareholders based on his dismissal as an executive employee of the
corporation in charge of financial matters and the reduction in his salary
from $90,000 to $20,000 per annum. The New York Supreme Court found
that in the absence of an employment agreement, the plaintiff was an
at-will employee subject to termination at anytime without cause; and
further found that although there was a shareholder agreement which
required the shareholders to elect the plaintiff secretary and treasurer,
there was no agreement or statute which required any specified duties for
these offices, which the plaintiff technically continued to hold.26 7 Based
on these findings, the court refused to enjoin the implementation of the
challenged action and dismissed four different causes of action seeking
injunctive relief and damages for the dismissal and salary reduction. A
fifth cause of action against one of the other shareholders for tortious
interference with the alleged employment agreement and a sixth cause of
action alleging damage to the plaintiffs reputation in the textile industry
caused by the dismissal were also dismissed. Nevertheless, the court,
citing other New York cases involving close corporations, 268 gave the
plaintiff twenty days to file an amended complaint specifically alleging a
breach of the fiduciary duty owed to him by the remaining shareholder.
Webber v. Webber Oil Company,2 69 the third case, involved an at-
tempted ouster of Larry Maheney, the President of a group of family
263 108 A.D.2d 704, 485 N.Y.S.2d at 1012-13.
264 66 N.Y.2d at 951, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 782-83, 489 N.E.2d at 752.
265 66 N.Y.2d at 951, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 783, 489 N.E.2d at 752.
266 500 N.Y.S.2d 494 (Sup. Ct, 1986).
267 Id. at 496-97.
268 Alpert v. 28 Williams St. Corp., 63 N.Y.2d 557, 473 N.E.2d 19, 483 N.Y.S.2d 667
(1984); Fender v. Prescott, 101 A.D.2d 418, 476 N.Y.S.2d 128 (1984), affd, 64 N.Y.2d 1077,
479 N.E.2d 225, 489 N.Y.S.2d 880 (1985).
269 495 A.2d 1215 (Me. 1985).
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corporations, by one Danville Webber. The attempted ouster was followed
by a substantial reduction in Webber's salary ($57,000 to $12,000) and a
disproportionate reduction in dividends paid to Webber, engineered by
the shareholders supporting Maheney. The attempted coup took place
when one of the directors was abroad and unable to attend the board of
directors meeting at which the removal vote was taken, with the result
that the board was evenly split on the removal motion. Webber, as the
leader of the faction seeking dismissal, asserted that Maheney had a
conflict of interest and was therefore ineligible to vote, thereby making
the vote two to one in favor of removal.
The absent director subsequently returned and at a later board
meeting voted to rescind the prior action and to reinstate Maheney as
President. This motion carried three to two. The plaintiffs then filed an
action, which for the most part was derivative in nature, seeking judicial
removal of Maheney and charging gross mismanagement and breach of
fiduciary duty. The Supreme Judicial Court of Maine upheld the trial
court's action in dismissing the causes of action relating to the removal of
Maheney on the grounds that under Maine law Maheney was entitled to
vote on his own dismissal as an officer, and the court had no inherent
equitable power to remove a director or officer in the absence of proof of
fraud.270 Moreover, the court upheld the dismissal of all the remaining
derivative causes of action based on mismanagement, diversion of corpo-
rate opportunities, and waste, primarily because the plaintiffs had failed
to meet the statutory pleadings requirements for derivative actions and
had also failed to make a proper demand on the corporation prior to filing
the action. 271 The court did, however, reverse the trial court's dismissal of
Count VI of the Complaint which alleged a breach of fiduciary duty
involving the reduction of Danville Webber's salary and dividends; but it
did not reinstate an injunction issued by the lower court keeping
Webber's salary at its prior level pending a trial on the merits.272
Many of the procedural difficulties encountered in these three cases
would not have existed had the complaints been brought as involuntary
dissolution suits in which the corporation and all the shareholders were
parties. In fact, in Landorff v. Glottstein,273 the court observed that the
270 Id. at 1221. Cf. Cressy v. Shannon Continental Corp., 378 N.E.2d 941, 946 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1978)(court has no inherent power in a breach of fiduciary duty case to order
amendment of articles of incorporation changing voting stock to nonvoting stock). But see
Zion v. Kurtz, 50 N.Y.2d 92, 428 N.Y.S.2d 199, 405 N.E.2d 681 (1980)(a court has the power
to amend the articles of incorporation to validate a shareholder agreement).
271 495 A.2d at 1221-23.
272 495 A.2d at 1224-25. In addition, the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine reversed the
dismissal of a cause of action by Webber against the trustees of a voting agreement trust
that held a majority of the shares. Id. at 1223-24. This cause of action was also based on a
breach of fiduciary duty theory.
273 500 N.Y.S.2d 494, 496-97 (Sup. Ct. 1986).
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facts presented precisely the type of situation the New York close
corporation involuntary dissolution statutes were designed to remedy.27 4
Moreover, the possibility of court-ordered dissolution provides additional
leverage for a plaintiff to bargain for a buy-out or other satisfactory
settlement of the action that does not exist in these other types of suits.
This does not mean that all suits involving oppression and related
claims should be cast solely as involuntary dissolution suits. As was
pointed out in Part II,275 involuntary dissolution suits have significant
shortcomings, especially in states having statutes that create severe
procedural limitations to such suits or caselaw that indicates a reluctance
to grant relief other than dissolution. It is also easier to recover attorneys'
fees in certain other types of actions, particularly in derivative actions, 276
and treble damages may be recoverable for some statutory causes of
action such as the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act
(RICO)277 and federal and state unfair trade practice and anti-trust
statutes.278 Therefore, in order to maximize the possibilities of recovery,
frequently the most advisable course of action is to join one or more
additional causes of action to an involuntary dissolution complaint.279
274 N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 1104-a, 1118 (McKinney 1986). These provisions are discussed
supra, notes 62-64, 112-17, 194-96 and accompanying text. Interestingly, the Maine
involuntary dissolution statute does not contain an oppression provision. See ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 13A, § 1111 (1981). Perhaps this is the reason Webber v. Webber Oil Company,
discussed supra notes 269-72 and accompanying text was based exclusively on other causes
of actions. See also supra notes 245-54 and accompanying text.
271 See supra notes 33-117 and accompanying text.
271 See LAWS OF CORPORATIONS, supra note 44, § 377; ALI PUNCIPLES OF CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE, supra note 257, §7.17. As a general rule, in the absence of statutory authority,
courts are very reluctant to award attorneys' fees in any corporate shareholder dispute
other than a derivative action. See, e-g., Baker v. Pratt, 176 Cal. App. 370, 222 Cal. Rptr.
253, 257-59 (1986). See also supra notes 97-100 and accompanying text. An increasing
number of statutes specifically authorize recovery of attorneys' fees. See, e.g., S.C. CODE
ANN. § 39-5-140 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1985)(state unfair trade practices act).
277 18 U.S.C. 88 1961-68. (Law. Co-op. 1979).
278 See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-5-140 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1985).
279 Although older cases ruled that direct actions such as a breach of fiduciary duty claim
and an involuntary dissolution claim could not be joined with a derivative cause of action,
the trend is toward allowing joinder, at least during the initial stages of the ligitation. See
Welch, supra note 257, at 193-94; LAWS OF COsPORATIONS, supra note 44, § 368. Joinder of
other causes of action with involuntary dissolution suits is quite common. See, e.g.,
Hackbart v. Holmes, 675 F.2d 1114 (10th Cir. 1982); Meiselman v. Meiselman, 309 N.C.
279, 307 S.E.2d 551 (1983). But see infra note 281. A final order on one of the causes of action
may, however, have an impact on the others. See Miller v. Ruth's of North Carolina, Inc., 69
N.C. App. 672, 318 S.E.2d 2 (1984)(court ordered a buy-out in involuntary dissolution suit
but mooted derivative cause of action because facts giving rise to derivative action took
place after the date established by the court for purchase of the plaintiffs shares).
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Finally, in states like Ohio28O and Massachusetts 281 where involuntary
dissolution by minority shareholders is virtually impossible because of
overly restrictive statutes, plaintiffs will have to rely exclusively on the
other types of actions. 282
280 The Ohio Business Corporate Code only authorizes involuntary dissolution upon the
petition of one-half the directors or the holders of one-half of the voting stock in a deadlock
situation unless the articles of incorporation otherwise provide. OHio REV. CODE ANN. §
1701.91(A)(4)(Page 1985). Two cases have held that this statute is preemptive and courts
have no inherent equitable power to dissolve an Ohio corporation. Schrage v. Portsmouth
Steel Corp., 207 F.2d 497 (6th Cir. 1953); Shearer v. Union Mortgage Co., 78 Ohio App. 373,
162 N.E. 696 (1928).
21 Under MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 156B § 99 (Michie/Law. Co-op. 1970), an involuntary
dissolution suit must be filed as an original action in the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts. Therefore, it is impossible to join an involuntary dissolution action with any
other type of claim since all other claims must be filed in the superior court or some other
trial court. See Cain v. Cain, 3 Mass. App. 467, 334 N.E.2d 650 (1975). See also Alkire v.
Interstate Theatres Corp., 379 F. Supp. 1210 (D. Mass. 1974)(state statute is exclusive). The
Massachusetts involuntary dissolution statute is also restrictive in other respects. For
example, except when the corporation is deadlocked, only holders of at least fifty percent of
the stock can petition for involuntary dissolution, unless the articles of incorporation
otherwise provide. See Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co. of New England, Inc., 367 Mass.
578, 328 N.E.2d 505, 514-15 (1975); Drury v. Abdallah, 9 Mass. App. 865, 401 N.E.2d 154
(1980).
282 Interestingly, courts in the states with the most restrictive involuntary dissolution
statutes appear to be the most receptive to granting remedies for close corporation
intracorporate dissension on a breach of fiduciary duty theory. This is particularly evident
in Massachusetts. See Donahue v. Rodd Electrotye Co. of New England, Inc., 367 Mass. 578,
328 N.E.2d 505 (1975); Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 370 Mass. 842, 353 N.E.2d
657 (1976); Cain v. Cain, 3 Mass. App. 467, 334 N.E.2d 650 (1975); Hallahan v. Haltom
Corp., 7 Mass. App. 68, 385 N.E.2d 1033 (1979); Smith v. Atlantic Properties, Inc., 12 Mass.
App. 201, 422 N.E.2d 798 (1981). Two recent Ohio cases endorse the strict fiduciary duty
concept enunciated in the Massachusetts case. See Soulas v. Troy Donut University, Inc., 9
Ohio App. 3d 339, 460 N.E.2d 310 (1983); Estate of Schroer v. Stamco Supply, Inc., 19 Ohio
App. 3d 34, 482 N.E.2d 975 (1984).
At the present time, however, the scope of the fiduciary duty cause of action and the
remedies that can be awarded by a court in such an action are unclear. In the leading case
of Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co. of New England, Inc., supra, the Supreme Judicial Court
of Massachusetts made two major holdings: (1) shareholders in a closely-held corporation
have a strict ficuciary duty to one another similar to the fiduciary duty among general
partners in a partnership; and (2) minority shareholders are entitled to the same rights as
the majority shareholders to the corporation's assets and therefore if a close corporation
purchases shares from a member of the controlling group, it must also purchase an equal
pro rata number of shares from the minority shareholders at the same price. See generally
Bulloch, Heightened Fiduciary Duties in Closely Held Corporations: Donahue Revisited, 16
PAC. L.J. 935 (1985); Johnson, Strict Fiduciary Duty in Close Corporations: A Concept in
Search of Adoption, 18 CAL. W. L. REV. 1 (1982); Note, The Strict Good faith
Standard Fiduciary Duties to Minority Shareholders in Close Corporations, 33 MERCER L.
REV. 595 (1982).
In subsequent cases, however, the Massachusetts courts appear to have modified the
strict fiduciary duty concept. In Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 370 Mass. 842, for
example, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that the strict fiduciary duty
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V. CONCLUSION
Involuntary dissolution suits have proven to be an effective method of
resolving protracted close corporation dissension that cannot be resolved
amicably. For the most part, courts have done a highly credible job of
fashioning remedies that are tailored to the specific factual situation
presented.
Judges have consistently viewed dissolution as a last resort remedy
that should only be ordered when there is an irreconcilable deadlock or
standard is satisfied if the majority shareholders prove a legitimate business purpose for the
challenged action and the minority shareholders fail to prove that an alternative course of
action could have achieved the same business objective with less harm to the minority. See
also Leader v. Hycor, Inc., 395 Mass. 215, 479 N.E.2d 173 (1985). As modified, the Donahue
strict fiduciary duty concept is not substantively very different from the more traditional
fiduciary duties of good faith and fair dealing that apply to corporate directors, officers and
controlling shareholders. See generally LAWS OF CORPORATIONS, supra note 44 §§ 173, 235-41,
268; O'NEAL'S OPPRESSION OF MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS, supra note 1, § 7:17. One major
difference may be that the Donahue fiduciary duty concept focuses more on the potential
harm to a minority shareholder regardless of the inherent fairness of the challenged
transaction to the corporation, whereas, under the more traditional corporate rules relating
to conflict of interest, a transaction will be upheld if those persons having a conflict of
interest prove the fairness of the transaction to the corporation. See Johnson, supra p. 21-25.
In the recent case of Horizon House-Microwave, Inc. v. Bazzy, 21 Mass. App. 190, 486
N.E.2d 70 (1985), however, the Appeals Court of Massachusetts seemingly ignored this
distinction in upholding a freeze-out triangular merger that had the effect of substantially
diluting the equity of a minority shareholder in the parent corporation.
The Donahue equal opportunity doctrine has also proven to be more limited than many
commentators originally thought. Some cases have rejected the per se equal opportunity
doctrine altogether with respect to corporate redemptions. See Toner v. Baltimore Envelope
Co., 304 Md. App. 256, 498 A.2d 642 (1985). Even those courts that have endorsed the
Donahue rationale have limited it to cases where there is no shareholder buy-out agreement
and the corporation has purchased stock from a majority shareholder and subsequently has
refused to purchase stock from a minority shareholder. See Comolli v. Comolli, 241 Ga. 471,
246 S.E.2d 278 (1978); Tillis v. United Parts, Inc., 395 So. 2d 618 (Fla. App. 1981); Estate
of Schroer v. Stamco Supply, Inc., 19 Ohio App. 3d 34, 482 N.E.2d 975 (1984). It does not
apply if the corporation has never purchased any shares from the majority shareholders. See
Corlett, Killian, Hardeman, McIntosh and Levi, P.A. v. Merritt, 478 So, 2d 828 (Fla, App.
1985); Goode v. Ryan, 397 Mass, 85, 489 N.E.2d 1001 (1986). Compare, e.g., Stefano v.
Coppock, 705 P.2d 443 (Alaska 1985)(buy-out of shares ordered in an involuntary dissolu-
tion suit). Nor does it apply to any corporate repurchases made pursuant to a shareholder
buy-out agreement or pursuant to the articles of incorporation or bylaws. See Donahue v.
Electrolyte Co. of New England, Inc., 367 Mass. at 598, 328 N.E.2d at 518 n.24. Moreover,
it does not apply to intra-shareholder sales. See Zidell v. Zidell, Inc., 277 Or. 413, 560 P.2d
1086 (1977); Johns v. Caldwell, 601 S.W.2d 37 (Tenn. App. 1980). Furthermore, most courts
have refused to apply the equal opportunity rule to allow minority shareholders equal
rights to sell shares to third parties or to share in any control premium received by the
majority shareholders for the sale of their share. See, e.g., Clagett v. Hutchison, 583 F.2d
1259, 1263-64 (4th Cir. 1978); Glass v. Glass, 228 Va. 39, 321 S.E.2d 69 (1984). Contra
Forinash v. Daughetry, 697 S.W.2d 294 (Mo. App. 1985). In other words, the Donahue equal
opportunity doctrine, as applied by the courts, provides a buy-out remedy in only a very
narrow band of cases.
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proof of high-handed, egregious conduct by a dominating shareholder. In
recent year, however, judges have been more willing than in the past to
order a buy-out or other less severe remedy although the case is cast as
an involuntary dissolution action.
Even though judges have shown more flexibility in the types of relief
they award, they still require substantial evidence of serious wrongdoing
by one side or the other as a precondition to granting relief. A judge is
unlikely to grant dissolution or any other relief where the proof shows
mere policy differences or transitory grievances unaccompanied by evi-
dence of protracted oppressive action or other improper conduct. 28 3 This is
particularly true in situations where the plaintiffs own actions have
caused or contributed to the dissension that underlies the lawsuit. For
example, dissolution has been denied in several cases where a minority
shareholder was dismissed for cause or engaged in some other improper
conduct.28 4 As was stated in the leading case of In re Kemp & Beatley, Inc.:
283 See the discussion of In re Dubonnet Scarfs, Inc, 105 App. Div. 2d 339, 484 N.Y.S.2d
541 (1985) and Coduti v. Hellwig, 127 Ill. App. 3d 279, 82 Ill. Dec. 686, 469 N.E.2d 220
(1984) supra notes 235-44 and accompanying text. This result is reinforced (1) by statutes
that seem to require proof of oppression directed against the shareholder, (2) the "fault"
basis that underlies breach of fiduciary duty claims, and (3) the allocation of the burden of
proof to the plaintiff in intra-shareholder dispute litigation. See, e.g., Meiselman v.
Meiselman, 309 N.C. 279, 307 S.E.2d 551 (1983); Jaffe Commercial Finance Co. v. Harris,
119 Ill. App. 3d 136, 74 Ill. Dec. 722, 456 N.E.2d 224 (1983).
21 See Capitol Toyota, Inc. v. Gervin, 381 So. 2d 1038 (Miss. 1980)(dismissal for cause);
Exadaktilos v. Cinnaminson Realty Co., 167 N.J. 141, 400 A.2d 554 (1979)(incompetence);
Mardilos v. Arger, 116 Misc. 2d 1028, 457 N.Y.S.2d 371 (1982)(shareholder and sons, who
were also employees of the corporation, surreptitiously started up a competing business).
Perhaps the most flagrant case is Smith-Shrader Co. v. Smith, 136 Ill. App. 3d 571, 91 Ill.
Dec. 1, 483 N.E.2d 283 (1985) where a fifty percent shareholder, after a policy dispute with
the other fifty percent shareholder, enticed the corporation's customers to do business with
him in a new competing corporation. When sued for breach of fiduciary duty and tortious
interference with business relations, he counterclaimed for involuntary dissolution. Not
only did the trial judge dismiss the involuntary dismissal claim, but he also authorized a
forfeiture of all salary recieved by the competing shareholder from the corporation after he
began negotiating with its customers, imposed a constructive trust on all profits made by
the competing corporation, enjoined the shareholder and his new corporation from doing
any business with the customers of his former employer for five years, and awarded
attorneys' fees and punitive damages to the other shareholder.
Sometimes courts have awarded limited relief in these types of cases. Gimpel v. Bolstein,
125 Misc. 2d 45, 477 N.Y.S.2d 1014 (1984), discussed supra notes 201-210 and accompany-
ing text is an example. See also Wolff v. Wolff, 67 N.Y. 638, 499 N.Y.S.2d 665, 490 N.E.2d
532 (1986)(huy-out of a shareholder who had misappropriated corporate property and
started a competing business affirmed); Mardikos v. Arger, 457 N.Y.S.2d 371 (corporation
ordered to continue paying plaintiff the same salary and other benfits as the other two
shareholders so long as the plaintiff ceased to engage in competition with the corporation;
and plaintiffs sons ordered to be rehired by the corporation if they ceased competition). Cf.
Exadaktilos v. Cinnaminson Realty Co., Inc., 167 N.J. 140 (although involuntary dissolu-
tion was denied on the grounds the plaintiff's employment had been properly terminated,
the case was remanded for a hearing on other grievances which might justify some relief).
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[t]he purpose of th[e] involuntary dissolution statute is to provide
protection to the minority shareholder whose reasonable expec-
tations in undertaking the venture have been frustrated and who
has no adequate means of recovering his or her investment. It
would be contrary to this remedial purpose to permit its use by
minority shareholders as merely a coercive tool .... Therefore,
the minority shareholder whose own acts, made in bad faith and
undertaken with a view toward forcing an involuntary dissolu-
tion, give rise to the complained-of oppression should be given no
quarter in the statutory protection. 285
The probability that courts will render just decisions in cases involving
close corporation shareholder dissension will be enhanced if the statutory
framework for such suits is improved. Three types of reforms are needed.
First, oppression or some equivalent term such as unfairly prejudicial
conduct should be included in every involuntary dissolution statute.
286
The growth in the number of cases decided on oppression grounds in
recent years is phenomenal. 28 7 The increased acceptance of the frustra-
tion of reasonable expectations doctrine as the basis for a finding of
oppression is a very significant development in corporate law. 28 8 This
doctrine is particularly effective in squeeze-outs where a shareholder who
reasonably expected to be permanently employed by the corporation is
fired without cause, the corporation pays little or no dividends, and there
is no contractual buy-out agreement that will enable the shareholder to
liquidate his or her shares. The reasonable expectations doctrine will
continue to play an important role in future oppression cases of all
types.28 9
285 64 N.Y.2d 63, 74, 484 N.Y.S.2d 799, 806,473 N.E.2d 1173, 1180 (1984). See alsoIn re
John J. McClure Agency, Inc., 15 Pa. D & C3d 677, 680 (Pa. Super. 1980)('"The evidence
shows that a deadlock exists, but has been entirely caused by petitioner. Petitioner cannot
simply cause a deadlock for the sole purpose of dissolving an otherwise viable and
prospering corporation.") Frequently, the equitable doctrine of "unclean hands" will be
asserted by the defendants against the plaintiff. The courts have generally held that this
doctrine will bar relief only when the plaintiffs wrongdoing amounts to fraud or bad faith
against the corporation or other shareholders in the transactions leading to the lawsuit. See,
e.g., Knaebel v. Heiner, 663 P.2d 551 (Alaska 1983); Jaffe Commercial Finance Co. v.
Harris, 119 Ill. App. 3d 136, 456 N.E.2d 224 (1983)(evidence indicated that the plaintiff,
when the other two shareholders refused to give in to his demands respecting a proposed
merger, had threatened to file a dissolution suit and told the other two shareholders the suit
would have a chilling effect on the corporation's lines of credit).
28. See supra notes 42-61, 245-54 and accompanying text.
287 See O'NEAL'S OPPRESSION OF MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS, supra note 1, p. iii.
288 See supra notes 47-55 and accompanying text.
289 At the present time much of the rationale for the reasonable expectations doctrine has
been based on analogizing close corporations to partnerships. This analogy was used in
Ebrahimi v. Westbourne Galleries, Ltd., [1972] 2 All E.R. 492 (H.L.), the first case to
formally adopt the reasonable expectations theory. The partnership analogy was also used
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Courts in states that do not authorize involuntary dissolution for
to justify the imposition of a strict fiduciary duty on close croporations shareholders in the
famous American case of Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co. of New England, Inc., 367 Mass.
578, 328 N.E.2d 505 (1975), discussed supra notes 45-46 and accompanying text and note
282.
Although it is helpful in describing the necessity for a harmonious relationship between
the shareholders who are actively engaged in the day-to-day management of a closely held
corporation, the partnership analogy is incomplete and can lead to undesirable results. See
generally Easterbrook & Fischel, Close Corporations andAgency Costs, 38 STAN. L. REV. 271,
297-99 (1986); Hillman, The Dissatisfied Participant in the Solvent Business Venture: A
Consideration of the Relative Permanence of Partnerships and Close Corporations, 67 MINN.
L. REV. 1, 63-75 (1982); Note, Relief to Oppressed Minorities in Close Corporations:
Partnership Precepts and Related Considerations, 1974 ARiz. ST. L. REV. 409.
For example, under the Uniform Partnership Act any general partner can dissolve a
partnership at any time with or without cause. The dissolving partner may be liable for
damages to his fellow partners and may not be able to recover any goodwill value of his
interest if the remaining partners agree to continue the business. Nevertheless he or she
has the right to force a technical dissolution at will and if the business is continued it is
technically a new partnership. Uniform Part. Act §§ 31, 37-40 (1914). This dissolution right
of general partners is based on the unlimited liability of each partner for the acts of.all other
partners in the conduct of the business, contrary to a corporation where limited liability of
a shareholder is a fundamental precept. Employing the partnership dissolution concept to
all close corporations would in effect give every shareholder a cash-out "put" and make
dissolution the norm rather than the exception, contrary to all existing case law. The
inappropriateness of such a result was recently recognized in In re a Company, [1983] 2 All
E.R. 854, 860-62 (Ch. Div.) where the court held that shareholders in a close corporation do
not expect they will have the dissolution rights of a partner, but on the contrary reasonably
expect that they will have to apply to a court for relief and will be granted dissolution only
if they have been wronged and there is no other appropriate relief available.
Note also that the death of a general partner automatically dissolves a general
partnership. See Uniform Part. Act § 31(4)(1914). If this rule were applied to close
corporations, the estate of a deceased shareholder could automatically have the corporation
dissolved if the decedent's shares were not purchased even though there was no buy-out
agreement and the shareholders had never purchased the shares of any other shareholder.
Even the most liberal states like Massachusetts have rejected this result. See Goode v.
Ryan, 397 Mass. 85, 489 N.E.2d 1011 (1986). See also supra note 282. In this connection,
giving a shareholder a no fault cash-out/dissolution right based on a partnership model as
advocated by some commentators (see Hetherington & Dooley, supra note 145, at 32-62)
would in effect give shareholders in a closely held corporation greater rights than
shareholders in a publicly held corporation. A shareholder of IBM can sell his shares on the
open market; but he or she cannot force IBM to buy those shares or be liquidated.
There are also other important fundamental differences between partnerships and
corporations. By statute, unless the partnership agreement otherwise provides, each
general partner is entitled to participate in the management of a partnership and votes are
cast on a per capita rather than a per share basis. Uniform Part. Act § 18(e), (h) (1914).
While equal management rights may be the "reasonable expectation" of the shareholders
who hold an equal number of shares and intend to be active in the management of the
corporation, they are not "reasonable expectations" for passive inactive shareholders. See In
re Fildes Bros., Ltd., [1970] 1 All E.R. 923, 925-28 (Ch. Div.)(refusal to hire brother who for
many years had been a passive shareholder not actionable).
From a legal theory standpoint, a firmer foundation for the reasonable expectations
doctrine is basic contract law principles under which a court will fill in "missing" terms once
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minority shareholder oppression have often dismissed the action unless
the facts can somehow be construed to constitute deadlock. Some courts,
however, have granted relief on other grounds, principally breach of
fiduciary duty. For reasons discussed in Part IV, however, involuntary
dissolution suits are often a more satisfactory manner in which to litigate
all of the issues involved. 290
Second, the statutes should specify a laundry list of other types of relief
that can be granted by a judge; and in the case of a court-ordered buy-out,
should give the judge the authority to authorize installment sales, a
covenant not to compete and other terms normally found in a close
corporation contractual buy-out agreement. 29 1 The deficiencies in many
of the existing buy-out statutes referred to in Part II need to be
corrected. 292 The statutes should also deal specifically with the allocation
of costs, including attorneys' fees and experts' fees, and prejudgment
interest.
2 93
Finally, close corporation relief statutes should be recast so that
involuntary dissolution is specified to be the last resort remedy rather
than the primary relief. Most of the existing statutes, including those
specifically authorizing other types of relief, are entitled "Judicial
the judge is convinced the parties intended to have a binding contract. See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) CONTRACTS §§ 110-50 (statute of frauds), 205-23 (duty of good faith and fair dealing,
usage of trade and course of dealing and parol evidence)(1984). See also id. § 90 (detrimental
reliance). This "gap filling" technique is particularly evident in the Uniform Commercial
Code. See, e.g., U.C.C. §§ 2-201, 2-204, 2-208. See generally, Hawkland, Sales Contract
Terms Under the UCC, 17 U.C.C.L.J. 195 (1985). By analogy, parol evidence (the oral
"reasonable expectations") as well as course of dealing and course of performance should be
admissible to supplement the basic written "agreement" among the shareholders (the
articles of incorporation, bylaws, any shareholder's agreement, etc.). Cf. U.C.C. § 1-
201(3)("agreement" means "the bargain of the parties in fact as found in their language or
by implication from other circumstances including course of dealing or usage of trade or
course of performance .... ").
The "contract" theory has been used by many courts to enforce oral agreements between
shareholders in a closely held corporation independently of the reaonable expectations
theory. See the cases cited supra note 51. See also, e.g., Wasserman v. Rosegarden, 84 Ill.
App. 3d 713, 406 N.E.2d 131 (1980)(oral agreement that salaries and dividends would be
equal even though stock ownership was unequal enforced); Schraft v. Leis, 236 Kan. 28,686
P.2d 685 (1984)(oral agreement with respect to salaries enforced). The shareholder seeking
to enforce the oral agreement would have the burden of proving the existence of the
agreement by clear and convincing evidence. See, e.g., Meiselman v. Meiselman, 309 N.C.
279, 307 S.E.2d 551 (1983); Allen v. Royale "16", Inc., 449 So. 2d 1365 (La. App. 1984); Jaffe
Commercial Finance Co. v. Harris, 119 Ill. App. 3d 136, 74 Ill. Dec. 722, 456 N.E.2d 224
(1983). Several courts have held that the plaintiff failed to meet this burden of proof. See,
e.g., Allen v. Royale "16", Inc., 449 So. 2d 1365 and Jafee v. Commercial Finance Co. v.
Harris, 119 Ill. App.3d 136.
290 See supra notes 255-72 and accompanying text.
291 See supra notes 68-74, 101-11 and accompanying text.
292 See supra notes 75-117 and accompanying text.
293 See supra notes 93-100 and accompanying text.
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Dissolution."294 Given this framework, many courts have taken the
overly restrictive position that no relief of any kind can be granted unless
the court was satisfied that dissolution was justified.2 95 This direct
linkage was broken in the 1980 English Companies Act with the adoption
of Section 75, which replaced former Section 210.296 The tiered remedial
scheme in the Model Business Corporation Act Statutory Close Corpora-
tion Supplement, which is described in Section II, also accomplishes this
result.297
Another reason for eliminating the existing statutory emphasis on
involuntary dissolution is to reduce somewhat that threat to the majority
shareholders presented by suits demanding involuntary dissolution.
Faced with the tax and other adverse consequences of a potential
liquidation, the majority may feel compelled to settle with the plaintiff on
terms that, in effect, amount to minority oppression. 298 If this is true, a
persuasive argument can be made that the present statutory formulation
gives the minority too powerful a bargaining weapon to hold over the
heads of the majority. Making dissolution by statute the last resort
remedy to be ordered only if all other possibilities of resolving the
dissension have failed changes somewhat the relative bargaining posi-
tion of the parties. Since dissolution will be a possibility, however, a
minority shareholder will still have effective bargaining leverage. In
addition, a court can use the threat of dissolution as well as the authority
to award attorneys' fees and other costs as leverage to assure that the
majority shareholders bargain in good faith. Moreover, a court can also
use its discretion to award attorneys' fees and costs as a means of
discouraging frivolous or groundless suits by minority shareholders.
Even with these statutory improvements, litigation to resolve close
corporation shareholder dissension will continue to be expensive, time-
294 See, e.g., MBCA, supra note 31 § 14.30; S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-21-150 (Law. Co-op Supp.
1985)("Dissolution Pursuant to Court Order").
295 This judicial attitude was particularly evident in the interpretation of Section 210 of
the 1948 English Companies Act. See O'NEAL'S OPPRESSION OF MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS, supra
note 1, § 10:12.
... ENGLISH CoMPANIE ACT 1980, § 75. See O'NEAL'S OPPRESSION OF MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS,
supra note 1, § 10:13.
297 See MCBA Stat. Close Corp. Supp., supra note 69, §§ 41-43, discussed supra notes
69-74 and accompanying text. Texas and Wisconsin (which has adopted the MBCA
Statutory Close Corporation Supplement) have adopted statutes allowing direct actions
against close corporations and their shareholders without having to prove specific grounds
for involuntary dissolution. See TEx. Bus. CORP. ACT. ANN. art. 12.51-.54 (Vernon 1986
Supp.); WIS. STAT. § 180.995(19)(Supp. 1985).
29. See Hetherington, The Minority's Duty of Loyalty in Close Corporation, 1972 DuKE
L.J. 921. Although rare, cases granting relief for minority oppression of majority share-
holders do exist. See, e.g., Smith v. Atlantic Properties, Inc., 12 Mass. App. 201, 422 N.E.2d
798 (1981)(minority shareholder who refused to vote in favor of dividend distributions
assessed personally the accumulated earnings tax penalties imposed on the corporation).
[Vol. 35:25
66https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol35/iss1/5
INVOLUNTARY DISSOLUTION SUITS
consuming and a high risk venture for both sides.299 Neither side can
predict the eventual outcome; and even if the plaintiff prevails, the relief
ordered by the judge may be different from what the plaintiff wanted. 300
Furthermore, the likelihood of reversal on the merits on appeal is small
because of the broad discretion vested in the trial judge. This uncertainty
provides an incentive for both sides to negotiate a settlement before the
trial judge issues a final order. An astute judge can and should facilitate
this settlement process.
The various non-litigation dispute resolution devices described in part
I also present potential problems.30 ' A broad buy-out arrangement
covering most situations that are likely to create dissension is the most
logical solution, but in many situations will be impractical because of the
expense. 302 The alternative involving third parties acting as decision
makers in place of the shareholders and directors also present serious
practical problems. 30 3 Perhaps the best solution from a corporate plan-
ning perspective is to utilize as broad a buy-out as the corporation and
shareholders can reasonably afford combined with arbitration as a
prerequisite for any court action. 30 4
When a major intra-corporate dispute arises, the best advice a lawyer
representing the majority shareholders can give is to recommend that
they refrain from taking any action that can give ammunition to the
minority to claim oppression or fraud.30 5 A proper paper trail justifying
299 See, e.g., Orchard v. Covelli, 590 F. Supp. 1548 (W.D. Pa. 1984)(buy-out price of
$354,447 plus seven years of prejudgment interest totalling $163,690); Stefano v. Coppock,
705 P.2d 443 (Alaska 1985)(buy-out price of $32,000, prejudgment interest from 1974 of
$23,431 plus attorneys' fees of $20,000).
300 See, e.g., Schaub v. Kortgard, 372 N.W.2d 427 (Minn. App. 1985)(plaintiff wanted to
buy the defendant's stock by the court ordered him to sell his stock to the defendant).
301 See supra notes 2-26 and accompanying text.
302 To provide protection against all contingencies, the buy-out agreement would have to
cover death, permanent disability, termination of management responsibilities, divorce and
bankruptcy. See ORGANIZING A SMALL BUSINESS ENTITY, supra note 2, § 5.04(c)(3). Depending
on whether the buy-out plan created a mandatory purchase right or merely an option to
purchase, the potential financial strain on the corporation and remaining shareholders of
such a plan could be tremendous.
303 See supra notes 2-19 and accompanying text.
34 Depending on the wording of an arbitration clause, the filing of an involuntary
dissolution suit in and of itself may not trigger arbitration. See e.g., In re Cohen, 183 Misc.
1034, 52 N.Y.S.2d 671 (1944), affd mem., 269 App. Div. 663, 53 N.Y.S.2d 467 (1945)(filing
of the suit is not a "dispute"). If the underlying dispute is one that is subject to arbitration,
courts will generally stay the dissolution proceeding pending the outcome of the arbitration.
See, e.g., Lehman v. Sage Metal Trading Corp., N.Y.L.J. Dec. 23, 1985, p. 11, col. 6; In re
Siegel, 80 Misc. 2d 255, 362 N.Y.S.2d 897 (1974). See generally O'Neal, CLOSE CORPOATInONS,
supra note 15, § 9.18; G. Wilner, DOMKE ON COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, § 13:02 (Rev. ed. 1984).
30' The absence of serious disciminatory action by the majority shareholder against a
minority shareholder after the dissension arises has been a major factor in several cases.
See, e.g., Coduti v. Hellwig, 127 Ill. App. 3d 279, 469 N.W.2d 220 (1984) discussed supra
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dismissal of a shareholder as an employee, officer, and director for
legitimate business reasons, (for example, incompetency), is extremely
important. A careful review of compensation and dividend policies with
the aim of being "fair" to the dismissed shareholder is also important.
Any substantial increase in the salaries and other benefits paid to the
remaining active shareholders after dismissing a shareholder employee
should be avoided unless the increases are clearly warranted. Finally, it
is very important to comply fully with all corporate formalities such as
notices of meetings. Allowing the minority reasonable access to all
corporate books and records required to be available for inspection is also
important.
Convincing the majority to make a "fair" offer to purchase the shares
of a disgruntled minority shareholder within a reasonable amount of time
after it is clear the dispute cannot be amicably resolved 30 6 is often
difficult, but in the long run may be in the best interests of all the
shareholders. It is certainly better than dissolution, especially if the
corporation is financially successful. It is also increasingly the most
likely remedy other than dissolution that a court will impose if litigation
ensues.30 7 So why risk a potential dissolution order, the time and expense
of a dissolution suit and the potential financial harm to the corporation
that can result from bitter, protracted litigation? Furthermore, a pre-
litigation buy-out offer at a reasonable price can be a positive factor in the
notes 239-44 and accompanying text. See also Mardikos v. Arger, 116 Misc. 2d 1028, 457
N.Y.S.2d 371 (1982)(plaintiff continued to receive the same salary and benefits as the other
two shareholders and continued to have full access to the corporation's office and records);
Zidell v. Zidell, Inc., 277 Or. 413, 560 P.2d 1086 (1977)(plaintiff left voluntarily after dispute
and no starvation tactics were used); Iwasaki v. Iwasaki Bros.,Inc., 58 Or. App. 543, 649
P.2d 598 (1982)(plaintiff left employment voluntarily and started a competing business).
General counsel for the corporation faces some difficult conflict of interest issues in the
event of shareholder dissension and litigation. See H. HAYNSWORTH, THE PROFESSIONAL SKILLS
OF THE SMALL BUSINESS LAYWER, § 2.02 (1984). The biggest danger is the failure to realize that
ethically, general counsel represents the corporation and not the shareholders individually.
Cf. Orchard v. Covelli, 590 F. Supp. 1548 (W.D. Pa. 1984), discussed supra notes 216-25 and
accompanying text (the court found "nothing laudable" in the lawyer's conduct but did not
impose any personal liability on him for his behavior in representing both the corporation
and a majority shareholder in a squeeze-out case).
'o The possibility of a non-taxable split off or split under I.R.C. § 355 should be explored.
Section 355 is often used as a means of resolving close corporation dissension. The statutory
requirements, however, are quite strict. Generally, two separate businesses, each of which
have been operated for five years, are necessary. See generally B. BrlrKER & J. EusTiCE,
FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS 13.01-13.15 (4th ed. 1979).
307 See supra notes 143-54 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 35:25
68https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol35/iss1/5
INVOLUNTARY DISSOLUTION SUITS
ultimate outcome of the case.308 It will at the least convince a judge not
to impose the plaintiffs' attorneys' fees as a sanction.309
Finally, a lawyer representing an aggrieved minority shareholder
must carefully analyze the applicable statutes and if the facts justify an
involuntary dissolution cause of action, the complaint should request that
the corporation be liquidated even if some other remedy is the client's
ultimate objective. Often because of statutory deficiencies or the partic-
ular facts, a complaint containing multiple causes of action will be
advisable. Pleading causes of action which are not justified by the facts,
however, is dangerous. Groundless pleadings are likely to have a nega-
tive effect on the trial judge and may result in sanctions.310 If a multiple
cause of action complaint is filed, the plaintiffs lawyer must be alert to
any procedural differences between the various types of action and the
potential impact a judgment on (or settlement of) one of the causes of
action will have on the remaining causes of action. 311
308 See, e.g., In re A Company [1983] 2 All. E.R. 854 (court ordered shares valued as of the
date of the court's judgment rather than the date of the oppression as a penalty for plaintiffs
refusal to accept a pre-litigation offer to have the shares appraised); Baker v. Commercial
Body Builders, Inc., 264 Or. 614, 507 P.2d 387 (1973)(pre-trail offer to minority shareholder
at one-half book value considered positively by court in decision denying relief); O'Farrell
v. Steel City Piping Co., 266 Pa. Super 219, 403 A.2d 1319 (Pa. Super. 1978)(plaintiff
rejected pre-litigation book value offer). A "bad faith" offer, however, can have a negative
effect on the outcome. See Stefano v. Coppock, 705 P.2d 443 (Alaska 1985), discussed supra
notes 230-34 and accompanying text.
309 Cf. In re A Company, supra note 308; Moore v. Carney, 84 Mich. App. 399, 269 N.W.2d
614 (1978)(court denied prejudgment interest because the plaintiff had rejected a pre-trial
offer for the same price ultimately determined to be the fair price).
310 See Orchard v. Covelli, 590 F. Supp. 1548, 1550 (W.D. Pa. 1984), discussed supra notes
216-25 and accompanying text where the court found "that the vast majority of Mr.
Orchard's claims are without merit and that the law does not recognize a right of recovery."
The court also observed that close corporation intra-shareholder dispute cases require a
"careful balance of equities" and that "[w]e are constrained to note here that the weight of
our responsibility has not been lightened by the manner in which plaintiff's counsel
presented his case." For a discussion of the increase in judicially imposed sanctions for
frivolous pleadings and related abuses, see, e.g., American Bar Association Section on
Litigation, SANCTIONs: RULE 11 AND OTHER PowERs (1986).
311 See supra notes 256-74 and accompanying text. See also Miller v. Ruth's of North
Carolina, Inc., 69 N.C. App. 672, 318 S.E.2d 2 (1984)(buy-out order barred other causes of
action including a derivative action); McLeod v. Stevens, 617 F.2d 1038 (4th Cir. 1980)(elec-
tion of remedies rule applied to deny recovery of punitive damages). Compare Humes v.
Margil Ventures, Inc., 174 Cal. App. 3d 486, 220 Cal. Rptr. 186 (1985)(suit for involuntary
dissolution and independent administrative action for termination of a contract held not to
be inconsistent causes of action requiring an election of remedies).
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